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This thesis examines the effect of a responsible investment index (FTSE4Good) on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the first study I investigate the impact of the 
FTSE engagement reinforced by the threat of exclusion from the index on 
companies’ improvements in environmental management. The results show that 
FTSE involvement doubles the probability that a company will meet stricter 
environmental management requirements within the three-year period 2002 to 2005. 
Both the dialogue and the exclusion threat stimulate compliance but the dialogue 
appears to be more effective where the perceived threat of exclusion is higher. The 
engagement effect persists for at least five years and is positively related to low 
concentrated ownership and to domicile in a coordinated market economy.  
In the second study I examine FTSE4Good’s effect on the probability that a 
company will implement strong countering bribery practices within the two-year 
time period 2007 to 2009. The results demonstrate that the combined effect of 
engagement and exclusion threat is significant in promoting compliance and the two 
act independently. Stronger anti-bribery provisions are positively associated with 
companies based in liberal market economies, with better internal governance and 
higher reputational concerns related to ethical controversies. 
 In the third study I investigate FTSE4Good’s impact on companies’ 
compliance with climate change criteria. The results show that the index is able to 
stimulate compliance and the dialogue appears to contribute more than the exclusion 
threat. I also find that the likelihood of the company adopting the required practices 
is negatively associated with concentrated ownership and with strong internal 
governance. Finally, the results offer some evidence that compliance is related to 
subsequent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.  
 These studies contribute to the understanding as to how different CSR areas 
are promoted or discouraged by the managers and the owners, and how the 
institutional environment influences this. The results are consistent with engagement 
via a responsible investment index being an effective means of large-scale collective 
monitoring by institutional investors. The findings are also relevant for policy 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis investigates whether a responsible investment index can be effective in 
instigating improvements in corporate social responsibility (CSR) among 
internationally diverse corporations. The engagement is performed by the index data 
provider but is influenced by different stakeholders including investment institutions. 
Institutional investors are putting increasing emphasis on companies’ environmental, 
social and governance performance (Cox et al., 2004; Kim & Lyon, 2007; O’Rourke, 
2003; Reid & Toffel, 2009). However, direct evidence of the effect of institutional 
engagement is limited and is more focused on corporate governance and operational 
improvements (e.g. Becht et al., 2009; Brav et al., 2008; Carleton et al., 1998; 
Thomas & Cotter, 2007; Klein & Zur, 2009) than corporate social responsibility 
(Dimson et al., 2012). Further, most evidence concerns publicly observable activism 
via shareholder proposals and voting rather than direct dialogue with management. In 
some instances private engagement by investment institutions is shown to be 
successful (Dimson et al., 2012; Gjessing & Syse, 2007), yet on the whole 
institutional ownership is not associated with enhanced CSR practices (Rees & 
Rodionova, 2012). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large blockholders have the 
incentives and the means to monitor management. Conversely, effective monitoring 
by institutions is shown to be constrained by a number of factors: the diversified 
character of their portfolios, agency problems including free-riding, noninvestor 
business ties with the portfolio firms, short-term investment focus, political motives, 
and the resulting costs (Becht et al., 2009; Brickley et al., 1988; Ryan & Schneider, 
2002). However, with the growth of institutional ownership (Aguilera et al., 2007; 
Ryan & Schneider, 2002) their capacity to challenge corporate practice has increased, 
and establishing effective activism on CSR has become a crucial issue.  
 
The thesis addresses this question by examining a particular strategy of private 
engagement by a responsible investment index that could be utilised by investment 
institutions. I use the case of FTSE4Good which engages in direct dialogue with 
companies regarding compliance with CSR criteria necessary for index membership. 
FTSE4Good is a stock-market index series introduced in 2001 and operated by FTSE 




potential membership as to whether they satisfy a set of established CSR criteria 
aiming to reflect good practice recognised by non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), CSR professionals and investors (FTSE, 2010). The criteria are finalised by 
an independent Policy Committee which consists of responsible investors, CSR and 
industry experts, and academics (FTSE, 2005). Every six months the committee 
assesses companies’ compliance with the criteria based on the research provided by a 
specialised non-profit research agency, the Ethical Investment Research Services 
(EIRIS). On the basis of these reviews, FTSE announces the names of the companies 
that have joined the index and those that have been deleted from it.  
 
Over the decade of its existence FTSE has developed and refined the inclusion 
criteria covering environmental management, human rights, countering bribery, 
supply chain labour standards and climate change (FTSE, 2010). The introduction of 
new themes and the upgrade of the existing criteria presented an interesting natural 
experiment. When the new or tightened criteria were introduced, FTSE informed 
member companies no longer meeting the new requirements of the changes and gave 
them a grace period to implement the needed practices. Over the whole period, FTSE 
engaged in extensive dialogue with management to facilitate improvements. The 
companies were also alerted about the potential public expulsion from the index at 
the end of the grace period if they failed to comply with the criteria. At the same 
time, companies that were not in the index had to meet the new criteria in full in 
order to be included. They did not receive any communication from FTSE nor did 
they face exclusion. This experimental setting offered the opportunity to assess 
whether the engagement reinforced by the threat of delisting from the index 
motivated management to adopt the required CSR practices and the way institutional 
environment and governance context affected compliance and the engagement. 
 
The empirical chapters of the thesis focus on three different CSR themes covered by 
the index: environmental management, controlling bribery and responding to climate 
change. According to agency theory, shareholder attitudes towards CSR proficiency 
ultimately depend on the net financial benefits from these activities (Clark & Hebb, 




different themes (Godfrey et al., 2009; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Sullivan & Mackenzie, 
2008). Environmental management, as a theme separate from climate change, has 
elements which are related to product innovation and operational efficiency (Melnyk 
et al., 2003) and issues benefitting the community rather than the firm such as 
pollution prevention. Here large undiversified investors are likely to resist excessive 
investment given that some activities are not aligned with their financial interests. 
More stakeholder-oriented institutional context may promote better environmental 
performance and the influence of strong internal governance will depend on the 
extent to which managers believe that environmental proficiency can be used to 
mitigate potential conflicts with different stakeholders including investors (Jo & 
Harjoto, 2011).  
 
Next, introducing practices to combat bribery is thought to enhance the relationship 
and trust between the firm and its business contacts including suppliers, employees 
and investors (Campbell, 2007; Gjessing & Syse, 2007; Rees & Mackenzie, 2011). 
Here the owners gain from the resulting business opportunities and the lower risks 
associated with higher transparency of the management’s activities, but they bear the 
costs related to contracts lost to an unethical competitor. Although owners do not 
bear the reputational risk from dishonest behaviour that managers do, they are 
affected by the financial risks associated with illegal activities and may therefore 
promote or discourage the anti-bribery initiatives depending on the net benefit 
(Ramdani & van Witteloostujn, 2012). The national environment which protects 
shareholder rights and exposes corruption by government officials is likely to 
promote countering bribery practices by firms (Treisman, 2000).  
 
Finally, developing strategies to reduce carbon footprint and mitigate the impact on 
climate change is largely an ‘external’ issue for the firm as these activities benefit the 
community (and the firm as a part of it) while the costs are borne by the owners 
(Rees & Rodionova, 2012). Managers may pursue these investments for ethical or 
strategic reasons, but owners are unlikely to favour expenditure on these projects. If 
the governance system is such that it ensures that managers are accountable to 




corporate strategy. However, if the institutional environment puts emphasis on the 
other stakeholders, management may respond more to their demands.  
 
Each of the empirical chapters is based on a different dataset. The case of 
environmental management offers the largest sample of 1,029 companies since all 
firms had to meet the criteria with the requirements varying according to the 
environmental risk. This setting is therefore used to establish the methodology which 
is then applied in subsequent studies. In particular, the quasi-experimental setting 
requires controlling for the differences between the treatment and the control group 
that would lead to sample selection bias and render the results regarding the effect of 
the engagement unreliable. I use two methods to address this issue. Firstly, in line 
with the general logic of Heckman’s two-stage estimation approach (Heckman, 
1976) I construct a measure reflecting the prior probability of the firm complying 
with the criteria. The rationale here is that firms in the treatment group would be 
more likely to meet the criteria since they had strong CSR commitment recognised 
by their initial membership in the index. Including this metric as an independent 
variable allows the additional testing of the impact of this probability on the 
efficiency of engagement. Secondly, following the same approach I model the prior 
probability of being included in the index. If a firm with certain characteristics is 
likely to be a member, it is presumably because there are net benefits, be they 
financial, reputational or strategic. Additionally, this would create stakeholder 
expectation of strong CSR as the norm (Campbell, 2007).  In this case exclusion 
from the index would be associated with costs. To the extent that this prior 
probability reflects the potential costs, this measure helps to disentangle the effect of 
the dialogue and the threat of exclusion from the index. Again, by including the 
interaction term between the engagement variable and the prior probability of being 
in the index I assess how the elements contributed to the effect of the index on CSR.  
 
To test the robustness of the findings, I use the propensity score matching approach 
which has been developed to assess the impact of treatment on the outcome in a non-
randomised experimental setting (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The idea behind the 




absence of treatment is unobservable, one can use a control group of non-participants 
whose pre-characteristics are similar to the treated cases. To do so, treatment and 
control cases are matched on their propensity to receive treatment based on those 
relevant characteristics (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Following this approach, I 
model the probability of the firm receiving engagement from FTSE as a function of 
the control variables used in the main regression analysis. This method allows me to 
test the robustness of the results of the regression approach and offers further 
evidence in the case of inconclusive findings.  
 
In short, the aim of the first study is to examine the impact of a responsible 
investment index on corporate environmental management practices, the combined 
effect of the engagement and the threat of exclusion from the index, the influence of 
both elements separately and the impact of concentrated equity ownership, 
institutional context and corporate governance. The study also investigates whether 
the FTSE effect was transitory or led to consistently higher improvements among 
engaged firms. The results show that, for a sample of 1,029 firms from 21 countries, 
the engagement allied to the threat of exclusion from the index has doubled the 
probability that a company failing to comply with the enhanced environmental 
management requirements in 2002 would meet the criteria by 2005. Both the 
dialogue and the threat of expulsion contribute to this effect but there is evidence to 
suggest that engagement works more efficiently when supported by the higher threat 
of exclusion. Additionally, the findings demonstrate that the higher compliance rate 
for the treated firms persisted for at least five years. Finally, the results suggest that 
compliance is positively related to lower levels of closely-held ownership and to 
firms residing in coordinated market economies.   
 
The aim of the second study is to investigate the impact of the FTSE engagement 
combined with the deletion threat on the companies’ adoption of a set of practices 
targeting prevention of bribery. The criteria applied to companies identified as 
having the highest exposure to illegal transactions based on the business sector, the 
country of operation and the reliance on government licences and contracts. For a 




motivating these companies to implement the required practices over the period 2007 
to 2009. The two drivers – engagement and the threat of exclusion – contributed to 
the outcome independently. Further, compliance is positively related to a high level 
of internal governance, domicile in a liberal market economy and reputational 
concerns associated with having experienced a prior ethical controversy. Finally, the 
findings offer some evidence that, while the dialogue is more effective in promoting 
compliance, peer pressure to be included in the index is also positively associated 
with FTSE’s assessment of best practice. 
 
The aim of the third study is to analyse the impact of index engagement reinforced 
by the threat of exclusion on corporate practices mitigating climate change. For a 
sample of 470 firms assessed as having a medium or high climate footprint, the 
results suggest that the index significantly increased the probability that a firm would 
develop the required climate change mitigating strategies within the two-year period 
2008 to 2010. The engagement tends to work particularly well where the expected 
index membership is lower. Further, compliance is negatively associated with 
strategic ownership and a strong corporate governance system. Finally, compliance 
with the FTSE4Good climate change criteria appears to correspond to enhanced 
efforts by the companies in subsequent emissions reduction.  
 
Taken together, the studies contribute to the governance theory and practice in 
several ways. Firstly, the findings add to the literature on what drives corporate 
social responsibility of firms. Prior work addressed this question mostly from an 
institutional (Campbell, 2007; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001; Neumayer & Perkins, 2004) or a resource perspective (Arora & Dharwadkar, 
2011; Hart, 1995; Stephan, 2002) rather than from an investor perspective. Investor 
influence on CSR is a growing but still an under-researched area (Cox et al., 2004; 
Sjöström, 2008). More specifically, environmental responsibility has previously been 
linked to industrial and financial characteristics of firms or institutional pressures 
from the government and NGOs (Bansal & Roth, 2000). Next, prior work on the 
drivers of ethical behaviour has predominantly established legal and cultural 




resources (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Chen et al., 2008; Hess & Ford, 2011; 
Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2012). Finally, much of the management literature on 
climate change focused on how proactive response to climate change can be 
beneficial for the company from the technological perspective (Lash & Wellington, 
2007). Yet there is sparse evidence of what drives management changes with regards 
to emission reduction strategies and the role of investors in particular (Reid & Toffel, 
2009).  
 
Consequently, this thesis adds to the limited knowledge on the investor influence on 
CSR practices in firms. More specifically, the findings further the understanding of 
the complex system of governance whereby equity investors, the firm’s internal 
governance structure, the institutional environment and the collective engagement by 
institutional investors all affect management’s decisions. The empirical results 
provide evidence of both agency and institutional matters influencing decision-
making regarding CSR performance. The focus of this thesis is predominantly on 
institutional investors who may want to promote enhanced CSR practices in firms. 
Agency theory implies that shareholders have to monitor and get actively involved in 
firm governance to influence management as managers may act in their own interests 
rather than in the interests of the owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Presumably not all financial institutions favour CSR investments 
because of pressure for short-term financial returns or lack of a clear ‘business case’ 
(Cox et al., 2004). However, those institutional investors who are motivated to 
promote CSR issues in companies are likely to be constrained by lack of power as a 
stakeholder (Mitchell et al., 1997) due to the often dispersed nature of their holdings, 
lack of technological expertise regarding CSR issues, e.g. environmental 
management, and costs of individual engagement (Gifford, 2010). Direct 
engagement has been promoted as a governance tool but has so far remained an 
under-researched topic (Dimson et al., 2012; Sjöström, 2008). While prior evidence 
suggests that management will tend to be prepared to discuss a CSR issue with 
investors, the effect of this engagement has not been established (Vandekerckhove et 
al., 2007). Consequently, the findings of this thesis make a contribution by 




responsible investment index reinforced by the threat of exclusion from the index.  
As the index incorporates stakeholder views on sound CSR practices and 
membership has thus reputational implications, this engagement strategy combines 
an investor monitoring mechanism advocated by the agency theory and the 
institutional forces that drive CSR improvements.  
 
Secondly, the three empirical studies add to the emerging arguments in the literature 
on the differences in CSR areas and the implications of such differences for 
investors’ and management’s behaviour (Cox et al., 2004). While the index 
engagement is found to be effective in all three CSR dimensions (environmental 
management, countering bribery and climate change), the findings show how the 
mediating impact on compliance and engagement of internal governance, ownership 
and institutional context varies across the three themes. The results therefore both 
highlight the importance of a finer differentiation between different CSR issues and 
demonstrate how investors can contribute to improvements in each of the themes. 
The results are consistent with higher governance levels and shareholder focus being 
related to better control over bribery. Where the benefits for the managers are 
personal or strategic, they will pursue such projects while blockholders will tend to 
obstruct these activities. Stronger alignment of the interests of managers and 
shareholders through the governance system is found to lead to lower investment in 
CSR where the benefits fall to society rather than the firm but the institutional 
context promoting the interests of stakeholders and the society is shown to encourage 
companies’ commitment to environment protection.  
 
Thirdly, the evidence presented in this thesis furthers the understanding as to how 
social activists can elicit social changes (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Reid & 
Toffel, 2009; Dimson et al., 2012). While the theoretical framework of social 
activism has been developed (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), the evidence of the use 
of such mechanisms by investors is scarce and is mostly related to shareholder 
resolutions (Reid & Toffel, 2009). Consequently, the thesis adds to this literature by 
demonstrating how engagement by a responsible investment index can be an 




approach to social issues. Consistent with the social activism framework, the 
dialogue between FTSE and the company raises awareness of the CSR issue in 
question and encourages its reconsideration in the firm while the threat of expulsion 
from the responsible investment index prompts changes in corporate behaviour by 
challenging the firm’s reputation and consequently its financial sustainability.  
 
Finally, the findings add to the governance literature discussing potential 
convergence of governance mechanisms across different countries (Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed. 2009). In particular, in the cases of all three CSR issues examined, FTSE 
engagement was conducted with internationally diverse samples of firms (e.g. 21 
countries in environmental management study). Consequently, the results highlight 
that such engagement strategy could be effective internationally. Although being 
domiciled in a liberal market economy or coordinated market economy is found to 
impact on compliance with the FTSE4Good criteria, the main effect of the index 
engagement remains both statistically and economically significant. Such approach 
to engagement is thus found to be an effective governance instrument for investors to 
monitor internationally diverse companies on their social and environmental 
performance. 
 
With regards to practice, the findings suggest that engagement via a responsible 
investment index reinforced by the threat of public exclusion from the index provides 
an effective route for large-scale collaborative investor activism on corporate social 
responsibility. Diversified institutions can consider such engagement as it allows the 
targeting of internationally and culturally diverse companies and consequently 
lowers the costs of individual monitoring and agency problems of free riding.  Policy 
makers can also promote engagement of this type to achieve social benefits. Further, 
the findings demonstrate that, whether in individual or collaborative engagement, the 
investors may wish to distinguish between different CSR issues and adjust their 
strategy accordingly. For example, in the case of environmental management they 
could explicitly promote a company’s membership in the index while in the case of 
controlling bribery they could particularly target companies from coordinated market 




initiatives such as the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment that also 
aims to bring about improvements in corporate social responsibility via direct 
engagement with corporations.  
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Firstly, I review the literature on the impact 
of active ownership on corporate performance and on corporate social responsibility 
in particular. Three empirical chapters follow examining the effect of the responsible 
investment index on environmental management, countering bribery and mitigating 
climate change respectively. I then review the findings to demonstrate the different 
influences of CSR proficiency and engagement across the three examined CSR 
themes. The thesis finishes with a conclusion.  
 
In the third empirical chapter I use the term ‘we’ instead of ‘I’. The rationale is that 
the third chapter is associated with a journal article published in 2013 in Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11(5): 495-512. This article is co-authored 
with my supervisors Prof Bill Rees and Dr Craig Mackenzie. In the two subsequent 
chapters I return to the term ‘I’ as my supervisors offered me guidance and insights 
but the work conducted is my own. These chapters will shortly be developed as 










In this chapter I review existing evidence on the role of the institutional investors in 
corporate governance and corporate social performance. Active ownership 
constitutes a major driver of corporate behaviour and as such is increasingly 
becoming the subject of interest for both academics and the investment community. 
Shareholder activism can be defined as “various actions undertaken by investors to 
influence corporate management and boards in order to make corporations change 
in corporate social responsibility (CSR) or improve their financial outcomes” 
(Chung & Talaulicar, 2010). Through active involvement with companies, investors 
aim to ensure that in a situation of agency conflicts management will make strategic 
decisions that deliver superior returns to shareholders, under the implicit assumption 
that an outperforming company ultimately benefits not only the owners but also the 
society at large.  
 
Shareholders have been shown to be targeting various aspects of corporate 
performance, e.g. business structure, accounting practices and corporate governance 
(Becht et al., 2009; Chung et al., 2002; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & 
Starks, 2007; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Starks, 2009; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). Another 
area of growing importance is corporate social responsibility which includes 
“actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm 
and that which is required by law” (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). The extent to 
which the roles in addressing social and environmental matters should be shared 
between governments and corporations has long been a subject of a heated debate. 
Yet what is undeniable is that these issues require action. While the implications of 
social and environmental problems for political and economic stability and 
consequently business environment should make the materiality of CSR apparent for 
investors, there is a large heterogeneity among them with regards to the costs and 
benefits of social and environmental investment and the strategies to influence 
management. Furthermore, because of its ethical implications, CSR can be used 




may therefore be viewed as an agency cost (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2010). Finally, corporate responsibility in itself is a broad amalgamation of 
specific issues which may trigger different reaction from the owners (Barnett, 2007; 
Rees & Mackenzie, 2011).  
 
Investment institutions are thought to be key actors in addressing corporate 
performance and corporate social responsibility in particular given their growing 
ownership (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Ryan & Schneider, 2002), large portfolios of 
‘universal owners’ (Gjessing & Syse, 2007) and their fiduciary duty to deliver not 
only competitive but also robust long-term returns (Kiernan, 2007). In the following 
review I find that some shareholders engage in active monitoring, both via private 
negotiations and public means such as voting on shareholder proposals. In some 
instances such engagement can be efficient in promoting improvements in 
accounting practices and corporate governance, yet on the whole the efficiency of the 
engagement to date is limited (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Conversely, large entrenched 
blockholders are shown to influence management decisions (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). More research on activism focuses on corporate governance and business 
operations rather than corporate social responsibility, and the limited evidence on 
CSR that does exist demonstrates a neutral impact of institutional investors. 
Consequently, the review furthers the understanding of the incentives and constraints 
in institutional monitoring by distinguishing between different CSR activities based 
on their costs and benefits and discussing the possibilities of collaboration in 
engagement among institutional investors.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, management’s personal, strategic and long-
term motives regarding CSR in general are presented, and differences among CSR 
themes are outlined. This is followed by the discussion of active ownership including 
evidence on the general relation between large shareholders and CSR and a more 
detailed comparison of two major groups of large shareholders, institutional 
investors and families. Next, evidence on investor engagement is presented including 




then outlines the limitations of the institutional investor engagement and finishes 
with a conclusion. 
 
2.2. CSR in Management Strategy  
 
A voluminous body of literature addressed the potential benefits for corporations of 
enhanced social and environmental performance, and the overall evidence may seem 
appealing to the management. Outstanding CSR is argued to be a source of 
competitive advantage (Aguilera et al., 2006; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Berry & 
Rondinelli, 1998; Jones, 1995; Lash & Wellington, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). This advantage can come from distinguishing 
the brand, signalling quality and appealing to conscious consumers (Becker-Olsen et 
al., 2005; Fisman et al., 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Siegel & Vitaliano, 
2007), employees (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010; Brekke & Nyborg, 2008; Turban & 
Greening, 1997) and responsible investors (Cox et al., 2004; Dimson et al., 2012).  
 
Apart from the likely link between the above competitive advantage and value 
creation, strong corporate social performance is shown to be associated with more 
favourable financing terms (Cheng et al., 2011). Furthermore, good relations with the 
bondholders and creditors and the resulting effect on the cost of capital are arguably 
directly relevant for long-term investors with large stakes who have to borrow 
substantial resources on the debt market (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The positive 
association between strong CSR and better access to finance may come from strong 
CSR being related to better overall management competence (Berry & Rondinelli, 
1998; Hart, 1995; Karkkainen, 2001; Solomon et al., 2004; Stephan, 2002), stronger 
governance and hence lower information asymmetry (Renneboog et al., 2008) and 
lower risks of the costs associated with potential conflicts with stakeholders 
(Godfrey et al., 2009; Jo & Harjoto, 2011). For example, evidence shows that 
companies with a poor environmental rating become exposed to sanctions by 
regulators or are put under increased scrutiny by activist groups and NGOs who may 
use aggressive campaigns (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Fineman & Clarke, 1996; 




Mure, 2003; Stephan, 2002). Whether or not such campaigns are successful, they 
send a signal regarding potential operation costs and long-term wealth loss for 
shareholders (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Hamilton, 1995; Renneboog et al., 2008).  
 
The scope for discretion regarding expenditures on various social and environmental 
projects may link them to managerial entrenchment and a source of agency conflict 
(Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Bénabou and Tirole (2010) argue 
that managers regard CSR as a source of long-term value creation, a strategic tool to 
balance interests of various stakeholders or a way to pursue their own ethical 
position and personal agenda. Barnea and Rubin (2010) refer to the latter as the 
‘warm-glow’ effect. For a sample of US firms they find that managers tend to over-
invest resources in CSR beyond value-maximising projects. Conversely, CSR is 
shown to strengthen positive impact of strong governance on firm value as a source 
of better relations with stakeholders (Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012).  Finally, there are 
cases where management’s investment in CSR brings about observable financial 
returns (Dimson et al., 2012). Therefore, all three motivations have found some 
empirical support. 
 
However, prior evidence remains inconclusive as to whether superior social 
performance results in superior financial performance (Barnett & Salomon, 2006; 
Margolis et al., 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Renneboog et al., 2008). Firstly, 
this comes from a lack of consensus as to which social and financial performance 
metrics should be used. Secondly, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) argue that, 
provided that managers pursue firm value maximisation, they will invest in CSR 
projects according to the costs and benefits, and therefore the relation between CSR 
and financial performance will be neutral. Most importantly, investors do not 
necessarily equate shareholder welfare with stock price maximisation. According to 
a survey conducted by McCahery et al. (2009) it is the long-term corporate strategy 







2.3 Differences among CSR Areas   
 
Putting their far-reaching social implications aside, as investment projects CSR 
activities exhibit substantial heterogeneity, and aggregating them together may be a 
priori uninformative (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Cox et al., 
2004; Godfrey et al., 2009; Dam & Scholtens, 2012). Different classifications have 
been proposed which helped explain motivations of enhanced CSR. For example, 
Johnson and Greening (1999) distinguished between the ‘people’ aspect of corporate 
social performance concerned with communities and employees, and the ‘product 
quality’ aspect related to production and environmental strategy. Similarly, Dam and 
Scholtens (2012) analysed separately stakeholder, ethical and environmental issues. 
Nevertheless, Barnea and Rubin (2010) along with numerous studies on social versus 
financial performance simply distinguished between socially responsible firms with 
increased investment in CSR from ‘socially irresponsible’ ones, under the 
assumption that any investment in CSR would imply long-term, strategic or personal 
interests of managers without certainty about the financial returns.  
 
In this thesis I focus on a classification which would most precisely incorporate 
shareholders’ view, i.e. reflect the distribution of the costs and benefits for 
corporations. From this perspective, social, environmental and governance 
developments are classified into largely ‘external’, or ‘social’, such as climate 
change or human rights, and ‘internal’, or ‘financial’, such as corporate governance 
or product innovation and operational efficiency  (Barnett, 2007; Judge et al., 2010; 
Rees & Mackenzie, 2011). Issues such as bribery prevention are thought to be more 
related to business contacts of the firm with employees, suppliers and customers, and 
constitute an intermediate ‘contacts’ category (Rees & Rodionova, 2012). Some 
empirical evidence reflected the impact of these differences on firm value with 
projects enhancing operational activities being related to higher value and ‘social’ 
CSR developments showing inconclusive results (Jo & Harjoto, 2012). Conversely, 
in the case of a negative event ‘external’ CSR has been shown to help preserve the 




Consequently, from the owners’ perspective, these differences will have implications 
for the motivation to actively promote or oppose such CSR developments.  
 
2.4 Motivations for Active Ownership 
 
2.4.1 Large Shareholdings and CSR  
 
Institutional theory postulates that pressure from institutional factors such as state 
and industrial regulation, private monitoring initiatives from NGOs, institutional 
investors and other groups of stakeholders influence company responsiveness to CSR 
(Bansal & Roth, 2000; Campbell, 2007; Christmann, 2000; Delmas & Toffel, 2010; 
González-Benito & González-Benito, 2006; Hart, 1995; Sharma & Vredenburg, 
1998). Whatever costs and benefits a corporation encounters from CSR activities, 
they are borne by the large equity owners (Cox et al., 2004).  The cost-benefit 
balance influences corporate performance and attracts certain types of investors, i.e. 
they react by buying or selling their shares (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Chung 
and Talaulicar (2010) call this a ‘walk activism’ and it has been shown to be efficient 
in improving governance, for example, by stimulating management to replace the 
CEO with an outsider (Parrino et al., 2003).  
 
However, given the long-term nature of concentrated ownership (Cox et al., 2004) 
and resulting strategic rather than trading interests, large owners are shown to 
monitor management (Burkart et al., 1997; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Faccio et al., 
2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Johnson & Greening, 1999; La Porta et al., 2000; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The question as to whether this affects firm value and in 
which direction has attracted substantial academic attention but the results have been 
mixed (e.g. McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Loderer & Martin, 1997). Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) examined a linear regression model of accounting profit rate and the 
holdings of the five largest shareholders controlling for the endogenous character of 
the ownership variable. They found no relation between ownership structure and 
corporate performance. Conversely, Morck et al. (1988) used Tobin’s Q and insider 




monotonic relation where the market value increased with insider ownership below 5 
percent or above 25 percent and declined when managers were holding between 5 
percent and 25 percent of equity. These findings were later disputed by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) who found the opposite and mostly insignificant signs using the 
same model. 
 
Consequently, while large owners attempt to impact on firm value, the way they 
influence management’s decisions is complex. With regards to CSR developments in 
particular, evidence of a direct relationship between closely held shares and CSR 
investment is, as may be expected, somewhat weak but is generally pointing towards 
a negative association (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010; Rees & Mackenzie, 2011). To 
enhance the interpretation of causality, Rees and Rodionova (2012) apply propensity 
score matching to a large sample of over 3,000 companies worldwide and find that 
entrenched shareholders are indeed associated with lower CSR performance as 
assessed by an independent CSR data provider.  
 
2.4.2 Families and Institutions as Blockholders  
 
The main objective of large equity holders is the ultimate return on their investments 
(Clark & Hebb, 2005; Lydenberg, 2007). However, blockholders are an aggregation 
of different actors such as families, financial institutions, individuals, government-
related bodies and industrial corporations (Andres, 2008). This review particularly 
focuses on two major groups of blockholders, families and financial institutions, and 
compares them based on prior evidence (Aguilera et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2003; 
Andres, 2008; Brickley et al., 1988). The rationale here is that, while the focus of the 
thesis is on the institutional engagement, a comprehensive analysis as to how 
institutional investors can be effective as monitors requires an understanding of the 
incentives of undiversified blockholders such as families.   
 
Table 2.1 outlines the main characteristics of these two groups of shareholders. As 
can be seen from the table, families invest their own funds and therefore have a 




power to pursue these objectives, whether at the expense of other shareholders or not. 
This has been shown to both benefit and jeopardise firm performance (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Jara-Bertín et al., 2008). The 
latter comes, for example, from the negative corporate reputation due to agency 
problems related to the expropriation of interests of minority shareholders (Delgado-
García et al., 2010). Financial institutions, on the other hand, tend to have  
diversified portfolios and invest on behalf of their clients. Therefore they perceive it 
as their fiduciary duty to deliver high returns on their clients’ investments. 
Consequently, institutions are more likely to prioritise the financial performance of 
the firms they invest in. Institutional activism can be effective as they have 
accumulated expertise and have access to specific information. However, the 
diversified character of the portfolio may prevent them from monitoring which leads 
to separation of ownership and control and agency problems between these 





TABLE 2.1 Families and Institutions as Owners: Differences and Similarities 
 Families Financial Institutions 
Capital 
invested 
Personal funds Clients’/trustees’ funds 
Portfolio Not diversified or not well-
diversified 











Are likely to pursue private 
agenda, focus on risk reduction 
and thus expropriate diversified 
minority investors 
May wish to set their agenda 
Incentive to 
monitor 
Significant Potentially significant but 
constrained by the diversified 
portfolio, potential business 
relations with the firm and 






Are likely to have specific 
knowledge of the firm due to their 
long relations with it 
Have experience and 
knowledge from monitoring 
different firms in the 
portfolio and may have 
access to specific information 
Relations with 
managers 
In many cases have family 
members on the executive board 
Are subject to agency 
problems of separation of 
ownership and control  
Relations with 
bondholders 
Mitigate the conflict of interest 
between equity and debt 
claimants and thus have relatively 
lower cost of capital 
Are likely to face divergence 




Are built on trust and implicit 
contracts 
Not ambiguous but the 




Long-term Are more pressured towards 
short-termism 
This table describes the main characteristics of families and financial institutions 
as large owners. The features presented reflect the incentives and the power of the 
two groups of investors to monitor management given the nature of funds invested, 




2.4.3 Families’ and Institutions’ Views on CSR  
 
While large owners on the whole are thought to be able to internalise more benefits 
from long-term projects, such as CSR investments, there are differences in the extent 
to which they can achieve that. The above description of the owner characteristics of 
families and institutional blockholders helps understand their motivations regarding 
investments in social, environmental and governance endeavours.  
 
Regarding ‘internal’ governance matters such as board composition, executive 
compensation and overall protection of shareholder rights, institutional investors on 
the whole are likely to favour these as they may offer benefits in terms of reduced 
information asymmetry and facilitate monitoring (Rees & Rodionova, 2012). In line 
with this reasoning, institutional ownership is shown to influence governance 
provisions such as board structure (Wu, 2004), CEO compensation (David et al., 
1998) and CEO turnover (Parrino et al., 2003). Conversely, families are unlikely to 
particularly welcome balanced power and low scope for discretion implied by strong 
internal governance (Rees & Rodionova, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, ‘external’, or ‘social’ CSR, such as emission reduction or human 
rights, may be opposed by both types of blockholders as it offers seemingly less in 
terms of  measurable financial benefits (Starks, 2009). However, the diversified 
nature of the portfolios of institutional investors, ultimate focus on economic returns 
and their reliance on multiple markets relate them to ‘universal owners’ who may be 
affected by economic consequences of political and social instability or 
environmental damage (Gjessing & Syse, 2007). In this case the negative impact of 
institutions may be smaller or it may be benign to the extent that they regard such 
investments as preserving their long-term returns or returns from investments in 
different regions and markets (Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008). Additionally, 
institutions are likely to have more reputational concerns and may favour the 






2.4.4 Different Types of Institutional Investors  
 
It is often stated that there is not enough understanding of the role that institutional 
investors play in corporate governance (Starks, 2009). Overall, they face a choice 
between monitoring and trading (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). However, financial 
institutions do not form a homogenous group of investors, and their specific 
characteristics affect their investment strategy and the way they influence companies 
(Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999). Table 2.2 presents a classification of institututional 
investors by Brickley et al. (1988). This classification has been widely employed in 
the corporate governance literature and distinguishes between institutions based on 
their relative independence from the company they invest in.  
 
The classifications used by other researchers follow the same principle and differ 
mostly in terminology. For example, Almazan et al. (2005) uses the terms ‘active 
monitors’ for investment companies and advisors and ‘passive monitors’ for banks 
and insurance companies. Elyasiani et al. (2009) additionally identifies institutions 
which side with management to exploit small shareholders and ‘passive indexers’ 
who hold shares because the company is in a certain index. Other empirical evidence 
reveals some implications for the corporate performance of these different groups of 
institutions. Large long-term shareholdings by independent institutional investors 
who are more likely to monitor are associated with higher firm value (Ferreira & 
Matos, 2008; Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2010). Similarly, Becht et al. 
(2009) note that Hermes UK Focus Fund, an activist hedge fund, never relied on 
support from banks in its engagement on corporate governance matters while Marler 
and Faugère (2010) find that ownership by banks and insurance companies siding 
with management is negatively associated with the use of equity incentives for 










TABLE 2.2 Classification of Institutional Investors by Brickley et al. (1988) 
Types of 
Institutions 







Trusts with a stake of at 
least 1  percent 
These are likely to have actual or 
potential business relations with the 
company which they do not wish to 
spoil; thus, they are expected to 
either support management 
decisions or sell their stake 
Pressure-
resistant 
Public pension funds 
Mutual funds 
Endowments 
Foundations with a stake of 
at least 1  percent 
These are likely to be less sensitive 
to management pressure 
Pressure-
indeterminate 
Corporate pension funds 
Brokerage houses 
Investment counsel firms 
Institutions with a stake of 
less than 1  percent 
N/A 
This table presents the classification of institutional investors by Brickley et al. 
(1988) which is widely utilised in the corporate governance literature. The authors 
distinguish between different types of investors based on their nonequity relations 
with the firms. 
 
 
Consequently, the above classification indicates that some institutions such as 
pension funds are more likely to be actively involved in governance focusing on the 
long-term shareholder wealth as they perceive it in their fiduciary duty to pursue not 
only high but also sustainable returns. Conversely, governance by banks is more 
‘insider-oriented’ and prioritises favourable business arrangements as banks may 
indeed be more content with the short-term profitability of a company they invest in 
and provide credit to.  
 
Another attribute of institutional ownership which has been shown to impact on firm 
value is their stability expressed as the proportion of equity held by institutions 
scaled by its standard deviation (Elyasiani et al., 2009). The findings suggest that 
stable institutional ownership has a positive effect on the company’s performance 




executive incentive-compensation. Along the same lines, institutional investors 
which hold shares for longer than a year tend to have lower monitoring costs as they 
have a better knowledge of the company, its governance and can process new 
information about the company more efficiently (Chen et al., 2007). The above 
attributes demonstrate that institutional investors vary in terms of their preference for 
certain governance and business practices of the companies they invest in. For 
example, hedge funds seem to pay most attention to the managerial shareholdings 
while for insurance companies and pension funds the most important issue is free 
float; pension funds are mostly concerned with board independence and ownership 
concentration; finally, mutual funds prioritise managerial ownership and ownership 
of the largest shareholder (McCahery et al., 2009).  
 
2.4.5 Institutional Investors and CSR  
 
As mentioned earlier, the ‘universal owner’ hypothesis postulates that large 
institutional investors would directly benefit from the improvements in social and 
environmental practices by companies since their portfolios reflect the entire global 
economy (Gjessing & Syse, 2007). Similarly, poor environmental or social decisions 
by some companies would adversely affect the portfolio by deteriorating conditions 
and increasing risks for other companies (Kiernan, 2007), jeopardising fiduciary duty 
to deliver returns to the trustees (Sethi, 2005) and exposing investors to adverse 
consequences of legal actions, NGO campaigns and other forms of stakeholder 
pressure (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Accordingly, these investors regard 
company’s commitment to preserve the environment and make social input as a 
necessary aspect of corporate strategy (Cox et al., 2004; Kim & Lyon, 2007; 
O’Rourke, 2003; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2008; Sparkes & Cowton, 
2004).  Similarly, institutional investors are attracted to companies with enhanced 
CSR (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). In particular, long-term oriented institutions, pension 
funds and life insurance companies invest more in firms with higher CSR 
performance as opposed to short-term institutional investors, trusts and charities 
(Cox et al., 2004). Investments by long-term institutions then contribute to reduced 




2.5 Investor Engagement as a Means of Active Ownership 
 
2.5.1 Active Ownership and Corporate Governance  
 
Shareholders, in particular institutional investors, have been consistently encouraged 
to actively monitor companies they invest in to ensure efficient governance and value 
creation (Mallin, 2007; Starks, 2009) and many of them do so. For example, 
independent long-term investors are shown to attempt to withdraw from a bad bid 
rather than just sell shares after the merger announcement (Chen et al., 2007). 
Extensive literature focused on various strategies of shareholder engagement but so 
far remained inconclusive on the effectiveness of activism and its impact on 
performance (Anderson et al., 2003; Becht et al., 2009; Gillan & Starks, 2007). As 
already mentioned earlier, there is some evidence that institutional activism enhances 
corporate performance. For example, institutional monitoring is shown to positively 
impact on executive compensation practices (Almazan et al., 2005; Elyasiani & Jia, 
2009; Hartzell & Starks, 2003) and M&A decisions (Chen et al., 2007), prevent 
opportunistic earnings management (Bange & DeBondt, 1998; Chung et al., 2002) 
and encourage R&D investment (Bushee, 1998). Further, it tends to be associated 
with higher credit ratings and lower bond yield spreads (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; 
Elyasiani et al., 2010) although Anderson et al. (2003) find no association between 
blockholders and the cost of debt. 
 
However, these studies do not directly address the question as to how specific actions 
of activism bring about corporate improvements through ‘voice’ engagement. Voice 
activism can take ‘public’ forms such as filing resolutions and building shareholder 
coalitions to augment voting rights (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010). On the other hand, 
engagement can also be performed via direct dialogues with management. In their 
survey, McCahery et al. (2009) find that about 80 percent of active institutional 
investors in different legal contexts act by selling their shares, however over 50 






2.5.2 The Effect of Public Shareholder Engagement  
 
Extensive literature has focused on publicly observable tools of shareholder 
influence such as shareholder resolutions, proposals and voting (e.g. Bates & 
Hennessy, 2010; Bebchuk, 2005; Brickley et al., 1988; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 
1999; Prevost et al., 2009; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2010). 
While initial evidence found shareholder proposals to be inefficient (Black, 1990; 
Karpoff, 2001), the situation is arguably changing (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; 
Thomas & Cotter, 2007). Nevertheless, empirical evidence of the impact of 
shareholder activism on corporate value remains mixed (Bradley et al., 2006; Del 
Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Karpoff, 2001; Prevost & Rao, 
2000; Romano, 2001; Sjostrom, 2008; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). For example, Del 
Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and Thomas and Cotter (2007) find that shareholder 
proposals have become more successful in eliciting requested changes in corporate 
governance practices but did not prompt significant market responses. In contrast, 
the results by Prevost and Rao (2000) support the view that shareholder proposals by 
public pension funds signal unwillingness or inability of the management to meet the 
demands of shareholders and trigger negative market reactions. Hedge funds on the 
whole seem to be more successful in their campaigns. For example, Brav et al. 
(2008) find that two-thirds of proposals by US activist hedge funds related to 
strategic, financial and operational improvements were successful and generated 
positive returns of 7 percent with no subsequent reversal for at least a year. Moreover, 
their results offer evidence of improvements in operating performance, higher CEO 
turnover and higher payout after the funds’ intervention.  
 
Similarly, Klein and Zur (2009) document significant positive stock returns of 10.2 
percent for hedge funds and 5.1 percent for other investors around the time of filing 
of the resolution, and further returns of 11.4 percent for hedge funds and 17.8 percent 
for other activists in the following year. These campaigns again targeted various 
aspects of governance and corporate strategy such as changing board of directors’ 
composition, preventing a merger and cutting CEO’s salary. The success of 




example, Thomas and Cotter (2007) observe that in their dataset of Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) data for over 1,600 proposals, none of the 
CSR proposals received more than 50 percent of the votes cast. Moreover, 
management is shown to use corporate resources to resist CSR-related proposals or 
demonstrate symbolic compliance with salient shareholders without effective 
changes (David et al., 2007). However, limited evidence suggests that shareholder 
proposals can be successful, for example, in encouraging corporate reporting on 
climate change strategies via Carbon Disclosure Project  (Reid & Toffel, 2009). 
 
2.5.4 The Effect of Private Shareholder Engagement  
 
Compared to research on publicly observable activism, significantly fewer studies 
have focused on investor engagement via dialogues with management. Such 
dialogues are shown to be efficient. For example, 71 percent of the firms targeted by 
TIAA-CREF, one of the major US institutional investors, on corporate governance 
through private negotiations, settled the matter before filing of a formal resolution 
(Carleton et al., 1998). Further, those cases that did result in a resolution reached the 
agreement later even though the investor only got the majority vote in one instance.   
A more recent clinical study by Becht et al. (2009) demonstrates the effect of the 
direct communication between Hermes UK Focus Fund, an activist hedge fund, and 
the investee companies. The requested changes were related to the board structure, 
unprofitable business segments, capital structure and payouts. The engagement itself 
was an extensive work involving meetings and conversations with CEOs, CFOs, 
divisional managers and non-executive board members. The resulting dialogues 
could be collaborative, confrontational or mixed but all generated mean excess 
returns to the shareholders of 5.3 percent in the seven-day event window with the 
highest returns triggered by confrontational or mixed engagements.  
 
Further examples of successful engagements include ABP, Government Pension 
Fund Global, CalPERS and other largest pension funds, and these address the issues 
of corporate social responsibility apart from other operational and financial 




observe significant positive returns of 1.8 percent to engagement on CSR by an 
activist asset manager with 4.4 percent for successful engagements.  Further, after 
implementing the requested changes companies experience improvements in various 
aspects of performance measured by the return on assets, profit margin, asset 
turnover and sales over employees ratio.  
 
The above evidence of successful engagement cases is consistent with the view that 
institutional investors do influence governance and more so from private means than 
public (Starks, 2009). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether such practices can yet 
be regarded as mainstream. Increased institutional ownership on the whole seems to 
have benign impact on corporate social responsibility (Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Rees 
and Rodionova, 2012) which can perhaps be explained by the constraints in the 
institutional engagement. 
 
2.5.5 Limitations to Institutional Investor Engagement  
 
Agency problems, time constraints and the portfolio structure of diversified 
institutional investors often prevent shareholders from effectively engaging with all 
companies in their portfolios. For example, for the asset manager analysed by 
Dimson et al. (2012) it takes on average two to three engagements before success, 
and the time frame is about 1.5 years. Similarly, Becht et al. (2009) report 469 days 
for collaborative engagements and as many as 1,284 days for the confrontational 
ones.  
 
While the largest institutional investors may well be ‘universal owners’ and as such 
have a mechanism of internalising the benefits from their active monitoring and 
engagement (Kiernan, 2007), this is not true for many smaller diversified investors 
(Becht et al., 2009). Further, institutions may be imperfect monitors because of their 
own internal agency problems and the resulting pressure for short-term solutions 
which they perceive to be in their fiduciary duty (Aguilera et al., 2006, 2007; Gorton 
& Kahl, 1999; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). Agency theory suggests that investors may 




benefits (Romano, 1993; Woidtke, 2002)  and may pursue only those issues where 
potential benefits can be internalised (Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008; Rees & 
Rodionova, 2012). This helps explain why the overall evidence of the impact of 
shareholder activism on the long-term performance remains inconclusive (Gillan & 
Starks, 2007).  
 
2.6 FTSE4Good and Inclusion Criteria 
 
2.6.1 FTSE4Good Overview 
 
FTSE4Good is a stock-market index series introduced in 2001 and operated by FTSE 
Group Ltd., a UK-based index company. For the FTSE4Good Index Series, FTSE 
uses its All-World Developed (AWD) Indices as a starting point with the exception 
of companies from nuclear, tobacco and weaponry-related industries. Then FTSE 
excludes any companies that fail to satisfy FTSE4Good criteria. The criteria aim to 
reflect emerging standards of CSR best practice as embodied in various authoritative 
codes (e.g. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) and in the practice of 
leading companies (FTSE, 2010). FTSE4Good inclusion criteria are selected and 
amended by independent Policy Committee comprising responsible investors, CSR 
experts and academics (FTSE, 2005).  Research for FTSE4Good is conducted by a 
specialised non-profit research agency, the Ethical Investment Research Services 
(EIRIS), and its international partners, e.g. EthiFinance in France and Avanzi in Italy, 
who conduct an annual survey and make use of information published by companies 
on their websites and in CSR reports (FTSE, 2010). Each company’s compliance 
with the FTSE4Good CSR criteria is assessed on a six monthly basis by the FTSE 
Policy Committee, based on recommendations supplied by EIRIS.  
 
Companies that meet the criteria are informed about their inclusion in the index and 
receive a certificate. Evidence suggests that they often use the index membership (e.g. 
in CSR or annual reports) as a benchmark to communicate their CSR practices to the 
external community, including investors and other stakeholders, and to encourage 




some researchers argue that ISO 14001 certification is partly regarded by companies 
as a tool to communicate their environmental position to stakeholders (Neumayer & 
Perkins, 2004).  
 
2.6.2 FTSE4Good Criteria Development 
 
The initial inclusion criteria covered three broad areas: environmental management, 
human rights and stakeholder relationships (FTSE, 2004). The criteria were fairly 
broad which resulted in their critical reception from some non-governmental 
organisations and responsible investors (Collison et al., 2009). However, since 2001 
the Policy Committee has steadily increased the extent and rigour of the index 
criteria. FTSE has added several new topics, i.e. countering bribery, supply chain 
labour standards and mitigating climate change, and has also increased the strength 
and coverage of the existing human rights and environmental management criteria 
(FTSE, 2010). When the criteria were upgraded or new criteria were implemented, 
companies had to meet both the existing criteria and the new criteria in order to 
stay/be included in FTSE4Good. Tightening of the criteria increased the recognition 
of the FTSE4Good index among NGOs and CSR experts as an international CSR 
benchmark. For example, the FTSE4Good inclusion/exclusion was used in NGO 
activist campaigns (Slager et al., 2012).  
 
2.6.2.1 Environmental Management Criteria  
 
The FTSE methodology requires companies to meet different levels of 
environmental criteria according to company’s environmental risk. The 
environmental risk of a particular company is identified based on the environmental 
impact of company’s business sector. For the initial environmental management 
criteria, companies were classified into two groups, those with a high environmental 
footprint and those with low impact. Environmental criteria were then applied to the 






In 2002 FTSE strengthened environmental management requirements. Companies 
were re-classified into those with high environmental risk (e.g. chemical, oil and gas 
or food industries), those with medium impact (e.g. electronics or banks) and those 
with low risk (e.g. software or telecommunications). The classification was based on 
the environmental footprint of the corresponding business sector. The three groups 
had to meet different levels of environmental criteria (FTSE, 2004) which ensured 
that companies causing more substantial pollution had to meet stricter requirements. 
The new environmental criteria were announced in 2002 and companies were 
assessed in 2005 as to whether they met the criteria and would be included/remain in 
the index or would be excluded from it. 
 
The criteria cover three aspects of environmental management: environmental policy, 
management system and reporting. The underlying indicators reflect the main 
aspects of management which can help to enhance environmental performance 
(Berry & Rondinelli, 1998). For example, the environmental management system has 
been shown to enhance environmental and operations performance and to stimulate 
the implementation of a wider range of available environmental activities (Melnyk et 
al., 2003). Further, environmental management requirements may contribute to the 




The indicators require that responsibility for policy is at board or 
departmental level and that policy expresses company commitment to the use of 
targets, monitoring, audit and public reporting. Other indicators include commitment 
to stakeholder involvement, focus on product or service impact, and formulation of 
strategic moves towards sustainability. Companies must meet different combinations 
of these requirements based on the environmental risk, with high-risk firms having to 
comply with the most extensive range of environmental requirements.  
 
Environmental Management Systems. The management requirements include 
presence of an environmental policy and documented objectives and targets in key 
areas, identification of significant impacts, use of internal audits against the 
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 The description of policy, management and reporting criteria for the three themes (environmental 




requirements of the system, and internal reporting and management review. Presence 
of the ISO14001 certification or the European Eco-management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS) registration is deemed to meet all environmental management requirements. 
High and medium-risk companies have to meet a corresponding number of indicators 
depending on how much of the company activity is covered by the environmental 
management system (EMS). Low-risk firms have no management requirements. 
 
Reporting. Reporting requires inclusion of the text of the environmental policy, 
description of main impacts, quantitative data, and performance measured against 
targets. Further, companies are required to disclose an outline of the environmental 
management system, details of negative events (non-compliance, prosecution, fines 
and accidents), financial dimensions, independent verification, stakeholder dialogue, 
and coverage of sustainability issues. High-risk companies must have published a 
report within the last (from the time of assessment) three years. Medium and low-risk 
companies have no reporting requirements. 
 
2.6.2.2 Countering Bribery Criteria 
 
Following a long process of criteria development, the introduction of countering 
bribery criteria was finalised in 2007 and company compliance was assessed in 2009. 
The criteria were based on the provisions set by Transparency International Business 
Principles for Countering Bribery where bribery refers to “an offer or receipt of any 
gift, loan, fee, reward or other advantage to or from any person as an inducement to 
do something which is dishonest, illegal or a breach of trust in the conduct of the 
enterprise’s business” (FTSE, 2010: 8). While FTSE recognised the potential risk of 
engaging in bribery by any company, the criteria started off as targeting companies 
from FTSE All-World Developed Index with the presumed highest exposure to 
corrupt practices. Companies were assessed by FTSE based on their business sector, 
country of operation and reliance on public contracts and government licences. If a 
company was identified as having high risk in all three dimensions, it was considered 
high risk regarding bribery and was subject to the countering bribery requirements. 




chemicals, industrial metals and mining, construction and materials, aerospace and 
defence, general industrials, electronic and electrical equipment, industrial 
engineering, utilities, pharmaceuticals, hotels, telecommunications, computer 
services and equipment. With regards to the country of operations, all countries 
scoring low (four or less) on Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index or countries with zero or negative scores according to the World Bank 
Governance Indicators were considered high risk in bribery(FTSE, 2010).  Finally, 
affected companies were working on government contracts or had to obtain 
government licences to perform their operations. The identified high risk companies 
were then subject to the set of criteria covering anti-bribery policy, management and 
reporting.  
 
Policy. Companies are required to explicitly prohibit giving and receiving bribes in 
their policy and to state commitment to obeying all relevant laws. Further, policy 
must state commitment to restriction of facilitation payments and giving or receiving 
gifts. Finally, policy must be publicly available.  
 
Management. Management practices include communication of the policy to 
employees and provision of training programmes, establishment of compliance 
mechanisms, e.g. via audits and board reports, and secure communication channels 
for employees such as hotlines, advice lines and whistle-blowing procedures and 
internal reporting mechanisms. Finally, management system must contain procedures 
to address non-compliance. If a significant bribery-related controversy is identified 
which involves the company itself, its suppliers and contractors, the company must 
present evidence of a thorough and effective investigation.  
 








2.6.2.3 Climate Change Criteria 
 
FTSE4Good climate change criteria were introduced in 2008 and companies were 
assessed for compliance in 2010. The criteria aimed to facilitate reduction by 
companies of their climate change impact. Given a constantly evolving character of 
climate change-related policies and practices, FTSE consulted a number of expert 
organisations regarding the criteria including The Climate Group, The Institutional 
Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), The Carbon Trust and the World 
Wildlife Fund (FTSE, 2010). 
 
The criteria targeted all companies from FTSE All-World Developed Index which 
were identified as having medium or high operational and/or product impact on 
climate change. The impact assessment was based primarily on business subsector 
and the corresponding magnitude of operational greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(FTSE, 2010). In particular, high operational impact areas included exploration and 
production, oil and gas, mining, building materials and fixtures, airlines, electricity 
and delivery services. Medium operational impact included the following subsectors: 
aerospace and defence, automobiles, speciality chemicals, paper, heavy construction, 
commercial vehicles and trucks, waste and disposal services, brewers, tires, distillers 
and vintners, soft drinks, farming and fishing, food products, home construction, 
pharmaceuticals, travel and tourism and utilities. The criteria addressed policy and 
governance, management and strategy, disclosure and performance (FTSE, 2010).  
 
Policy. For companies with both high and medium operational impact policy must 
present climate change-related issues as one of the key concerns and explicitly 
acknowledge responsibility for climate change issues at board or senior executive 
level. Management and strategy requirements applied only to high impact companies 
who had to state a long-term (over five years) strategic quantified target of 




medium and short-term (less than five years) targets for emission reduction. Medium 
impact companies did not have any management requirements. 
 
Disclosure. High impact companies had to publicly disclose the total operational 
CO2 or GHG emissions and an appropriate sector metric (e.g. kg CO2 per tonne of 
cement for cement firms). Companies with medium operational impact had to 
disclose either total emissions or the corresponding sector metric. 
 
Performance. Companies with a high operational impact were required to 
demonstrate either a five percent reduction in carbon intensity over two years, being 
in a top quartile of the firms in the corresponding subsector according to carbon 
efficiency measures or evidence of a strategic initiative with quantified targets in 
reduction of GHG emissions. The initiatives included switching fuel, development of 
low carbon technologies, product and service innovation, carbon capture and storage 
etc. These initiatives would then be assessed for their relevance by climate experts 




Institutional investors are encouraged to become actively involved in engagement to 
enhance governance and promote corporate social responsibility. While other 
powerful blockholders such as families pursue both personal and economic 
objectives, financial institutions are guided by their fiduciary duty to deliver high 
returns on their clients’ investments. This, however, also constraints their monitoring 
as they may be more prone to short-termism and more focused on financial 
performance. The classification of the financial institutions as pressure-resistant, i.e. 
with no noninvestor dealings with the firms, and pressure-sensitive, i.e. those having 
nonequity business ties, helps explain why there is heterogeneity among institutional 
investors with regards to CSR investments. Moreover, CSR itself is a broad 
amalgamation of activities with a different balance of costs and benefits. Financial 
CSR presents both social and financial gains and is likely to be favoured by all 




executive compensation are beneficial for institutional investors as they reduce 
information asymmetry and facilitate monitoring while families may oppose these as 
they challenge their influence. Conversely, social CSR such as emission reduction, 
despite its society-wide implications, may be opposed by both types of blockholders 
but less so by the large institutions who are effectively ‘universal owners’ or may  
favour the ‘goodwill’ attribute of social CSR. 
 
Consequently, although there is evidence to demonstrate the efficiency and value 
relevance of both private and public means of institutional investor activism related 
to accounting practices, capital structure, decisions on mergers and acquisitions, 
executive compensation and other provisions of corporate governance, on the whole 
the effectiveness of the institutional monitoring is limited. In particular, institutional 
engagement on CSR is challenged by a) undiversified owners such as families 
effectively obstructing CSR initiatives and b) institutions being constrained in their 
ability to monitor by the diversified character of the portfolio and agency problems 
of separation of ownership and control. Yet, institutional activism can be effective as 
they have accumulated expertise and knowledge and are shown to process 
information more efficiently.  
 
Consequently, this thesis explores one way of engaging collaboratively by delegating 
the dialogue itself to a responsible investment index and navigating the agenda and 
the scope of the engagement. In the three studies that follow the engagement 
concerns companies’ compliance with a set of requirements necessary for inclusion 
in the FTSE4Good index. For each of the themes (environmental management, 
controlling bribery and mitigating climate change), the criteria cover policy, 
management practice and reporting, and the scope of the requirements varies with 
the company risk. The assessment of the requirements themselves and their 
substance is not the focus of this thesis, however prior evidence suggests a positive 
association between FTSE4Good metrics and other reputable data providers such as 
ASSET4 (Rees & Mackenzie, 2011) which is consistent with different experts 
independently evaluating the same CSR and governance issues. Further, FTSE4Good 




by stakeholders including individual and institutional investors, CSR experts and 
NGOs (Slager et al., 2012). Whether engagement via an index is effective and how 
its effect varies in different governance and CSR contexts is the subject of the 




Chapter 3 Do Responsible Investment Indices Improve Corporate Social 




We examine whether a responsible investment index is able to effect substantial 
change in environmental management practices across a large sample of 
internationally diverse firms. There is some evidence from both the US and the UK 
that engagement by institutional investors can influence management, but this comes 
from small sample case studies and is not typically focused on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) issues (Becht et al., 2009; Dimson et al., 2012; Gifford, 2010). 
There is also evidence that engagement by shareholders can be driven by 
considerations of financial or social performance and is conditioned by the 
institutional setting (Rees & Rodionova, 2012; Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008; Young 
& Marais, 2012). Conversely, institutional shareholdings are typically associated 
with lower performance in the CSR rankings and, whilst this might be most strongly 
driven by entrenched shareholders, there is no evidence that diversified institutional 
investors impact beneficially on CSR practices (Rees & Rodionova, 2012; Starks, 
2009). It is, therefore, unclear whether investors effectively engage with firms to 
improve CSR practices and which institutional or governance characteristics impact 
on the effectiveness of that engagement. Our analysis assesses the impact on 
environmental management of engagement by institutional investors via a 
responsible investment index combined with the threat of exclusion from that index.  
 
Our analysis is based on a natural experiment provided by the enhancement of the 
environmental management requirements necessary for membership of the 
FTSE4Good index. In 2002 FTSE strengthened the criteria and engaged with index 
members that failed to meet the new standards. The engagement was designed to 
improve the environmental practices of the firms and was reinforced by the threat of 
exclusion from the FTSE4Good index if the new criteria were not met by 2005. All 
constituents of the FTSE All-World Developed Index were potential members of 
FTSE4Good and independent experts assessed their environmental management 




treatment group whilst non-members failing to meet the criteria form the control 
group. We examine the response of these two groups between 2002 and 2005 and 
whether an effect is temporary or persists until 2010. We also investigate the impact 
of ownership, governance and institutional environment on rates of compliance.  
 
The results show that engagement allied to the threat of exclusion substantially 
increases the probability that a firm will meet the FTSE4Good environmental 
management criteria. To the extent that high levels of index membership among 
matched firms reflect benefits from inclusion, we separate the engagement and the 
incentive to stay in the index. We find that both engagement and the incentive to stay 
stimulate compliance but that engagement is most efficient when coupled with a high 
probability of index membership. We also show that compliance is negatively 
affected by concentrated ownership, and positively affected by the firm’s location in 
a coordinated rather than a liberal market economy. These results demonstrate that 
management reacts to engagement but not that engagement necessarily improves 
environmental performance. The FTSE4Good criteria are demanding and it would be 
reasonable to assume that a firm meeting these criteria would tend to have better 
environmental management than one that does not. However, we only have evidence 
that management has undertaken the necessary action to comply with FTSE4Good 
criteria. 
 
We believe these results to be of particular relevance to both the theory of corporate 
governance and to practitioners in the investment community. With regards to the 
theory, previous evidence has generally shown no robust link between institutional 
shareholdings and CSR practices. We demonstrate that engagement by a responsible 
investment index, combined with potential exclusion, can affect CSR-related 
management decisions and that this is conditional on factors consistent with both 
agency and institutional theories. With regards to practitioners, our results are of 
significance to investment institutions seeking to influence management, to 
regulators who may wish to encourage responsible investment, and to the responsible 






3.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses 
 
3.2.1 CSR and Index Engagement  
 
Whether or not a firm engages in CSR-enhancing projects depends on managerial 
decisions and the underlying motivations can be either profit-oriented or non-
financial (Fisman et al., 2006). CSR may trigger a ‘warm-glow’ effect for the 
manager as a ‘good citizen’, signal competence and lead to a stronger reputation and 
enhanced job security (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Renneboog et al., 2008; Solomon et 
al., 2004; Stephan, 2002). Personal benefits aside, strong CSR can potentially reduce 
conflicts with stakeholders and signal business value (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). It may 
also emphasise product quality (Becker-Olsen et al., 2006; Fisman et al., 2006; Jo & 
Harjoto, 2011; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), improve the ability to raise capital 
(Cheng et al., 2011; Kiernan, 2007) and attract motivated employees (Brekke & 
Nyborg, 2008; Turban & Greening, 1997).  
 
From the institutional theory perspective, the propensity to invest in CSR may be 
influenced by several factors: state and industrial regulation, the firm’s financial and 
competitive situation, pressure groups such as NGOs, and dialogue with stakeholders 
(e.g. Bansal & Roth, 2000; Campbell, 2007; Christmann, 2000; Delmas & Toffel, 
2010; González-Benito & González-Benito, 2006; Hart, 1995; Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998). In particular, evidence shows that companies facing a poor 
environmental rating may become exposed to sanctions by regulators or put under 
increased scrutiny by activist groups and NGOs (Lenox & Eesley, 2009; Stephan, 
2002). This, in turn, can send a negative signal to shareholders concerning increased 
operational costs and long-term wealth loss (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Hamilton, 1995; 
Renneboog et al., 2008).  
 
One of the channels by which a company’s efforts in CSR can be communicated to 
its stakeholders is via responsible investment indices and ratings. Chatterji and Toffel 




socially responsible investment has increased both the salience of independent rating 
agencies and companies’ responsiveness to risks to their brand reputations”. While 
there is an on-going, often critical, discussion about how well these indices and 
ratings capture the underlying socially responsible behaviour, some of them at least 
present a credible reflection of investor expectations regarding CSR and can increase 
the transparency of company reporting on its CSR activities. Rees and Mackenzie 
(2011) report that in 2011 the FTSE and ASSET4
2
 metrics exhibit a significant 
positive correlation. Using a large sample of US companies in 2003-2008, Semenova 
(2010) shows that the environmental performance assessments provided by KLD, 
GES and ASSET4 correlate positively both for environmental performance and 
environmental risks
3
. Chatterji, Levine and Toffel (2009) also show that KLD’s 
assessment of firms’ environmental performance reflects environmental performance 
measures such as toxic emissions and environmental fines. However, they note that 
the assessment seems to provide a better estimation of past performance than future. 
At the same time, Chatterji and Toffel (2010) find that low KLD environmental 
scores stimulate companies to reduce their toxic emissions. The above evidence 
suggests that responsible investment indices and ratings consistently assess reported 
CSR practices. 
 
Shareholders can also influence CSR decisions. Investment institutions on the whole 
attribute a growing importance to sound CSR practices (Cox et al., 2004; Kim & 
Lyon, 2007; O’Rourke, 2003; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2008; Sparkes 
& Cowton, 2004). This is reflected in the growth of the responsible investment 
industry, which reached about 12.2 percent of the $25.2 trillion in total assets under 
management in the US in 2010 (US SIF, 2010). Many institutional investors aim to 
enhance CSR via active ownership (Gifford, 2010). Some of the largest pension and 
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 ASSET4 is an environmental, social and governance (ESG) data provider owned by Thomson 
Reuters. A detailed description can be found at  
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/content_news/content_overview/content_az/co
ntent_esg/. 
3  Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) were ESG data providers owned by KLD Research & 
Analytics, Inc., which covered all companies from S&P 500 Index and Domini Social 400 Index. The 
data provider was acquired by RiskMetrics in 2009 which was later acquired by MSCI Inc. More 
information can be found at http://www.msci.com. GES Investment Services is a Swedish consulting 





hedge funds successfully engage with companies to enhance corporate governance 
and social performance. For example, a clinical study by Becht et al. (2009) 
demonstrated the effect of direct engagement by the Hermes UK Focus Fund on the 
business structure, governance and financial policy of the investee companies. 
Carleton et al. (1998) analysed private engagement initiatives by TIAA-CREF, a 
major US institutional investor. Emerging evidence looks specifically at CSR-
oriented private interventions by asset managers (Dimson et al., 2012; Gifford, 2010). 
Analysing investor involvement in 613 US companies, Dimson et al. (2012) find that 
engagement may be successful (17 percent of initiatives resulted in the company 
meeting the asset manager’s request), and observe a positive market reaction to 
successful engagements of 4 percent. However, such studies are scarce and although 
large institutions such as ‘universal owners’ are thought to be motivated to monitor 
corporate social performance (Gjessing & Syse, 2007; Kiernan, 2007), there is still 
little evidence of them doing so as mainstream practice (Rees & Rodionova, 2012; 
Starks, 2009). Based on a large international sample of over 3,500 firms, Rees and 
Rodionova (2012) report no influence from investment institutions on CSR as 
assessed by ASSET4, suggesting that as yet institutional investors do not provide any 
widespread benefit in terms of CSR enhancement.  
 
3.2.2 The FTSE Engagement Process 
 
FTSE assesses all companies from the FTSE All-World Developed Index against a 
set of CSR criteria. The inclusion criteria are selected and amended by an 
independent Policy Committee comprising responsible investors, CSR experts and 
academics, and aim to reflect emerging standards of CSR best practice (FTSE, 
2005).  Research for FTSE is carried out by a specialised non-profit research agency, 
Ethical Investment Research Services (EIRIS). EIRIS conduct an annual survey and 
make use of information published by companies on their websites and in CSR 
reports (FTSE, 2010). The FTSE Policy Committee, based on recommendations 
supplied by EIRIS, assesses each company’s compliance with the FTSE4Good 
criteria on a six-monthly basis. In its first ten years, FTSE has increased the strength 




example, the introduction of the new environmental criteria was supported by a 
number of institutional investors, including those on the FTSE Policy Committee 
(Insight Investment, Jupiter, Legal and General) and those involved in the public 
consultation process. This consultation activity helped to establish environmental 
management criteria that would reflect the expectations of investors (Slager et al., 
2012).  
 
In each of its six-monthly reviews, FTSE announces the names of the index’s newly 
joined companies and those that have been deleted. The publicity surrounding these 
announcements can be significant, particularly if a major company is deleted 
(Collison et al., 2009). For example, several Japanese newspapers ran stories when, 
in 2007, Toyota was excluded from the FTSE4Good index on labour rights grounds. 
Along the same lines, Hamilton (1995) found that higher levels of pollution reported 
to the Toxic Release Inventory resulted in increased media attention. Partly because 
of the potential negative publicity, if a member-company did not meet new or 
upgraded inclusion criteria, FTSE would engage with its management during a grace 
period before criteria changes are enforced. Slager et al. (2012) contend that 
engagement both demonstrates to companies that FTSE is monitoring their 
compliance with the index and enhances their recognition of the index and their view 
of its legitimacy. Engagement starts with notifying a no-longer complying company 
of criteria upgrades and sending subsequent reminders. This often gives rise to 
extensive discussions between the company and FTSE about the nature of criteria 
requirements and their rationale. Further engagement consists of a dialogue with 
company management via emails, letters, telephone conversations and meetings 
(FTSE, 2011). Thus, it takes a similar approach to the observed private individual 
engagement by activist institutional investors and hedge funds (Becht et al., 2009; 
Dimson et al., 2012).  
 
Index engagement has two main additional characteristics. Firstly, it brings together 
the requirements of multiple stakeholder groups and transforms them into a set of 
achievable and precise requirements, thereby providing an international standard for 




investor engagement mechanism, allowing engagement with and triggering changes 
in companies within various industries and countries.  CSR matters may be too costly 
and complex for one investor to influence and may require the pooled expertise, 
influence and resources of various investment institutions (Gjessing & Syse, 2007).  
 
Secondly, FTSE notifies affected member companies about the potential exclusion 
from the index if they fail to implement the requirements by the given date. In doing 
so, the index applies additional levers of normative power and urgency shown to be 
related to successful engagements by institutions (Gifford, 2010). Since companies 
use CSR benchmarks such as indices to mitigate potential conflicts with stakeholders 
and enhance their reputation (Young & Marais, 2012), non-compliance with a CSR 
standard could trigger negative reputational effects. Potentially it raises the question 
as to why the company did not report on its CSR practices sufficiently to be included 
in the index if it claims to have a strong CSR involvement. The threat of public 
deletion from the index, therefore, gives FTSE an additional lever through which to 
encourage companies to improve their CSR practices according to the index 
requirements and within the required time period.  
 
3.2.3 The Effect of Index Membership and Engagement on Management 
 
Recent research has begun to examine the influence of rankings, ratings and 
responsible investment indices on companies (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Collison et 
al., 2009). Interview-based evidence suggests that managers react positively to being 
included in the FTSE4Good index to the extent that they believe that it reflects CSR 
expectations of responsible investors and other stakeholders (Slager et al., 2012). In 
some instances, managers asserted that the CSR enhancement was not necessarily 
done ‘for FTSE4Good’ but rather resulted from the general management strategy 
(Collison et al., 2009). Nevertheless, index membership was used in CSR or annual 
reports to communicate company CSR practices to the external community (Slager et 
al., 2012). Similarly, ISO 14001 certification is shown to be used by management as 
a tool to communicate their environmental position to stakeholders (Neumayer & 





Managers may perceive public exclusion from a responsible investment index as a 
potential threat to corporate and personal reputation. This is particularly the case for 
large international corporations, which are more exposed to stakeholder pressures 
and social activism (Judge et al., 2010). Non-compliance with the index criteria and 
resulting delisting signals under-performance against a CSR standard. Conversely, if 
engagement by the index offers an opportunity to develop the necessary practices, 
managers could be expected to react positively for personal advantage, out of 
genuine interest in CSR or for the strategic use of CSR to mitigate conflicting 
interests of different stakeholders. We, therefore, predict the following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Firms will be more likely to meet the FTSE4Good 
environmental management criteria if they are subject to FTSE 
engagement and face FTSE4Good exclusion. 
 
Prior research suggests that addressing social demands (such as environmental 
management) requires diverting corporate resources from the short-term agenda 
towards long-term projects (Judge et al., 2010). The costs and benefits of compliance 
with environmental management criteria may be estimated by observing the 
propensity to comply among similar firms. If comparable firms have a high 
probability of complying with the FTSE4Good environmental criteria we assume 
that the cost to benefit trade-off for such firms is relatively favourable and that non-
compliant firms would be more responsive to engagement by FTSE. Consequently, 
we postulate that the likelihood of the company meeting the upgraded environmental 
criteria positively moderates the engagement effect. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. The impact of engagement and threatened exclusion 
on the probability that a firm will meet the FTSE4Good 
environmental management criteria will be higher where the 







3.2.4 The Impact of Incentives and Constraints on Compliance 
 
The response to engagement and threatened deletion from the index may be 
conditioned by the costs and benefits of exclusion and the strength with which 
stakeholders can advocate their particular interests.  We therefore examine the 
influence of the benefit of index membership, the ownership structure of the firm, its 
internal governance practices and the governance of the economic system in which it 
operates.  
 
3.2.4.1 Index Membership Benefits and Compliance  
 
Prior research suggests that firms with stronger reputational concerns are more likely 
to implement CSR demands by activist asset managers (Dimson et al., 2012). Fisman 
et al. (2006) found that the more competitive the industry and the more intensive the 
advertising, the higher were the levels of CSR. We therefore postulate that the costs 
and benefits of index membership can be estimated from the proportion of 
comparable firms included in the index. If similar firms are likely to be included we 
presume that there is a net benefit whereas if they tend to be excluded then the 
benefits are assumed to be trivial or negative. Where there is a net benefit a firm will 
have an incentive to meet the criteria and stay in the index and will be more 
responsive to contact from FTSE.  
 
Hypothesis 2a. Firms will be more likely to meet the FTSE4Good 
environmental management criteria where the expectation of the 
firm being included in the index is higher. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. The impact of engagement and threatened exclusion 
on the probability that a firm will meet the FTSE4Good 
environmental management criteria will be higher where the 






3.2.4.2 Ownership and Compliance  
 
Prior research has established that ownership concentration can have a significant 
effect on the monitoring and governance of the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). When the financial and social 
interests of shareholders are aligned, they will actively promote such projects 
(Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008). However, Rees and Rodionova (2012) argue that 
environmental management includes financial CSR, for example for product 
innovation, and social CSR, for example for emission reduction. Social CSR implies 
that expenditures are borne by the owners while the benefits affect the society at 
large (Rees & Mackenzie, 2011). Undiversified or entrenched owners that hold 
equity for strategic reasons rather than for trading are thought to actively obstruct 
investment in social CSR projects. Given their incentive and power to closely 
monitor management decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983), closely-held ownership 
reduces the incentive and scope for external social activism (Judge et al., 2010). We 
can, therefore, predict that owners with closely-held stock will tend to resist 
management decisions to invest resources in enhancing environmental performance 
and may respond negatively to engagement.  
 
Hypothesis 3a. Firms with high levels of closely-held ownership 
are less likely to meet the enhanced FTSE4Good environmental 
management criteria. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. High levels of closely-held ownership will reduce 
the engagement effect. 
 
3.2.4.3 Institutional Environment and Compliance  
 
Prior scholarship has documented the influence of the institutional setting on CSR 
proficiency (Campbell, 2007; Delmas & Toffel, 2010; Young & Marais, 2012). In 




(CME) have established a more society-oriented vision compared to liberal market 
economies (LME). In line with this proposition, CMEs exhibit better overall CSR 
reporting and focus more on social community-oriented areas such as the 
environment (Young & Marais, 2012). To the extent that CSR reporting and 
membership in a responsible investment index can be used by management in their 
dialogue with stakeholders, we can expect a positive response towards compliance 
with the index requirements to be more prevalent in CMEs than in LMEs and to 
positively affect the engagement process.  
 
Hypothesis 4a. Companies from coordinated market economies are 
more likely to meet the FTSE4Good environmental requirements 
within the required time period. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. The engagement effect will be stronger if the 
company comes from a coordinated market economy rather than a 
liberal market economy. 
 
3.2.4.4 Governance and Compliance  
 
According to agency theory, if managers are monitored and mechanisms are set in 
place to align their interests with those of shareholders, managers will favour 
decisions which create value for shareholders. The impact of strong governance on 
CSR proficiency can, therefore, follow two directions. On the one hand, managers 
may oppose social CSR as they may perceive it as destructive to shareholder value, 
but they may favour financial CSR where there may be direct financial gains for the 
company (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Rees & Rodionova, 2012). On the other hand, 
institutional theory suggests that good governance can help balance interests of 
various stakeholders and as such can help sustain the firm’s legitimacy and 
consequently its profitability. In this instance good governance may promote social 
CSR despite its negative impact on value. Therefore, internal governance may have a 





Hypothesis 5a. Firms with high governance ratings comply 
differently from firms with low governance ratings. 
 
Hypothesis 5b. Firms with high governance ratings are influenced 
by engagement differently from firms with low governance ratings. 
 
3.2.4.5 An Integrated Model of the Responsible Investment Index Engagement 
and CSR 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts engagement as instigated by the index data provider, in this case 
FTSE, but also influenced in the index design and implementation by investment 
institutions, NGOs and academics. The engagement is further reinforced by the 
threat of public expulsion from the index. The research reviewed above suggests that 
CSR investment may be beneficial to managers and their firm. Membership of a 
responsible investment index makes that investment apparent and we hypothesise 
that engagement will therefore tend to induce increased compliance with the 
requirements of the index (H1a&b). We propose four moderating factors which may 
further impact on CSR commitment and on the managers’ response to engagement 
by the responsible investment index: the probability of the firm being in the index 
and hence the implied costs of exclusion (H2a&b); the proportion of closely-held 
equity (H3a&b); the institutional environment (H4a&b); and the internal governance 
of the firm (H5a&b). Following Judge et al. (2010) and in line with Rees and 
Mackenzie (2011), we classify CSR investment into two categories: financial CSR, 
defined as positive NPV projects that are in the interests of the shareholders; and 
social CSR, defined as negative NPV projects that are in the interests of other 














































3.3 Research Method 
 
3.3.1 Sample and Experimental Setting 
 
To assess the impact of the engagement/exclusion threat on environmental 
management practices we use the natural experiment resulting from the 2002 change 
to FTSE4Good environmental criteria and the implementation of the updated criteria 
in 2005. 1,602 firms in the FTSE All-World Developed Index were assessed in both 
2002 and 2005
4
 according to the FTSE4Good environmental management standards 
but 148 were disqualified from consideration for the FTSE4Good index membership 
as their business fell outside accepted industry criteria (e.g. weaponry or tobacco). A 
further 20 were excluded due to missing data leaving 1,434 firms. Of these, 1,029 
companies from 21 different countries and 32 industries did not meet the new 
environmental criteria in 2002 and form our main sample
5
. In some models data 
requirements for explanatory or control variables reduce the sample further.  
 
The treatment group consists of 377 companies that were included in the 
FTSE4Good index in 2002 but did not at that time meet the enhanced environmental 
management requirements. The control group contains the 652 companies that were 
                                                 
4
 During this period 2002 to 2005 a number of firms dropped out of FTSE All-World Index. However, 
given the small number of those companies we were able to check that, regardless of the potential 
compliance outcome for those companies, the results regarding the engagement impact and its 
magnitude would be qualitatively similar.  
 
5
 The international classification is as follows (an asterix marks those countries classified as CME): 
Australia 42, Austria* 6, Belgium* 9, Canada 52, Denmark* 6, Finland* 1, France* 28, Germany* 12, 
Hong Kong 41, Italy* 22, Japan* 167, Netherlands* 10, New Zealand 16, Norway* 3, Portugal* 5, 
Singapore 30, Spain* 10, Sweden* 6, Switzerland* 6, UK 263, USA 294. Where prior research was 
available we followed the established classification and for countries for which extant evidence was 
not available the classification was based on stock market capitalisation to GDP (La Porta et al., 1997) 
and anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008). This segments the sample into the British 
Commonwealth and the USA versus all others and also effectively segments common law versus code 
law.  
The industrial classification is as follows: Automobiles & Parts 18, Banks 84, Beverages 15, 
Chemicals 28, Construction & Building Materials 56, Diversified Industrials 19, Electricity 10, 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 30, Engineering & Machinery 27, Food & Drug Retailers 20, Food 
Producers & Processors 34, Forestry & Paper 6, General Retailers, 61, Health 30, Household Goods & 
Textiles 24, Information Technology Hardware 40, Insurance 33, Leisure & Hotels 38, Life 
Assurance 17, Media & Entertainment 59, Mining 10, Oil & Gas 37, Personal Care & Household 
Products 9, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 35, Real Estate 36, Software & Computer Services 44, 
Speciality & Other Finance 59, Steel & Other Metals 9, Support Services 52, Telecommunication 




members of the All-World Developed Index but were not included in FTSE4Good in 
September 2002 and also failed to meet the requirements of the new environmental 
criteria. These companies did not face the threat of deletion from the index and the 
associated adverse publicity, nor did they receive any contact from FTSE explaining 
the requirements of the new criteria. We use this setting to investigate whether the 
companies in the treatment group were more or less likely than the control group to 
adopt the environmental management practices required for FTSE4Good inclusion 
within the necessary three-year time period. The structure of the experimental setting 



































Table 3.1 reveals a clear difference between the treatment and control firms with 49 
percent of the former complying and only 24 percent of the latter. However, in order 
to contrast the response to the index requirements of the two groups we have to 
ensure that we control for other factors which may make the two groups inherently 
different. Firstly, in Table 3.1 we show that FTSE classify the treatment group as 
2005 2002 2010 
408 FTSE4Good 
firms meet the new 
criteria and are not 
analysed further. 
377 FTSE4Good 
firms fail to meet 
the new criteria 
and form the 
treatment group. 
652 non-FTSE 
firms fail to meet 
the new criteria 
and form the 
control group. 
49 percent of 
treated & 24 
percent of control 
firms meet the new 
criteria in 2005. 
51 percent of 
treated & 76 
percent of control 
firms fail to meet 
the new criteria in 
2005. 
65 percent of 
treated & 41 
percent of control 
firms meet the new 
criteria by 2010. 
35 percent of 
treated & 59 
percent of control 
firms fail to meet 
the new criteria by 
2010. 
The sample includes the FTSE All-World Developed Index constituents 
(excluding prohibited firms, e.g. weaponry, tobacco), which are independently 
assessed by EIRIS for environmental policy, management and reporting with 
requirements varying by environmental risk. Enhanced environmental criteria 
were announced in 2002 and firms were given until 2005 to comply. 
Engagement was conducted with FTSE4Good member firms that had not 




having lower environmental risk and better dialogue with key stakeholders (defined 
as compliance with FTSE4Good stakeholder criteria
6
) than the control group.  
 
TABLE 3.1 
Comparison of Treatment Group and Control Group Using Key Variables: Compliance in 
2005, Environmental Risk, Stakeholder Compliance, Predicted Compliance in 2002 and 
Predicted Index Membership in 2002 
 Control (n=652) Treatment (n=377) 
Abstain 498 76% 193 51% 
Comply 154 24% 184 49% 
Chi
2
=73.63, p<0.001     
High 320 49% 20 5% 
Medium 232 36% 253 67% 
Low 100 15% 104 28% 
Chi
2
=213.53, p<0.001     
Stakeholder not met 423 65% 0 0% 
Stakeholder met 229 35% 377 100% 
Chi
2
=423.79, p<0.001     
Predict Abstain 606 93% 324 86% 
Predict Comply 46 7% 53 14% 
Chi
2
=18.27, p<0.001     
Predict Out 470 72% 70 19% 
Predict In 182 28% 307 81% 
Chi
2
=274.35, p<0.001     
This table presents the distribution of compliance with new environmental criteria between 
treatment and control groups. The treatment group includes 377 firms from the main test sample 
(1,029 firms) that were in the index and did not comply in 2002. The control group includes 652 
firms that were outside the index and did not comply in 2002. Abstain denotes not complying in 
2005 and Comply denotes moving to meet the new environmental criteria in 2005. High, Medium 
and Low represent distribution of the firms with the corresponding environmental risk. Predict 
Abstain and Predict Comply present the number of firms that are predicted to comply/not comply 
with environmental management in 2002. The number of firms that are predicted to be included in 
or excluded from the index are given by Predict Out and Predict In. Stakeholder not met and 
Stakeholder met present compliance with stakeholder criteria. In each case, the significance of the 
differences is estimated using the Chi
2
 test.  
 
 
Secondly, for H1b we construct the probability of meeting the enhanced 
environmental requirements in 2002 when they were introduced, thereby measuring 
the ease with which a firm would move to meeting the criteria between 2002 and 
2005. We do so by estimating the probability that firms would comply with the 
environmental criteria in 2002, even though they had not yet done so. The 
                                                 
6
 FTSE4Good stakeholder criteria aim to reflect company relations with key stakeholders. 
Requirements include existence of policies and management systems and processes related to the core 
labour standards, equal opportunities and diversity and relationships with suppliers and customers. 




probability of complying with the FTSE environmental management criteria in 2002, 
designated P.Meet02, is estimated using a logit model based on the available sample 
of 1,434 firms, where the probability of compliance is based on country (Country) 
and industry (Industry) dummies, the FTSE assessment of the environmental risk of 
the firms (High or Medium) and the FTSE assessment of the firms’ stakeholder 
policies (Stake): 
 
Meet02j = a0 + a1Highj + a2Mediumj + a3Stakej + … 
C1-21Countryj + I1-32Industryj + ej 
 





=120.10, p<0.001 respectively) as are high environmental risk 
(Chi
2
=4.73, p<0.05) and the stakeholder (Chi
2
=74.16, p<0.001) dummies. The model 
has a pseudo-R
2
 of 0.22 and correctly classifies 76 percent of cases. P.Meet02 is then 
the predicted value from the equation. Table 3.1 reveals that firms in the treatment 
group were more likely to meet the environmental criteria in 2002 than those in the 
control group. 
 
For H2a and H2b we also estimate the probability that a firm would be a member of 
the FTSE4Good index. The probability of a firm being in the index, designated 
P.Ind02, is estimated using a logit model with the same sample as P.Meet02, country 
(Country) and industry (Industry) dummies, the log of market capitalisation (Size) 
and the closely-held ownership percentage (Close) as reported by Datastream: 
 
Ind02j = a0 + a1Sizej + a2Closej + C1-21Countryj + I1-32Industryj + ej 
 
 The country and industry dummies are collectively statistically significant 
(Chi
2
=171.50, p<0.001 and Chi
2
=136.89, p<0.001 respectively) as are the size 
(Chi
2
=69.22, p<0.001) and ownership (Chi
2
=13.91, p<0.001) variables. The model 
has a pseudo-R
2
 of 0.28 and correctly classifies 76 percent of cases. P.Ind02 is the 
predicted value from the model. We assume that the observed propensity of firms to 




Table 3.1 demonstrates that firms in the treatment group were more likely to be 
members of the index. In later tests this measure allows us to examine whether the 
incentive to remain in the index (due to potential exclusion costs) influences 
compliance separately from the engagement by FTSE.  
 
3.3.2 Model Specification 
 
Our main results are based on models that control for the probability of the firm 
meeting the new standards when they were introduced in 2002. We also introduce 
environmental risk and stakeholder relations as separate controls as they are 
parameters that have a role in the FTSE evaluation and may, therefore, affect 
compliance beyond their impact on the prior probability of meeting the new 
requirements. A firm cannot enter the FTSE4Good index without meeting the 
stakeholder criteria, and failing to meet these would reduce the firm’s incentive to 
meet the environmental management criteria. Equally, the upgrading of the 
environmental management criteria had the greatest impact on those firms assessed 
as having medium risk and we might, therefore, expect such firms to have the most 
difficulty in meeting the new criteria. We also examine the sensitivity of our results 
to the inclusion of industry and country dummies in case their impact on subsequent 
compliance of firms originally failing to meet the new criteria differs from their 
impact on prior compliance.   
 
The regression attempts to model external factors that will impact on the firms’ 
probability of meeting the FTSE4Good environmental management requirements 
and allows us to separate the impact of the prior probability of compliance, the 
engagement allied to the exclusion threat, environmental risk and stakeholder 
relations, and the interaction between engagement and the prior probability of 
compliance. As a robustness test we also use propensity score matching (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), which controls for the sample selection 




of environmental risk, industry and country
7
, on the implicit assumption that other 
factors which would affect compliance are randomly distributed. Our tests suggest 
that this assumption is valid and the propensity score approach provides reliable 
support for the regression approach.  However, we maintain our focus on the 
regression models as they provide a straightforward method to examine the impact 
and interaction of various additional factors on firm compliance rates. Thus our 
initial logit model is: 
 
Meet05i  = 0 + 1Engagei + 2P.Meet02i + 3Engagei*P.Meet02i + 4Mediumi +... 




Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable (Meet05) is a zero-one dummy that 
indicates compliance with the FTSE4Good environmental management criteria for 
all firms in the All-World Developed Index regardless of the inclusion or exclusion 
from the FTSE4Good index. In our initial models we use compliance in 2005, the 
deadline set by FTSE when they upgraded the criteria in 2002. To examine the 
persistence of the engagement effect we also investigate compliance in 2006 to 2010. 
 
Explanatory Variables. Our primary explanatory variable (Engage) is the combined 
effect of FTSE engagement and the threat of exclusion, which applied to all firms 
that were included in the FTSE4Good index in 2002 but were assessed, at that point, 
as failing to meet the upgraded environmental management criteria. In subsequent 
                                                 
7
 The model was tested for sensitivity to financial metrics (e.g. market-to-book, return on equity and 
equity returns) but none of these measures were statistically significant and were therefore excluded 
from the final model. Most importantly, as the discussion of the results in 3.4.2 reveals, matching 
balanced the treatment and the control groups with regards to the additional explanatory variables we 
investigated, i.e. ownership, predicted index membership and type of economy. However, difference 
in governance scores between the treatment and the control groups was still statistically significant 
(this is demonstrated in Table 3.4) so we re-estimated the propensity scores including governance in 
the sample selection model. The results of the engagement impact on compliance were consistent with 
the propensity scores estimation model where governance is not included, and we therefore kept the 





models we additionally examine the impact of the incentive to stay in the index, the 
ownership of the firm, the firm’s governance and the institutional environment.  
 
The membership incentive (P.Ind02) is measured as the predicted probability of the 
FTSE4Good index membership in 2002 as discussed in the previous section. The 
ownership (Ownership) of the firm is the Datastream assessment of concentrated 
ownership in 2005. Concentrated ownership is defined as shares that are closely-held 
rather than traded, and includes shares held by family and employees, other 
corporations, governments, investment institutions and pension funds. The firm’s 
governance (Governance) is the ASSET4 overall governance score in 2005, which is 
assessed using multiple criteria and standardised to a 0-100 score. We used ASSET4 
scores to indicate this dimension in order to avoid any bias arising from taking both 
compliance and governance scores from FTSE.  Finally, the institutional 
environment (Economy) is included as a dichotomous variable distinguishing liberal 
market economies and coordinated market economies
3
. For all the variables included 
as moderating factors we firstly use a single broad indicator as described above, but 




. We first control for the prior probability of meeting the new 
criteria in 2002 (P.Meet02) and also interact that with the engagement variable 
(Engage). Further, in our model of compliance we include separately the FTSE 
environmental risk indicators (Medium and High) and the indicator of compliance 
with FTSE4Good stakeholder criteria (Stakeholder) plus 32 industry (Industry) and 




Table 3.2, panel A, reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample and for the 
treatment and control subsamples. Where we measure the probability of index 
inclusion, closely-held ownership or governance the samples are reduced due to 
                                                 
8
 The model was tested for sensitivity to firm financial characteristics (log of market capitalisation, 
log of total assets, market-to-book, price-to-earnings, return on equity and equity returns). None of 




missing data. As all variables fall between zero and one our data includes no outliers. 
These descriptive statistics confirm the differences between the treatment and control 
firms given in Table 3.1. In comparison with the control firms the treatment firms are 
more likely to have met the criteria in 2002, have lower environmental risk as 
assessed by FTSE, necessarily comply with FTSE4Good stakeholder criteria whereas 
only 35 percent of the control group comply, and are more likely to be members of 
FTSE4Good. In addition Table 3.2 clarifies that treatment firms are less likely to be 
from CMEs, have higher levels of concentrated ownership and higher ASSET4 
governance scores. 
 
Panel B contains the correlation matrix for the dependent variable and explanatory 
variables. Both constructed variables, the probability of meeting the criteria in 2002 
and the probability of being an index member in 2002, are positively correlated with 
the outcome (0.40 and 0.18 respectively) but have low correlation between the two 
measures (-0.03). High correlations (greater than 0.50) between explanatory 
variables include the expected positive relationship between the engagement variable 
and both the FTSE stakeholder measure (0.64) and the probability of index 
membership (0.60), the anticipated negative correlation between the indicators of 
high and medium risk (-0.66), and a negative correlation between the indicator of a 
coordinated market economy and both ownership (-0.51) and governance (-0.61). 
Most of these relationships are as expected but our data shows that concentrated 
ownership is higher in LMEs than in CMEs. This is driven by higher levels of 
ownership by financial institutions in the LMEs.  Conversely family and corporate 
ownership is higher in CMEs than in LMEs
9
. We examine the sensitivity of our 
results to the inclusion or otherwise of various combinations of these variables in 
subsequent tables. 
                                                 
9
 Our results show that there is a consistent negative response to the three main categories of 
concentrated ownership – institutional, corporate and family. Following a suggestion by the journal 
reviewer we have also examined whether the results are consistent for both CME and LME countries 





Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Meet05 Engage P.Meet02 Medium High Stakeholder P.Ind02 Economy Ownership Governance 
Full Sample           
Mean 0.33 0.37 0.21 0.47 0.33 0.59 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.54 
Std. Dev 0.47 0.48 0.19 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.30 
Max 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.92 0.98 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
N 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 976 1,029 992 752 
Engagement           
Mean 0.49  0.25 0.68 0.05 1.00 0.65 0.19 46.48 65.02 
Std. Dev 0.50  0.20 0.47 0.23 0.00 0.20 0.40 17.87 22.89 
Max 1.00  0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 82.33 97.41 
Min 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 3.10 
N 377  377 377 377 377 356 377 375 307 
Control           
Mean 0.23  0.19 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.31 0.34 40.58 46.46 
Std. Dev 0.42  0.18 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.24 0.47 20.14 31.64 
Max 1.00  0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 92.33 97.56 
Min 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.49 





Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 Meet05 Engage P.Meet02 Medium High Stakeholder P.Ind02 Economy Ownership Governance 
Meet05 1.00                 
Engage 0.26
***

















































































Statistics and correlations are presented for the main test sample (1,029 observations) or where data on a specific variable is missing for the available sample. Meet05 
denotes meeting new environmental standards in 2005 (=1); Engage denotes subject to FTSE Engagement (=1); P.Meet02 and P.Ind02 are our estimates of the 
probability of meeting the new environmental criteria and of being in the index in 2002 respectively (on a zero to one scale); Medium, High and Stakeholder denote 
environmental risk and meeting stakeholder governance requirements as assessed by FTSE in 2002 (all variables are zero-one). Economy equals one for CME, 
Ownership is the percentage of closely-held equity as assessed by Datastream and Governance is the firm’s overall governance score as assessed by ASSET4 and 




3.4.1 Test of the Joint Engagement and Exclusion Effect 
 
In Table 3.3 we report the tests of the joint impact of engagement and threatened 
deletion (treatment) on compliance. In Models 1 and 2 we control only for the prior 
probability of meeting the criteria and in Models 3 and 4 we include the control 
variables identifying high and medium environmental risk, as assessed by FTSE, and 
whether or not the firm meets FTSE4Good stakeholder requirements. In Models 5 
and 6 we interact the treatment variable with the prior probability to examine 
whether the impact of treatment is affected by the expected ease with which the firm 
can meet the criteria. We estimate the models without industry and country dummies 
(Models 1, 3 and 5) and secondly with these controls included (Models 2, 4 and 6).  
 
The treatment coefficient is positive and significant in the simplest model (Model 1: 
β=1.06, p<0.001) and when industry and country dummies are included (Model 2: 
β=1.79, p<0.001). When the FTSE controls are included (Model 3: β=1.39, p<0.001), 
and also when industry and country dummies are included (Model 4: β=1.57, 
p<0.001), the results remain strongly positive and statistically significant. For all four 
models our results are consistent with H1a: treatment significantly increases the 
probability of compliance. The marginal effect estimated for these four models 
shows a significant impact of treatment (Model 1: 0.19, p<0.001, Model 2: 0.27, 
p<0.001, Model 3: 0.24, p<0.001 and Model 4: 0.23, p<0.001), indicating an increase 
in the probability of a firm complying after treatment of approximately 19 to 27 
percent points. 
 
The high environmental risk and stakeholder control variables are not statistically 
significant. However, the medium risk variable is negative and significant, which is 
consistent with the increased requirements imposed on medium risk firms by the new 
environmental management criteria making it particularly difficult for these firms to 
comply. The industry and country dummies are collectively significant but they 
make little difference to the coefficient estimated for the test variables. The 




dummies are included. This is expected, as prior probability is partly determined by 
industry and country variables.  
 
TABLE 3.3 
Tests of the Joint Engagement and Deletion Threat Effect 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
       
Intercept -2.22*** -1.95** -1.68*** -0.62 -1.78*** -0.78 
 (5.89) (3.04) (3.73) (0.92) (4.18) (1.14) 
       
Engage 1.06*** 1.79*** 1.39*** 1.57*** 1.71* 2.10* 
 (3.31) (6.42) (3.95) (3.48) (2.35) (1.96) 
       
P.Meet02 4.67*** 2.81* 4.93*** -0.55 5.46*** 0.62 
 (3.82) (2.44) (3.97) (0.20) (4.26) (0.16) 
       
P.Meet02 * 





       
Medium   -0.61* -0.80* -0.62* -0.80* 
   (2.50) (2.03) (2.42) (2.02) 
       
High   -0.42 -1.23 -0.43 -1.18 
   (0.92) (1.44) (0.94) (1.33) 
       
Stakeholder   -0.49 1.10 -0.57 0.88 
   (1.44) (1.38) (1.48) (0.85) 
       
Marginal  
effect      
 
Engage 0.19*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.30* 0.31* 
P.Meet02 * 
Engage 







         
Full Model 144.42*** 965.78*** 291.64*** 862.77*** 401.38*** 584.82*** 
All Engagement 10.93*** 41.18*** 15.58*** 12.08** 20.76*** 11.23** 
Country/ 
Industry Excluded 965.78*** Excluded 477.53*** Excluded 435.37*** 
       
Observations 1,029 1,023 1,029 1,023 1,029 1,023 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.16 0.29 0.17 0.29 0.18 0.29 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with upgraded environmental 
criteria in 2005. The independent variables are engagement from FTSE reinforced by the exclusion 
threat (Engage), the prior probability of complying with the new criteria (P.Meet02), medium 
environmental risk (Medium), high environmental risk (High), meeting stakeholder criteria 
(Stakeholder), and industry and country dummy variables. The absolute t-statistics are given 
underneath in parentheses. We also present Wald-Chi
2
 estimates of the significance of a) the full 
model, b) the engagement variables plus any interaction term and c) the full set of country and 
industry dummies. All standard errors are robust and are clustered by country.  





The inclusion of an interaction term between the treatment variable and the prior 
probability variable appears to increase the coefficient on treatment but suggests a 
decline in statistical significance (Model 5: β=1.71, p<0.05 and Model 6: β=2.10, 
p<0.05), whilst the coefficients on the treatment and prior probability of compliance 
interaction are individually insignificant (Model 5: β=-1.20, p=insig and Model 6: 
β=-1.72, p=insig). This is potentially misleading, as the joint statistical significance 
of both treatment related variables remains strongly significant (Model 5: Chi
2
=20.76, 
p<0.001 and Model 6: Chi
2
=11.23, p<0.01). The net marginal effect of treatment, 
estimated using the mean value for the prior probability of compliance of 0.21, 
remains in the same region estimated by Models 1 to 4 without interaction effects 
(Model 5: 0.30-(0.21*0.21)=0.25 and Model 6: 0.31-(0.25*0.21)=0.25). Although 
not individually significant, the negative coefficient on the interaction term suggests 
that treatment is less effective for firms that are expected to be close to compliance. 
This suggests that firms that find it easy to comply do not require the additional 
incentive of the FTSE engagement and is therefore inconsistent with H1b. 
  
3.4.2 Propensity Score Matching Tests of the Joint Engagement and Exclusion 
Effect  
 
In Table 3.4 we report the results of the propensity score matching approach. Here 
we have controlled for sample selection bias and contrast the results for firms that are 
equally likely to receive engagement but where the treatment firms receive 
engagement and the control firms do not. We report a number of different results 
based on varied matching procedures and statistical methods. Our results include 
matching our treatment firms with a) their nearest neighbour, b) the three nearest 
neighbours, c) the three nearest neighbours that fall within plus or minus 0.001 
probability of treatment, d) all firms that fall within plus or minus 0.001 probability 
of treatment, and e) a kernel matching procedure that uses the weighted average of 
all control firms, depending on the propensity score, to construct the counterfactual 
outcome. We also re-estimate the statistical significance using bootstrapping 




requirements, we also report sample size. This reveals that the matching technique 
leaves some treatment cases unmatched and, therefore, excluded from the analysis.  
 
TABLE 3.4  
Analysis of the Joint Engagement and Deletion Threat Effect Using Propensity Score Matching 
 ATT    
Matching Treatment Control Diff. t-statistic Treatment Control 
Unmatched 
 0.49 0.22 0.27 8.79***   
 
Model 1: Nearest (n1) 0.49 0.20 0.29 4.48*** 377 567 
Bootstrapped 




   
Model  2: Nearest (n3) 0.49 0.18 0.31 6.42*** 377 567 
Bootstrapped 




   
Model 3: Nearest (n3)  
Caliper (0.001) 0.47 0.17 0.30 5.80*** 290 567 
Bootstrapped   0.29 6.14***   
Model 4: Radius, 
(0.001) 0.47 0.16 0.31 6.34*** 290 567 
Bootstrapped   0.30 6.65***   
 
Model 5: Kernel 0.49 0.17 0.32 7.16*** 377 567 
Bootstrapped   0.32 9.79***   
 
Impact of Matching on Incentive Variables  
  Treated Control %Bias % Change t-statistic 
P.Ind02 Unmatched 0.65 0.36 139.00  20.26*** 
 Matched 0.64 0.64 -0.6 99.6 0.11 
Ownership Unmatched 0.47 0.41 32.4  4.76*** 
 Matched 0.47 0.46 3.4 89.4 0.50 
Governance Unmatched 0.65 0.44 77.7  9.96*** 
 Matched 0.65 0.58 25.1 67.7 3.32** 
Economy Unmatched 0.18 0.34 -37.0  5.49*** 
 Matched 0.17 0.16 3.7 90.1 0.59 
This table presents the results of the test of the treatment using propensity score matching. We use 
nearest neighbour matching, radius matching and kernel matching methods to test whether the 
treatment (combined effect of FTSE engagement and the threat of expulsion from the index) has an 
effect on compliance with the enhanced environmental criteria. ATT denotes average treatment effect 
on the treated group regarding the outcome (compliance). T-statistic is the result for the average 
treatment effect. Treatment presents the number of companies subject to engagement and threatened 
with exclusion. Control denotes the matched companies that were not engaged with and did not face 
the deletion threat. The second panel reports the distribution of the incentive variables before and after 
the matching process. We report the means of treated and control sample unmatched and matched, the 
pre-matching and post-matching bias, the reduction in that bias achieved by matching and the t-test of 







However, in all cases the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is found to be 
strongly positive and significant, and thus the propensity score matching approach 
also supports H1a (Model 1: ATT=0.29, p<0.001, Model 2: ATT=0.31, p<0.001, 
Model 3: ATT=0.30, p<0.001, Model 4: ATT=0.31, p<0.001, Model 5: ATT=0.32, 
p<0.001). The ATT is comparable with the marginal effect from the logit models, 
and the propensity score matching approach suggests an increased probability of 
complying with the environmental management criteria of approximately 30 percent 
if a firm receives treatment. 
 
Table 3.4 also reports the distribution of the expected index membership, closely-
held ownership, governance rating and type of economy which are not used in the 
matching process but which, as we hypothesise, constitute incentives to comply with 
the FTSE4Good requirements. We expect that these variables may impact on the 
response to engagement and might affect the results of the matching process. We 
therefore have to ensure that after matching there are no significant differences 
between treated and control firms in these characteristics. The reported results are 
derived from the first approach, where we match each treated firm with its nearest 
neighbour, but are similar whichever matching process is used. This reveals that the 
probability of being in the index, closely-held ownership and the LME vs. CME 
distributions are significantly different for the unmatched treatment and control 
samples, but insignificantly different for the matched samples. However, the 
governance measure, whilst also moving towards equality for the matched sample, is 
still significantly different, with treatment firms recording higher governance scores 
than the control group (bias in matched samples 25.1 percent, t-statistic 3.32, p<0.01). 
We repeat the process but include governance in the propensity score calculation and 
find that it does have a statistically significant impact on the sample selection model. 
Firms with higher governance scores are more likely to receive treatment. Using 
governance in the matching balances the governance scores for the treatment and 
control group. The matching process now generates slightly smaller samples, but the 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 3.4 and the impact of engagement 





3.4.3 Tests of the Persistence of the Engagement Effect 
 
In Table 3.5 we rerun the regression model estimating the effect of engagement and 
the associated threat of deletion but we simplify the specification to exclude the prior 
probability variable. Our rationale is that the prior probability of compliance 
estimated in 2002 will become increasingly irrelevant as we move from 2005 to 2010. 
In this version we simply use the medium and high-risk dummies and the stakeholder 
compliance dummy plus industry and country dummies. This also has the advantage 
of simplifying the relationship between the control variables and compliance but 
retains the full information set used in the estimation of Table 3.3 results. We have 
also estimated these relationships using the same model as in Table 3.3 and find the 
results to be robust. 
 
We see that engagement remains significantly positive throughout the period (Model 
1: β=1.72, p<0.001, Model 2: β=1.62, p<0.001, Model 3: β=1.63, p<0.001, Model 4: 
β=1.35, p<0.001, Model 5: β=1.06, p<0.001, Model 6: β=1.04, p<0.001). The 
environmental risk dummies are both negative and, apart from the results for 2006, 
significantly so and the stakeholder dummy is positive and significant. These results 
are consistent with engagement continuing to impact positively on compliance with 
the environmental management practices through to 2010. Thus, H1a holds even 
when we measure the impact of engagement up to five years after the 
implementation date. The marginal effect remains high until 2008 when it starts to 
diminish, although even in 2010 the estimated marginal effect is 18 percent (Model 





TABLE 3.5  
Tests of the Joint Engagement and Exclusion Threat Effect on Compliance in 2005-2010 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
       
Intercept -0.94 -0.75 -0.13 0.32 0.67 0.49 
 (1.29) (1.06) (0.19) (0.47) (0.94) (0.68) 
       
Engage 1.72*** 1.62*** 1.63*** 1.35*** 1.06*** 1.04*** 
 (5.46) (5.42) (5.54) (4.55) (3.50) (3.36) 
       
Medium -0.62* -0.36 -1.03*** -1.27*** -1.17*** -1.11*** 
 (2.30) (1.27) (3.54) (4.06) (3.61) (3.31) 
       
High -1.09** -0.65† -1.22** -1.23** -1.38*** -1.33** 
 (2.92) (1.70) (3.25) (3.19) (3.47) (3.23) 
       
Stakeholder 0.96*** 0.89** 0.87** 1.02*** 1.19*** 1.07*** 
 (3.37) (3.27) (3.26) (3.84) (4.36) (3.83) 
       
Country effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
Marginal Effect       
Engage 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
Wald-Chi
2
 224.81*** 210.76*** 216.88*** 187.71*** 182.87*** 169.19*** 
       
Observations 1,008 916 877 818 756 714 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with upgraded environmental 
criteria in 2005-2010. The independent variables are engagement from FTSE reinforced by the 
exclusion threat (Engage), medium environmental risk (Medium), high environmental risk (High), 
meeting stakeholder criteria (Stakeholder), and industry and country dummy variables. The absolute t-
statistics are given underneath in parentheses. All standard errors are robust and are clustered by 
country. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
3.4.4 Tests of Incentives and Constraints  
 
In Table 3.6 we examine the effect of a) the probability of index membership, which 
we view as a surrogate for the net benefit of membership, b) ownership, c) 
governance and d) institutional environment on compliance both directly and via an 
interaction term with the engagement variable. The model is estimated for each 
construct separately (Models 1 to 8) and then for the four taken together (Models 9 




construct under examination and then consider more narrowly defined measures as 
sensitivity tests. We also conduct propensity score matching tests (unreported) of the 
type reported in Table 3.4 but subsampled according to the incentive or constraint to 
identify where responses differ under different circumstances. 
 
3.4.4.1 The Impact of Index Membership  
 
Our results suggest that the prior probability of index membership is related to 
compliance when estimated using only the main effect (Model 1: β=1.33, p=<0.05). 
When jointly estimated with an interaction effect the main effect appears 
insignificant (Model 2: β=0.53, p=insig) and the interaction effect marginally 
significant (Model 2: β=2.31, p<0.10). However, when we also test whether the main 
effect and the interaction effect are jointly significant we find that they are (Model 2: 
Chi
2
=18.95, p<0.001) and when we test whether the engagement variable and the 
interaction term are jointly significant, again they are (Model 2: Chi
2
=10.57, p<0.01). 
Thus both engagement and the probability of membership are significantly related to 
compliance, and there is some evidence that engagement works more strongly when 
associated with firms that have a high probability of index membership
10
. It is worth 
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 Given that the test model is a logit model, the interpretation of the coefficients on the interaction 
terms should be treated with caution. Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) derive the 
appropriate formulae for the interaction effect and the standard error, and show that both the sign and 
the statistical significance of the estimates may be miscalculated. More specifically, if to consider a 
probit model, the interaction effect will be as follows (Ai & Norton, 2003: 124): 
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where y is the dependent (dummy) variable, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution and x1 
and x2 are continuous independent variables. Instead, the effect of the interaction term is often 















This implies that the magnitude of the interaction effect and its statistical significance may differ for 
different levels of the predicted value of the dependent variable. If to plot the interaction effect 
graphically against the predicted probability of the dependent variable, the resulting curve would have 
an S-shaped pattern with the interaction effect being positive for some values of the predicted 
probability and negative for others. At the same time, the (incorrect) estimation of the interaction 
effect as the marginal effect of the interaction term would correspond only to the observations where 
the predicted probability is about 0.5. It may therefore be invalid for many cases in the sample. Given 
that the main focus of the thesis is on the engagement effect itself, the main findings are not affected 
by the issue discussed above. Further, the relative effect of the engagement in different governance 




reiterating that we view the probability of index membership as an indicator of the 
net benefit of being in the index. Firms will tend to comply with the index 
requirements when the net balance of costs and benefits is positive. Being excluded 
when matched firms have complied implies that there is a cost to exclusion. The 
results we present here are consistent with both engagement and the probability of 
index membership being important influences on compliance but engagement works 
best when coupled with a high probability of membership (implying a high cost of 
exclusion). 
 
Our propensity score analysis clarifies the relationship. Matched cases show that 
engagement increases the probability of compliance from 32 percent to 52 percent 
for firms with a higher than average probability of being in the index compared to an 
increase from 16 percent to 46 percent for firms which are less likely to be in the 
index. Thus, although engagement has a lesser impact on the first group the net effect 
of engagement and expected index membership is higher for that group than for 
firms which are less likely to be in the index. 
 
3.4.4.2 The Impact of Concentrated Ownership  
 
We find a strong negative impact of concentrated shareholdings on compliance 
whether an interaction term with engagement is excluded (Model 3: β=-0.02, 
p<0.001) or included  (Model 4: β=-0.02, p<0.001) and the interaction term is 
marginally positive (Model 4: β=0.01, p<0.10.). When both terms are included in the 
model their joint effect is statistically significant (Model 4: Chi
2
=19.93, p<0.001). 
These results are consistent with H3a but not with H3b. We then decompose the total 
closely-held ownership into components held by families, corporations, investment 
institutions, the state, and pension funds. We also find that the impact of 
concentrated equity holdings is driven by holdings of investment institutions, 
families and corporations despite a positive impact where the state holds equity and 
an insignificant impact of pension fund holdings. 
                                                                                                                                          
already interesting. Nevertheless, a more precise examination of the interaction effect between the 
engagement variable and the governance contexts can offer interesting insights into the relative effect 





3.4.4.3 The Impact of Institutional Differences  
 
Firms in coordinated market economies are also shown to move to compliance more 
strongly than those in liberal market economies and this result is statistically 
significant (Model 5: β=1.10, p<0.01 and Model 6: β=1.12, p<0.001). However, the 
type of economy is independent of the engagement effect as the interaction term is 
insignificant (Model 6: β=-0.08, p=insig). Thus, our evidence supports H4a but not 
H4b. The propensity score matching tests confirm the first conclusion but also 
suggest that the engagement effect may be stronger for CME firms. For LME firms 
compliance moves from 17 percent to 43 percent on engagement but from 29 percent 
to 74 percent for CME firms. However, the sample for CME firms only includes 66 
cases and this result, combined with the insignificant regression model result, should 
be treated with caution.  
 
We enhance the institutional analysis by including market capitalisation scaled by 
GDP (La Porta et al., 1997) and the anti-self-dealing director index (Djankov et al., 
2008) together with the LME-CME dichotomy. The first variable indicates the 
influence of equity markets and the second is argued to be an indicator of the extent 
to which company law protects the rights of shareholders against exploitation by 
insiders. As neither of these variables captures the LME versus CME differences in 
institutional arrangements, we retain the variable indicating the type of economy 
together with the two new measures. Market capitalisation is significantly negatively 
associated with compliance, the anti-self-dealing director index is significantly 
positively associated and the economy variable remains significantly positively 
associated with compliance.  
 
3.4.4.4 The Impact of Corporate Governance  
 
When we estimate the impact of governance on compliance we find no reliable main 
effect (Model 7: β=0.13, p=insig and Model 8: β=-0.61, p<0.10) but the engagement-




being more effective for well-governed firms (Model 8: β=2.20, p<0.01). This result 
is consistent with H5b but not with H5a. The ASSET4 measure of governance is a 
broad amalgamation of various factors so we further analyse the impact of CEO-
chair duality, the size of the board and the number of non-executive directors (Judge 
et al., 2010). CEO duality is insignificantly negative but both the size of the board 
and the number of non-executive directors are significantly positive. Taken together, 
the three indicators of governance appear statistically significant and indicate that 
characteristics associated with good governance are associated with better rates of 
compliance. However, we find that governance is sensitive to the inclusion of other 
incentive variables and our propensity score matching tests suggest that treatment 
has an almost identical significant impact for both high and low governance firms. 
Engagement increases compliance from 18 percent to 49 percent for high governance 





TABLE 3.6  
Tests of Incentives and Constraints 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9) (Model 10) 
           
Intercept -2.20*** -1.90** -0.86* -0.76† -2.02*** -2.03*** -1.84*** -1.63*** -2.68*** -2.24*** 
 (4.41) (3.26) (2.09) (1.79) (3.62) (3.79) (5.91) (5.16) (3.74) (3.84) 
           
Engage 1.38*** 0.04 1.43*** 1.06* 1.35*** 1.36** 1.40** -0.05 1.32** -0.99 
 (3.64) (0.08) (3.83) (2.36) (3.45) (3.01) (3.24) (0.11) (2.85) (0.89) 
           
P.Meet02 5.49*** 5.57*** 4.67*** 4.62*** 4.21*** 4.20*** 5.55*** 5.59*** 5.35*** 5.39*** 
 (4.36) (4.50) (4.56) (4.51) (4.68) (4.63) (5.26) (5.32) (5.42) (5.18) 
           
Medium -0.74** -0.81* -0.72*** -0.70** -0.69** -0.69** -0.42** -0.43** -0.67*** -0.67** 
 (2.58) (2.43) (3.31) (3.13) (3.04) (3.06) (2.79) (2.61) (3.83) (3.20) 
           
High -0.25 -0.40 -0.56 -0.55 -0.64 -0.64 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34 -0.40 
 (0.61) (0.94) (1.18) (1.15) (1.24) (1.24) (0.78) (0.78) (0.77) (0.88) 
           
Stakeholder -0.84* -0.75* -0.27 -0.24 -0.06 -0.06 -0.66 -0.40 -0.69 -0.43 
 (2.43) (2.44) (0.85) (0.75) (0.19) (0.19) (1.57) (1.02) (1.64) (1.10) 
           
P.Ind02 1.33** 0.53       1.52* 1.10* 
 (3.11) (0.83)       (2.50) (2.03) 
           
Engage *  2.31†        1.28 
P.Ind02  (1.94)        (1.07) 
           
Ownership   -0.02*** -0.02***     -0.01* -0.02** 
   (3.85) (4.27)     (2.24) (2.70) 




Engage *    0.01†      0.01 
Ownership    (1.75)      (1.13) 
           
Economy     1.10** 1.12***   1.10* 0.98* 
     (2.88) (4.26)   (2.00) (1.99) 
           
Engage *      -0.08    0.17 
Economy      (0.14)    (0.23) 
           
Governance       0.13 -0.61† 1.00* 0.48 
       (0.38) (1.75) (2.22) (0.76) 
           
Engage *        2.20**  1.43 
Governance        (2.98)  (1.39) 
           
Wald-Chi
2
           
Full Model 476.11*** 425.57*** 455.19*** 484.30*** 542.49*** 563.82*** 377.43*** 436.29*** 536.09*** 1516.78*** 
All Engagement 13.25*** 10.57** 14.68*** 16.97*** 11.92*** 16.86*** 10.47** 9.90** 8.11** 20.20** 
All Incentives 9.70** 18.95*** 14.79*** 19.93*** 8.29** 26.84*** 0.14 9.65** 15.65** 128.40*** 
           
Observations 976 976 993 993 1,029 1,029 748 748 706 706 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.24 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with upgraded environmental criteria in 2005. The independent variables are engagement from 
FTSE (Engage), the prior probability of complying with the new criteria (P.Meet02), medium environmental risk (Medium), high environmental risk (High), meeting 
stakeholder criteria (Stakeholder), the prior probability of being included in the FTSE4Good index (P.Ind02), the percentage of closely-held equity (Ownership), 
domicile in a CME (Economy) and the ASSET4 assessment of corporate governance (Governance). We also present Wald-Chi
2
 estimates of the significance of a) the 
full model, b) the engagement variables plus any interaction terms and c) all incentive variables plus any interaction terms. The absolute t-statistics are given 




3.4.4.5 The Impact of All Incentives  
 
In Models 9 and 10 we incorporate index membership, closely-held ownership, type 
of economy and firm governance together in a joint model. The results for the first 
three variables remain similar to those from the individual estimations. If we test the 
significance of all the variables including the engagement parameter, they are 
statistically significant when only the main effects are included (Model 9: Chi
2
=8.11, 
p<0.01) and also when interaction effects are also included (Model 10: Chi
2
=20.20, 
p<0.01). If we test the significance of all incentive variables they are jointly 
significant in both models (Model 9: Chi
2





However, the impact of governance is less robust than for the economy, ownership or 
index membership variables. There is no robust evidence of a significant main effect 
when governance is estimated without the other incentives (Model 7: β=0.13, 
p=insig). However, a significant positive main effect is noted when included with 
other incentives but with no interaction terms (Model 9: β=1.00, p<0.05). The strong 
positive interaction effect when governance is the only incentive variable (Model 8: 
β=2.20, p<0.01) is weaker and insignificant when all incentives are included (Model 
10: β=1.43, p=insig). This instability is driven by a strong correlation between the 
governance score and the economy variable (Table 2, =-0.61). Overall, the results 
regarding the impact of governance are mixed and we would treat any conclusions 
with caution. 
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Prior research has shown that, even if some institutional investors successfully 
engage with management on the matters of corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility, investment institutions do not seem to generally impact 
beneficially on CSR practices. Using a sample of 1,029 internationally diverse 
companies, our study analyses the impact of a responsible investment index on CSR. 




that may moderate the engagement impact and affect CSR compliance. Specifically, 
we used a quasi-experimental setting to evaluate the impact of engagement by FTSE 
on environmental management practices as assessed by compliance with the index 
requirements, allied to the threat of exclusion from that index.  
 
The main results are strong and consistent, regardless of whether they are estimated 
by a logit analysis or propensity score matching. Firms subject to engagement and 
potential exclusion were considerably more likely to be assessed as having complied 
by 2005 with the FTSE4Good enhanced environmental management criteria 
introduced in 2002. This finding is consistent with prior research which suggested 
that managers on the whole were likely to favour CSR investment for selfish, selfless 
or strategic reasons (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001) and would recognise the benefits to themselves and the firm of 
compliance with an established standard (Slager et al., 2012; Young & Marais, 2012). 
Our results also show that through direct involvement with management, FTSE 
encouraged companies to improve their compliance regardless of how potentially 
easy it was for the company to comply. Furthermore, engagement had a significant 
impact on management for at least five years.  
 
Part of the impact of FTSE may be driven by the threat of expulsion from the index 
and we estimate the strength of that threat as a function of the probability of a 
particular firm being a member. It is assumed that membership of matched firms 
indicates the net costs and benefits to such firms and can hence be used as a measure 
of the strength of the threat of expulsion. The actual engagement and the probability 
of membership are positively correlated (0.60) and as such it is difficult to 
disentangle their individual effect; however, both seem to influence compliance 
positively and compliance is highest when engagement is accompanied by a high 
probability of membership. 
 
In line with prior evidence, we additionally find that the management decision 
regarding compliance with the CSR standard was influenced by national and firm 




Young & Marais, 2012). Firms in coordinated market economies were more likely to 
implement the environmental practices necessary for FTSE4Good membership. 
Entrenched owners, including investment institutions, hindered the CSR investment 
necessary for compliance. However, we found that the impact of firm governance is 
sensitive to the model specification and any conclusions should be treated with 
caution.  
 
We cannot claim without caution that engagement leads to improved environmental 
performance - only that FTSE evaluated the firms’ practices as meeting the index 
requirements. However, to meet the enhanced environmental management criteria 
management would have had to respond to the engagement and meet the reporting 
and organisational requirements. This is consistent with case study research that 
suggests that managers react to investor engagement (Becht et al., 2009; Dimson et 
al., 2012). Our analysis presents the first empirical evidence that direct involvement 
with firms by a responsible investment index is effective in inducing that reaction. 
Only if there were no positive link between the FTSE4Good criteria and effective 
environmental management would our results not suggest improved performance.  
 
This study makes several important contributions to the current knowledge on 
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and, in particular, active 
ownership. Agency theory postulates that in the absence of constraints managers will 
tend to use their position for their own benefit. Institutional theory helps to explain 
how managers’ decision-making is influenced by external factors including 
entrenched shareholders, internal governance arrangements and institutional context. 
In line with prior research, our analysis emphasises that both theories are important 
in understanding the intricacies between managers’ and owners’ incentives and 
influences with regards to corporate social responsibility and, specifically, 
environmental management. Such issues may have a substantive impact on society 
and require large corporate investments, even though the immediate benefits for the 





Most importantly, in this complex governance system, our findings contribute to the 
understanding of how active ownership and involvement with firms advocated by 
agency theory can be achieved through collective action, rather than by leaving the 
matter to the discretion of a few substantial equity holders. Our results imply that 
engagement through a responsible investment index could provide a route for social 
activism. The practical implications of our findings derive from the fact that 
investment institutions may control vast funds but they are widely diversified, hold a 
relatively small percentage of equity and may not be highly influential within the 
firm. Our results suggest that combining their influence via a responsible investment 
index may be an effective way for these investors to have a direct impact on 
management decision-making. This implication may also be of interest to regulators, 
who might consider encouraging this type of collective-investor engagement and 
who might have cause for concern regarding the negative impact of entrenched 












This study investigates whether a responsible investment index effectively 
encouraged management of internationally diverse companies to introduce robust 
anti-bribery practices assessed by compliance with FTSE4Good countering bribery 
criteria. Engagement was performed by FTSE via extensive consultation and 
dialogue with company management and was reinforced by the threat of public 
deletion from the FTSE4Good index. Using a quasi-experimental setting, I contrast 
the response to meeting anti-bribery criteria by the companies in engagement and 
threatened with exclusion to a sample of otherwise similar companies which did not 
receive engagement nor were facing expulsion. I further analyse the influence of 
engagement and the index membership separately and whether the effect of 
engagement was dependent on companies’ incentive to be included in the index. 
Next, I examine possible drivers of compliance and engagement related to the overall 
governance context: presence of influential blockholders, the institutional 
environment defining shareholder rights protection and emphasis on investors versus 
other stakeholders and the level of internal governance. I further assess whether 
reputational concerns associated with a publicly known ethical controversy instigate 
compliance  and the response to the engagement. Finally, I test whether the index 
was effective in prompting companies to implement provisions consistent with 
FTSE’s assessment of best practice of preventing bribery.  
 
Despite the development of anti-bribery laws and policies in many countries, 
international bribery still proliferates (McKinney & Moore, 2008). For example, 
according to the survey of 350 international companies conducted by the Control 
Risks Group in 2006, 43 percent of respondents believe that they have at some point 
lost business to an unethical competitor, and this number has increased since a 
comparable survey in 2002 (Control Risks, 2006). This could be in part attributed to 
ineffective implementation of the laws (Global Corruption Report, 2009). However, 
even if the prosecution of corrupt practices is increasing (Karpoff et al., 2012), the 




corruption (Hess & Ford, 2011; McKinney & Moore, 2008). Bribing also constitutes 
a product of corporate culture and as such leads to major corporations considering 
illegal payments a legitimate business practice hereby providing a supply of bribes 
(Gjessing & Syse, 2007; Martin et al., 2007). If the incident involves a major 
international company, such behaviour encourages this practice across the industry 
and stimulates an unethical environment. Consequently, these cultural and ethical 
norms are challenged by the voluntary initiatives such as the United Nations Global 
Compact, the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment and activities by 
non-governmental organisations, e.g. Transparency International. The active 
involvement of the business community is thus one of the core strategies in 
countering bribery and corruption. For example, the UN Global Compact’s tenth 
principle against corruption underlines the shared responsibility and willingness of 
the private sector to play its part in eliminating corruption (Global Corruption Report, 
2009). 
 
Various national and international regulatory initiatives are aimed at preventing 
corporate bribery, such as the UK Bribery Act and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA). Increasing the scrutiny and toughening the level of convictions brought 
by these regulations is an important problem, yet exposure to bribery also represents 
a product of corporate culture and a system of incentives set up for employees. While 
it is commonly thought that bribery may be justified under some conditions, 
companies sometimes deliberately use corrupt practices as a source of competitive 
advantage and offer bribes themselves (Martin et al., 2007).  
 
There is emerging evidence that direct involvement with companies by a responsible 
investment index can be effective in enhancing environmental performance 
(Mackenzie et al., 2013).  Limited case studies suggest that private dialogue with 
companies by institutional investors can bring about positive changes to business 
practices (Becht et al., 2009; Carleton et al., 1998; Gjessing & Syse, 2007) and 
corporate social responsibility in particular (Dimson et al., 2012). Social activism is 
expanding (Judge et al., 2010), yet on the whole diversified institutions do not seem 




therefore sets out to expand the current knowledge on the topic and analyses whether 
collaborative investor involvement via a responsible investment index could be 
effective in addressing an ethical issue as crucial as bribery.  
 
For a sample of 340 large companies, the findings demonstrate that engagement via a 
responsible investment index reinforced by the potential exclusion from the index 
has led to a sustained increase in compliance with countering bribery requirements 
covering policy, management systems and reporting. Both the dialogue and the index 
exclusion threat motivated compliance and the two contributed independently. 
Further, compliance is found to be negatively associated with concentrated 
ownership and positively related to strong internal governance and domicile in liberal 
market economies. The difference in compliance stimulated by the index engagement 
persisted for at least two years and, while the negotiations element has contributed to 
motivating good practice, the peer pressure from the index membership is shown to 
effectively promote best practice.  
 
Consequently, the results further the understanding as to how international bribery 
can be combated by encouraging companies to adopt strict preventive measures. In 
particular, the findings demonstrate that both higher governance level and the 
institutional environment where shareholder rights are better protected against the 
expropriation by the State are positively associated with management’s preference to 
restrict bribery. Further, the results show how in the context of costs associated with 
business lost in the unethical competition, the index can engage effectively by 
combining the dialogue and raising awareness of the issue and challenging 
organisational legitimacy with the risks of the exclusion threat. With regards to 
practice, the findings demonstrate that institutional investors could consider such 
engagement via an index to instigate sustained changes in management practice 





4.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses 
 
4.2.1 Investor Engagement to Counter Bribery 
 
The ‘universal owner’ hypothesis suggests that for large diversified institutional 
investors the ultimate costs of bribery in investee firms may exceed potential benefits 
(Kiernan, 2007). This comes from the fact that while some companies in their 
portfolio will benefit from a business contract being awarded after an illegal payment, 
the deterioration of the business environment due to unethical behaviour would make 
it more difficult for well-performing firms to operate successfully. Indeed, extensive 
literature focuses on the detrimental effects of bribery and corruption in general on 
economic development (Guiso et al., 2009; Mauro, 1995; McKinney & Moore, 2008; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, 1994). The harmful impact arises from the unstable and 
inefficient legal and economic environment created by corruption, and a higher cost 
of finance due to a deterioration in trust and reputation (Hess & Ford, 2011). Bribery 
increases the risks caused by less scrupulous businesses winning contracts, hinders 
productivity by de-motivating employees and curbs sustainable growth (Aidt, 2009; 
Gjessing & Syse, 2007; Lydenberg, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Moreover, 
evidence suggests that firms which are supposed to benefit from the contracts 
awarded through illegal payments, have a lower return on assets, asset turnover, 
operating and net profit margins compared to their peers, and this underperformance 
is shown to persist not only before the bribery incident but also for at least three 
years after the award of the contract (Cheung et al., 2011). This implies that the 
resources are shifted towards less efficient firms, which has negative implications for 
the long-term returns of institutional investors. Institutional investors are therefore 
encouraged to become actively involved with management to enhance ethical 
behaviour in business transactions (Kiernan, 2007; Lydenberg, 2007).  
 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that investor engagement on environmental, 
social and governance matters is increasingly making its way into the business 




responsibility (Gifford, 2010). For example, Dimson et al. (2012) analysed the 
involvement of an asset manager with US public firms on CSR issues and observed 
an average success rate of 17 percent together with a positive market reaction to 
overall engagement and particularly to successful engagement with no penalty for 
unsuccessful engagement. Regarding bribery in particular, there are examples of 
investor movements such as the Extractive Industry Transparency initiative which 
encourages companies to publish their payments to host countries for licences to 
extract natural resources.  
 
Yet there is still little indication that institutional investors monitor anti-bribery 
provisions (Starks, 2009; Rees & Rodionova, 2012). Further, empirical evidence 
suggests that bribery per se does not deter investors, customers or suppliers from 
dealing with the firm (Karpoff et al., 2012). This is in line with the view that at least 
for some owners bribery may still be justified as the means to acquire private 
privileges and hence create firm value (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2012). However, 
even though bribery itself may not trigger significant negative market reaction, the 
accompanying concerns over financial representation and potential financial fraud 
are shown to have caused significant stock price falls (Davidson & Worrell, 1988; 
Karpoff et al., 2012). Therefore, whether investors actively oppose illegal payments 
or not, they may associate bribery with higher risks and inefficient management. This 
is consistent with the view suggesting that strong CSR performance is regarded as a 
sign of the overall management competence and of the governance quality 
(Renneboog et al., 2008; Solomon et al., 2004).  
 
4.2.2 FTSE4Good Countering Bribery Criteria 
 
FTSE4Good anti-bribery criteria take as a starting point the provisions set by 
Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery and follow 
the definition of bribery as “an offer or receipt of any gift, loan, fee, reward or other 
advantage to or from any person as an inducement to do something which is 
dishonest, illegal or a breach of trust in the conduct of the enterprise’s business” 




company, the criteria specifically targeted firms that have been assessed by FTSE as 
having the largest exposure to engaging in illegal payments. The identification of the 
affected companies was carried out by FTSE based on business sector, country of 
operation and involvement in public contracts or dealing with government licences.  
 
The requirements cover three main areas: policy, management and reporting (FTSE, 
2010). By combining three areas, the criteria target both a corporation’s ‘hardware’ 
(formal policies and processes) and ‘software’ (related to the behavioural norms and 
culture). Hess and Ford (2011) argue that both means help reduce the exposure of 
engaging in bribery by employees. According to FTSE, policy must explicitly 
prohibit giving and receiving bribes and state commitment to obeying all relevant 
laws. Further, it must cover restriction of facilitation payments and giving or 
receiving gifts. Finally, policy must be publicly available. Management practices 
include communication of the policy to employees and provision of training 
programmes, establishment of compliance mechanisms, e.g. via audits and board 
reports, and secure communication channels for employees such as hotlines, advice 
lines and whistle-blowing procedures. Finally, management system must contain 
procedures to tackle non-compliance. Reporting requires the company to publicly 
disclose its policy and compliance mechanisms.  
 
While these practices cannot guarantee that a given company will not engage in 
bribery, they constitute an important step towards preventing bribery and reflect the 
expectations of responsible investors and other stakeholders as to what ‘good 
practice’ against bribery and corruption would be. Specifically, countering bribery 
criteria were developed in collaboration with Transparency International and the 
development involved market consultations as well as focus groups with CSR and 
industry experts, investors and NGOs. Such process therefore increases the index 
legitimacy as a stakeholder (Mitchell et al., 1997). Further, having a written code of 
ethics is shown to be related to less tolerant attitude by management to bribing 
(McKinney & Moore, 2008). Additionally, Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) observe a 
positive association between mandatory sustainability reporting and ethical practices 




association between mandatory sustainability reporting and a reduction in bribery as 
well as corruption. Provided that FTSE assesses large global corporations from FTSE 
All-World Developed Indices, countering bribery practices of those companies could 
contribute to a deinstitutionalisation of the established norms of corruption in the 
host country and a reduction of the demand for bribes (Gjessing & Syse, 2007; Hess 
& Ford, 2011).  
 
4.2.3 The Engagement Process 
 
For the membership in the index, FTSE assesses all companies from FTSE All-
World Developed Indices for environmental management, human rights, supply 
chain labour standards, countering bribery and mitigating climate change, based on 
independent research by a specialised data provider, Ethical Investment Research 
Services (EIRIS). Over the years FTSE4Good criteria have evolved and new criteria 
were implemented. In particular, countering bribery criteria were introduced in 2007 
and compliance was enforced in 2009. At the moment of the criteria introduction, all 
companies from FTSE All-World Developed Indices were assessed for compliance. 
However, those companies that were in the index but did not immediately meet the 
new standards, were not immediately excluded from the index. Rather, FTSE gave 
these companies time until the criteria enforcement to implement the requirements. If 
at the end of the given period these non-complying member firms have not adopted 
the required practices to meet the criteria, they would be excluded from the index.  
 
During the implementation period the Responsible Investment Unit at FTSE engaged 
with the affected member-companies. The engagement was conducted as a dialogue 
with company management via emails, telephone conversations and personal 
meetings (FTSE, 2011). FTSE held discussions with representatives from 
sustainability, investor relations, risk management and legal departments. Such 
process therefore mirrors the engagement by activist hedge funds and institutional 
investors (Becht et al., 2009; Dimson et al., 2012; Gifford, 2010). During the 
engagement process FTSE clarified the criteria and assisted companies in enhancing 




disclosure of those practices. For example, FTSE could provide consultation on the 
wording in the company’s Code of Conduct regarding facilitation payments and gifts, 
or the necessary elements of employee training and whistleblowing. This is 
consistent with the findings by Gordon and Miyake (2001) suggesting that 
companies’ own codes of conduct vary significantly in the way they disclose their 
anti-bribery provisions including the concepts and the language which may blur the 
line between establishing a long-term business relationship and engaging in corrupt 
behaviour.  
 
Apart from direct dialogue and consultation, the index simultaneously challenged the 
reputation of the company by the potential exclusion. FTSE informs engaged 
companies about the potential public delisting from the index if they fail to meet the 
criteria by the given time. Given the growing importance of the ratings and indices as 
the means to communicate CSR endeavours to stakeholders (Chatterji & Toffel, 
2010; Young & Marais, 2012) the index engagement possesses normative power and 
urgency which contribute to the influence of the engagement (Gifford, 2010; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). The threat of public deletion from the index therefore gives 
FTSE an additional lever through which to encourage companies to improve their 
anti-bribery practices according to the index requirements.  
 
4.2.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
Engagement by a responsible investment index reinforced by the potential exclusion 
threat is shown to double the probability that a firm would enhance its environmental 
management practices within the required time period (Mackenzie et al., 2013). The 
impact of engagement lasted for at least five years suggesting that it stretched beyond 
hastening companies to adopt stronger CSR practices faster. Similarly, Chatterji and 
Toffel (2010) found that KLD environmental ranking prompted more rapid 
improvements in environmental performance by poorly-rated companies than by 





However, it remains unclear whether the index would be effective in encouraging 
stronger anti-bribery management. Many researchers have argued that different areas 
of corporate social responsibility should be studied separately given their different 
nature and implications (Cox et al., 2004; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Godfrey et al., 
2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Rees & Rodionova, 2012).  
As an element of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, anti-
bribery practices can be defined as a ‘contact’ CSR, i.e. impacting on company’s 
relations with business partners, customers and suppliers (Mackenzie & Rees, 2011). 
Consistent with this view, the results of a Dow Jones survey reveal that company’s 
control of bribery and corruption risks is an important part of gaining trust among 
business partners (Dow Jones, 2011). Similarly, over 40 percent of managers in 
Control Risks Group survey would stop working with a business partner involved in 
bribery (Control Risks, 2006).  
 
Managers could favour compliance with countering bribery standards and 
membership in a responsible investment index for strategic or personal reasons. 
Compliance could send a favourable message to stakeholders and investors about 
company’s anti-bribery provisions recognised by an independent assessment and 
help enhance the relationships with stakeholders (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010). This 
could include attracting customers (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009) and improving 
employee morale and satisfaction which could result in better financial performance 
(Aguilera et al., 2007; Edmans, 2011). Further, managers may want to avoid negative 
reputational effects associated with the exclusion from the index on failing to meet 
anti-bribery requirements (Ramdani & van Witteloostujn, 2012). This is consistent 
with the observations by Carr and Outhwaite (2011) suggesting that companies 
regarded protection of the corporate reputation as the main driver of complying with 
a CSR initiative. Furthermore, negative business and social reputation may draw 
attention to the firm and make it a more likely target by activists (Bartley & Child, 





Hypothesis 1a. Companies engaged with by FTSE and in danger of 
exclusion from the FTSE4Good index would be more likely to meet 
the FTSE4Good countering bribery criteria. 
 
Mackenzie et al. (2013) additionally examined the impact on compliance of the 
probability that a company would meet the necessary environmental requirements at 
the moment the new criteria were announced. They found no evidence that prior 
likelihood of a company to have the necessary level of environmental management 
affects the efficiency of the FTSE engagement. In the case of controlling bribery, it 
could be expected that the engagement effect could be leveraged by a company's 
propensity to meet the FTSE requirements from the start.  
 
Firstly, Dimson et al. (2012) find that business ethics (which included bribery and 
corruption) was the topic of many engagement activities by an activist fund but 
received a relatively low success rate, with proposed changes taking a longer time for 
implementation than in other CSR areas. Prior evidence suggests that firms with a 
greater capacity to improve their CSR performance are more likely to be targeted by 
activists and to succeed (Dimson et al., 2012). Similarly, Chatterji and Toffel (2010) 
find that firms which have more low-cost scope for improvement are more likely to 
improve their environmental efficiency. In line with this evidence, it can be expected 
that if a company is more likely to have countering bribery practices in place that are 
sufficient to meet the FTSE4Good criteria, it is because it has most likely invested 
resources to set up necessary policies, training programmes, communication channels 
and other management processes and reporting to prevent incidents of engaging in 
corrupt actions. Management may then be expected to communicate such activities 
to stakeholders to improve the key relationships and gain reputational benefits 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2010). I therefore expect that the engagement effect will be 
stronger if the company is closer to complying before the start of the engagement.  
 
Hypothesis 1b. The FTSE engagement/exclusion effect is stronger if 
the prior probability of the firm to comply with the FTSE4Good 





4.2.5 Incentives and Constraints of Compliance and Engagement 
 
4.2.5.1 The Effect of Expected Index Membership 
 
I next attempt to disentangle the effect of the engagement from the effect of potential 
exclusion threat. Mackenzie et al. (2013) reported that both engagement and the 
expected index membership stimulated company’s implementation of the required 
environmental practices but the engagement was particularly effective when the peer 
pressure of the index membership was higher. Similarly, Chatterji and Toffel (2010) 
observed that the improvements in environmental efficiency were more likely among 
the firms with highest potential benefits. Consistent with this view, I predict that if 
similar firms tend to be members of the index, this is because there are net benefits 
for them to do so and potential costs of being excluded. For example, the likelihood 
of competitors complying with a CSR initiative was listed by companies as one of 
the drivers of their compliance (Carr & Outhwaite, 2011). Given that engagement 
aims at facilitating a company’s adoption of the required anti-bribery provisions, it 
may be further expected that companies with the highest peer and reputational 
pressure would wish to stay in the index and would be more responsive to contact 
from FTSE. I therefore formulate the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Firms are more likely to meet the FTSE4Good 
countering bribery criteria if the expectation of the company to be 
in the index is higher. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. The FTSE engagement/exclusion effect is stronger if 
the expectation of the company to be in the index is higher. 
 
4.2.5.2 The Effect of Concentrated Ownership  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that in a situation of the separation of the 




their best interests which may not be aligned with the interests of the shareholders. In 
the case of CSR, the motives may include shareholder value maximisation but may 
also be related to personal ethical position or strategic motives such as reputation and 
relationship with other stakeholders (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Bénabou & Tirole, 
2010). While diversified investors may not be effective monitors due to the costs 
involved, large shareholders have been shown to substantially impact on the 
governance of companies (Fama & Jensen, 1983). When a project presents clear 
financial benefits, influential owners are likely to actively encourage such investment 
(Rees & Mackenzie, 2011). Conversely, entrenched long-term owners are shown to 
effectively inhibit investment in those CSR projects where the benefits are seen as 
‘external’ such as environment or human rights (Rees & Rodionova, 2012). Bribery 
may offer some benefits to the strategic owners related to the business opportunities 
acquired by the firm with the reputational risks falling mainly on the management 
(Ramdani & van Witteloostujn, 2012). On the other hand, as a ‘contact’ CSR, anti-
bribery provisions may help improve the business relationships of the company and 
reduce the risks of the prosecution and potential negative reputation. Therefore the 
inclination of the owners to promote anti-bribery practices may depend on the net 
cost and benefit of bribery activities (Ramdani & van Witteloostujn, 2012). I 
therefore predict that concentrated ownership will influence compliance but can do 
so in either direction. In any case, however, as strategic owners tend to influence the 
company in their interests, they are unlikely to favour social activism (Judge et al., 
2010). I therefore predict the following relationships: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. Firms with high levels of closely-held ownership 
comply differently from firms without such shareholdings. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. High levels of closely-held ownership will reduce 
the engagement effect. 
 





Prior literature suggests that the differences in the institutional environment have an 
impact on the emphasis that companies put on the interests of society and 
stakeholders (Campbell, 2007; Chen et al., 2008). While there are various attributes 
of the institutional environment and the classification of the institutional systems can 
be more refined (Kang & Moon, 2012), on the whole a common law system implies 
wider capital markets and thus less reliance on the state support (La Porta et al., 
1997) and a higher likelihood of the exposure of corrupt practices (Treisman, 2000). 
Consistent with these views, Chen et al. (2008), using a survey-based dataset for 55 
countries, find that British legal origin is negatively associated with the chances that 
a firm will pay a bribe. While coordinated market economies are generally associated 
with better overall CSR disclosure, liberal market economies tend to emphasise 
issues related to shareholder protection and transparency, and are likely to report 
more on issues related to governance and ethics (Campbell, 2007; Young & Marais, 
2012). Consequently, even though abstaining from paying a bribe may at some point 
result in losing a contract to an unethical competitor, enhanced disclosure of the anti-
bribery practices and membership in a responsible investment index could offer 
compensating reputational benefits of recognised stronger CSR commitment. 
Responding to FTSE engagement could further facilitate successful compliance. I 
therefore propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a. Companies from liberal market economies are more 
likely to meet the FTSE4Good countering bribery requirements 
within the required time period. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. The engagement effect will be stronger if the 
company comes from a liberal market economy rather than a 
coordinated market economy. 
 
4.2.5.4 The Effect of Corporate Governance  
 
Good governance implies that managers act in the interests of the shareholders and 




With regards to the former, since owners may take a different view on bribery, the 
effect of strong governance on active anti-bribery activities is uncertain. However, 
with regards to the latter, as bribery is likely to involve financial misrepresentation 
(even if to cover up the bribe itself), transparency of the management’s activity is 
likely to be lower increasing the risks for the shareholders. Consistent with this view, 
attributes of strong governance such as executive equity incentives and proportion of 
non-executive directors have been shown to reduce the chances of accounting fraud 
and financial misconduct (Beasley, 1996; Erickson et al., 2006). Moreover, since less 
efficient firms use bribes most and continue underperforming even after securing the 
contract (Cheung et al., 2011), this indicates that management in those firms is not 
maximising the shareholder value successfully.  Conversely, through compliance 
with anti-bribery requirements, management may improve relationships with 
stakeholders, which has been shown to be linked to superior financial performance 
(Jo & Harjoto, 2011). For example, since employee satisfaction is shown to be 
associated with better financial performance (Edmans, 2011), it may be expected that 
where the company creates a corporate culture preventing bribes, the security of 
employees is improved and their satisfaction increases (Hess & Ford, 2011). If 
engagement can facilitate creating such corporate environment, management will 
tend to respond positively. I therefore formulate two hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5a. Firms with high governance ratings comply 
differently from firms with low governance ratings. 
 
Hypothesis 5b. Firms with high governance ratings are influenced 
by engagement differently from firms with low governance ratings. 
 
4.2.5.5 The Effect of Ethical Controversies  
 
Prior evidence suggests positive relationship between the number of lawsuits and the 
probability of success from the shareholder engagement on social and environmental 
issues (Dimson et al., 2012). Company visibility, for example through media 




(Kiousis et al., 2007). Dawkins and Fraas (2011) observe that general visibility and 
in particular issue visibility is positively associated with disclosure on climate change 
strategies. Moreover, visibility is shown to moderate positively the effect of 
environmental performance on climate strategies reporting. This is consistent with 
companies with better business and social reputation attracting particular attention 
from activists and stakeholders as in the case of misconduct they may be seen as 
‘hypocritical’ (Bartley & Child, 2010). Based on this evidence, having a public 
ethical controversy related to bribery and corruption is likely to instigate companies 
to implement stronger anti-bribery provisions required by the index and make them 
more responsive to engagement by FTSE. I therefore predict the following 
relationships: 
 
Hypothesis 6a. Companies linked to ethical controversies are more 
likely to meet the FTSE4Good countering bribery requirements 
within the required time period. 
 
Hypothesis 6b. The engagement effect will be stronger if the 
company is linked to an ethical controversy. 
 
4.3 Research Method 
 
4.3.1 Sample and Experimental Setting 
 
To analyse the impact of the FTSE index and engagement on companies’ compliance 
with the FTSE4Good anti-bribery requirements, I make use of a natural experiment 
which resulted from the introduction by FTSE of countering bribery criteria in 2007 





Experimental Setting and Timeline 
2007 2009 
110 FTSE4Good 
firms fail to meet 
countering bribery 
criteria and form the 
treatment group. 
230 non-FTSE firms 
fail to meet 
countering bribery 
criteria and form the 
control group. 
65 percent of treated 
& 19 percent of 
control firms meet 
the criteria in 2009. 
35 percent of treated 
& 81 percent of 
control firms fail to 
meet the criteria in 
2009. 
Sample are FTSE All-World Developed constituents, excluding prohibited firms 
(e.g. weaponry, tobacco), identified by FTSE as having higher exposure to 
bribery. These companies are independently assessed by EIRIS for policy, 
management, reporting and performance. Countering bribery criteria were 
established in 2007, with firms given until 2009 to comply. Engagement was 





criteria and are not 
analysed further. 
54 percent of treated 
& 17 percent of 
control firms score 
minimum for index 
membership in 2011. 
19 percent of treated 
& 8 percent of 
control firms score at 






Overall, 2,222 companies from FTSE All-World Developed Index were assessed by 
FTSE in both September 2007 and September 2009
11
. Of these, I excluded 
companies with business related to tobacco, weaponry or nuclear areas (not 
considered for the FTSE4Good membership according to FTSE process) and 
companies with missing data and arrived at 1,852 companies. Since the criteria were 
only applied to the companies considered as high risk in bribery, a subset of 485 
companies had to meet the requirements. Of these, 340 companies from 18 countries 
and 9 industry groups did not meet the requirements and form the test sample
12
. 
Treatment group includes 110 companies that were members of the FTSE4Good 
index in 2007 and, therefore, received engagement
13
 from FTSE and were in danger 
of public exclusion from the index if they failed to comply by 2009. The remaining 
230 high-risk companies were not members of the index in 2007 and hence were not 
in danger of public exclusion. These companies did not receive any engagement 
from FTSE and formed the control group for the analysis. In the tests of incentives 
and constraints missing data for explanatory or control variables could reduce the 
sample further.  
                                                 
11
 During this period 2007 to 2009 a number of firms dropped out of FTSE All-World Index. 
However, none of those had been assessed as high risk in bribery and therefore were not subject to 
countering bribery requirements and did not affect the sample. 
 
12
 The country distribution of the sample is as follows (an asterix identifies those countries classified 
as CME): Australia 21, Austria* 5, Belgium* 2, Canada 7, Denmark* 1, Finland* 4, France* 12, 
Germany* 9, Hong Kong 38, Italy* 1, Japan* 77, Netherlands* 2, Norway* 2, Spain* 7, Sweden* 6, 
Switzerland* 8, UK 53, USA 85. I followed prior evidence where available, otherwise I based the 
classification on stock market capitalisation to GDP (La Porta et al., 1997) and anti-self-dealing index 
(Djankov et al., 2008). This effectively reflects common law versus code law.  
The industry distribution of the sample is as follows: Oil & Gas 59, Basic Materials 85, Industrials 77, 




 It could be the case that companies were subject to simultaneous engagement regarding several 
FTSE4Good criteria or were previously in engagement regarding a different CSR theme. While this 
could provide a ‘synergy’ effect, different nature of the criteria and tight requirements in each theme 
meant that it would unlikely bias the results. Further, the analysis of semi-annual Policy Committee 
documents and conversations with the representatives from FTSE revealed that companies could 
struggle with a particular indicator, e.g. would not be willing to explicitly prohibit bribes in their 
policy or develop whistle-blowing channels or would make policy available internally but not 
publicly. Finally, the strongest incentive to comply would be in situations where previous (or 
simultaneous) engagement on a different issue resulted in companies moving to meet those criteria, to 
the extent that this implied spending resources on moving to comply. I therefore introduced a control 
variable of meeting environmental criteria in the analysis (these were the criteria that had been 





In this quasi-experimental setting, the adoption of countering bribery practices 
sufficient for membership in the FTSE4Good index among the companies in the two 
groups was contrasted. If FTSE engagement simply coincided with the general trend 
towards enhanced corporate social responsibility or with the impact of other global 
anti-bribery initiatives, I would expect there to be no significant differences between 
the treatment and the control group, provided that the possible differences between 
the two groups are controlled for. I discuss the way comparability is ensured when 




Dependent variable. The dependent variable measures compliance with the 
FTSE4Good anti-bribery standards in 2009. It is a dichotomous variable taking the 
value of one if a firm met the countering bribery criteria in 2009 and zero otherwise. 
 
Explanatory variables. FTSE engagement, expected index membership, ownership, 
institutional context, internal governance and prior controversies are the explanatory 
variables. The main explanatory variable (Engage) is expressed as a zero-one dummy 
as all firms which were in dialogue with FTSE were subject to the same engagement 
process.  
 
Expected index membership (P.Ind07) aims to capture the extent to which similar 
firms tend to be members of the index. As shown in prior literature, the behaviour of 
comparable firms regarding compliance with CSR initiatives and the ones related to 
bribery and corruption in particular influences the company’s choice to implement 
those practices (Carr & Outhwaite, 2011). I therefore measure it as a predicted 
probability from a binary logistic regression of FTSE4Good index membership in 
2007 based on country (Country) and industry (Industry) dummies, size as the log of 
market capitalisation (Size) and the percentage of closely-held shares (Close) (the 





Ind07j = a0 + a1Sizej + a2Closej + … 
C1-21Countryj + I1-32Industryj + ej 
 
It is estimated on the whole population of 1,852 companies in the All-World 
Developed Index with available data (except tobacco, weaponry or nuclear 
businesses). In the model the country and industry dummies are jointly statistically 
significant (Chi
2
=305.07, p<0.001 and Chi
2
=134.37, p<0.001 respectively) and both 
size and ownership are significant (t-stat=11.22, p<0.001 and t-stat=-2.61, p<0.01). 
The model has a pseudo-R
2
 of 0.23 and correctly classifies 74 percent of cases. 
 
Next, ownership data (Ownership) is obtained from Datastream and the variable is 
specified as a dummy where one indicates closely-held shareholdings greater than 10 
percent and zero if a company does not have such shareholdings. For sensitivity tests 
I also use strategic shareholdings and percentages instead of dummy variables. The 
results are qualitatively similar. For the measure of the internal governance 
(Governance) I collect corporate governance score in 2009 from ASSET4 which is 
assessed using multiple criteria and standardised to a 0-100 score. I therefore avoid 
potential bias of both corporate governance and countering bribery practices 
assessment coming from the same source. This is particularly relevant in the case of 
countering bribery provisions since controlling bribery may be regarded itself as a 
governance attribute (Ramdani & van Witteloostujn, 2012).  
 
The institutional context (Economy) is expressed as a dichotomous variable with one 
indicating coordinated market economy (CME) and zero a liberal market economy 
(LME). Finally, to assess the effect of ethical controversies, I construct a variable 
(Controversy) using ASSET4 data. According to the ASSET4 definition, I code the 
variable one if a firm received media coverage regarding an ethical controversy in 
any year from 2005 to 2009. I choose such extended period since these matters and 
the potential related prosecution may take a long time and negative visibility is likely 
to affect company’s reaction to the index and the engagement both prior to and 
during the engagement period. As a robustness test I use other time periods and the 





Control variables. Following prior evidence suggesting that better environmental 
performance will stimulate better environmental disclosure as a way to communicate 
these practices to stakeholders (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011) a similar case for countering 
bribery compliance can be expected. Therefore I construct a control variable 
(P.Meet07) indicating the prior probability of meeting countering bribery criteria in 
2007. Meeting anti-bribery criteria in 2007 is a function of industry (Industry) and 





Meet07j = a0 + a1Environmentj + C1-21Countryj + I1-32Industryj + ej 
 
Prior probability of compliance with FTSE4Good countering bribery criteria is 
estimated as a predicted probability from this binary logistic regression model for a 
sample of all 485 high-risk companies. In the model the country and industry 
dummies are collectively statistically significant (Chi
2
=39.48, p<0.01 and 
Chi
2
=19.24, p<0.05 respectively) and so is compliance with FTSE4Good 
environmental requirements (Chi
2
=26.21, p<0.001). The model has a pseudo-R
2
 of 




I also include compliance with the FTSE4Good environmental management criteria 
(Environment) as a separate control in the test model as its impact may differ from 
                                                 
14
 FTSE4Good environmental management criteria included policy requirements, environmental 
management systems and reporting (FTSE, 2010). These criteria were chosen as they were applied to 
all companies assessed by FTSE. Consequently, if a company did not meet FTSE4Good 




 Following prior research, a number of additional factors was considered. In particular, additional 
analyses accounted for firm characteristics such as profitability (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Cheung 
et al., 2011), e.g. return on equity; growth opportunities (Cheung et al., 2011), e.g. market-to-book; 
financing (Cheung et al., 2011), e.g. gearing; foreign ownership (Chen et al., 2008; Ramdani & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2012); exposure to foreign operations (Karpoff et al., 2012; Ramdani & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2012), e.g. foreign sales as a percentage of total sales. Finally, a number of country 
characteristics (Cheung et al., 2011; Karpoff et al., 2012; Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2012) was 
examined, e.g. World Bank indicators of voice and accountability and Transparency International 
industry or country indices. Firm-specific variables were not significant, and including country 
dummies proved to capture country differences best, therefore the additional variables discussed 




the impact on the initial propensity to meet the countering bribery criteria. Finally, 
based on prior evidence regarding the differences in CSR disclosure among countries 
and industries (Deegan et al., 2000; Sottorío and Fernández Sánchez, 2008; Young & 
Marais, 2012), I control for the national and the industrial environment by including 
variables measuring mean compliance rates in a given country (Co.Meet) or industry 
(Ind.Meet) (Antonakis et al., 2010). The rationale to control for the country of 
residence in particular is that different anti-bribery regulation and its enforcement 
may or may not prevent large companies from ‘exporting’ bribery to the countries of 
operation (Karpoff et al., 2012).  
 
4.3.3 Model Specification 
 
Given the binary character of the dependent variable, I use a logit regression model 
to examine the effect of engagement allied to the threat of exclusion from the index 
on the company’s compliance with the FTSE4Good countering bribery requirements: 
 
Meet09i  = 0 + 1Engagei + 2P.Meet07i + 3Engagei*P.Meet07i + … 
4Environmenti + 5Ind.Meeti +6Co.Meeti + ei 
 
In this model i indicates firms, Meet09 is compliance with FTSE4Good countering 
bribery criteria in 2009, Engage denotes treatment (index engagement reinforced by 
the exclusion threat), P.Meet07 is the likelihood of meeting the criteria in 2007, 
Environment is compliance with FTSE4Good environmental management criteria 
and Ind.Meet and Co.Meet are the mean compliance rates in a given industry or 
country.  
 
For the tests of incentives and constraints of compliance and engagement I modify 
the above model and include the incentive variables plus interaction terms with the 
treatment variable:  
 
Meet09i  = 0 + 1Engagei + 2P.Meet07i + 3Environmenti +… 





In this model Incentive includes expected index membership (P.Ind07), concentrated 
ownership (Ownership), institutional context (Economy), corporate governance 
(Governance) and ethical controversy (Controversy). 
 
4.3.4 Propensity Score Matching Approach 
 
The regression approach has the advantage of explicitly demonstrating the effect that 
the prior propensity to meet the criteria has on the ultimate compliance. In this case 
the other control variables may impact on this prior probability rather than the 
ultimate compliance. Inclusion of the prior probability in the regression model 
therefore allows controlling for pre-treatment differences between the engaged and 
control firms. As a robustness test I additionally use propensity score matching 
(Armstrong et al., 2010; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) to control for the sample 
selection bias. According to this approach, I model the likelihood of a given firm to 
be in treatment group as a function of the variables used to estimate the prior 
probability of compliance, i.e. meeting environmental management standards, 
industry and country. Given that the incentive variables are hypothesised to influence 
compliance, I test whether the differences in those between the matched firms remain 
statistically significant. In the cases where they are, I repeat the procedure but 
include those incentive variables in the estimation of the propensity to be treated. 
The results remain qualitatively similar. Finally, propensity score matching is used to 




Table 4.1, panel A, presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and treatment 
and control groups separately. Overall, 34 percent of affected companies met 
FTSE4Good countering bribery standards by 2009 with as many as 65 percent 
among engaged firms and only 19 percent of the control companies. The likelihood 
that a company would already have the required anti-bribery practices in place in 
2007 is only 17 percent, however treated companies were almost twice as likely to be 




companies (25 percent and 13 percent respectively). Engaged firms were also more 
likely to be in the index, had lower probability of a strategic blockholding than the 
control firms and had comparable governance scores and likelihood of ethical 
controversies.  
 
The correlation matrix in Panel B of Table 4.1 reveals a strong positive correlation 
between the treatment variable and compliance (0.46). Expected index membership 
correlates positively with compliance (0.40) and strongly with engagement (0.60). 
There is a strong negative correlation between the governance variable and residing 
in a coordinated market economy (-0.58) which is consistent with prior research (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 2000). There is also a positive correlation between governance and 
controversy (0.29) which is in line with the view suggesting that managers may 
justify ethically questionable practices by acquiring business and generating firm 






Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Meet09 Engage P.Meet07 Environment P.Ind07 Ownership Economy Governance Controversy 
Full Sample          
Mean 0.34 0.32 0.17 0.49 0.38 0.32 0.40 0.53 0.26 
Std. Dev 0.47 0.47 0.15 0.50 0.28 0.47 0.49 0.31 0.44 
Max 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
N 340 340 340 340 318 340 340 301 276 
Engagement          
Mean 0.65 1.00 0.25 0.98 0.61 0.21 0.65 0.52 0.27 
Std. Dev 0.48 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.41 0.48 0.32 0.44 
Max 1.00 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 
Min 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
N 110 110 110 110 106 110 110 102 101 
Control          
Mean 0.19 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.26 0.37 0.28 0.54 0.25 
Std. Dev 0.39 0.00 0.13 0.44 0.22 0.48 0.45 0.31 0.44 
Max 1.00 0.00 0.87 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
N 230 230 230 230 212 230 230 199 175 




Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 Meet09 Engage P.Meet07 Environment P.Ind07 Ownership Economy Governance Controversy 
          
Meet09 1         
Engage 0.46*** 1        
P.Meet07 0.31*** 0.38*** 1       
Environment 0.40*** 0.68*** 0.48*** 1      
P.Ind07 0.40*** 0.60*** 0.25*** 0.54*** 1     
Ownership -0.21*** -0.16** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.14*** 1    
Economy 0.10† 0.35*** -0.07** 0.25*** 0.32*** 0.16***  1   
Governance 0.21*** -0.02 0.37*** 0.03 0.05* -0.26*** -0.58*** 1  
Controversy 0.20*** 0.02 0.20*** 0.10*** 0.13*** -0.09*** -0.11*** 0.29*** 1 
Statistics and correlations are presented for the main test sample (340 observations) or where data on a specific variable is missing for the available sample. Meet09 
denotes meeting countering bribery criteria in 2009 (=1); Engage denotes subject to FTSE Engagement and threat of exclusion from FTSE4Good (=1); P.Meet07 
and P.Ind07 are the estimate of the probability of meeting the countering bribery criteria and being in the index in 2007 respectively (on a zero to one scale); 
Environment denotes meeting environmental management requirements as assessed by FTSE in 2007 (=1). Ownership, Economy and Governance are the 
percentage of closely-held equity as assessed by Worldscope, indicators of LME vs. CME where one indicates CME, and the firms overall governance score as 
assessed by ASSET4 and calculated on a zero to one scale. Economy, Ownership and Governance are measured as at 2009. Controversy denotes ASSET4 indicator 




4.4.1 Test of Engagement and Threat of Deletion from the Index 
 
Table 4.2 presents the tests of the combined effect of FTSE engagement and deletion 
threat (treatment) on compliance in 2009. In Model 1 I include the treatment variable 
and a prior probability of meeting FTSE4Good anti-bribery standards in 2007, and I 
additionally control for industry and country in Model 2. In the next two models I 
incorporate compliance with FTSE environmental management requirements, first 
without industry and country controls (Model 3) and then with them (Model 4). 
Finally, I interact the treatment variable with the prior probability to assess whether 
the influence of treatment is dependent on how potentially easy it is for the firm to 
meet the requirements. This is again done without industry and country controls 
(Model 5) and with them included (Model 6).  
 
Firstly, the coefficient on the treatment variable is positive and significant in the first 
model specification, both without and with industry and country controls (Model 1: 
β=1.82, p<0.001, Model 2: β=1.71, p<0.001). The coefficients remain positive and 
significant when I control for compliance with another FTSE requirement (Model 3: 
β=1.48, p<0.001, Model 4: β=1.40, p<0.001). These results suggest that firms which 
received engagement from FTSE and were in danger of public exclusion from the 
index were more likely to comply with the anti-bribery requirements by 2009. 
Therefore, H1a is supported. Estimated marginal effect (Model 1: 0.31, p<0.001, 
Model 2: 0.28, p<0.001, Model 3: 0.25, p<0.001, Model 4: 0.23, p<0.001) reveals 
that engagement reinforced by the threat of deletion increases the probability of 







Tests of the Joint Engagement and Deletion Threat Effect 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
       
Intercept -1.83*** -4.06*** -1.93*** -4.15*** -1.82*** -4.04*** 
 (6.07) (5.86) (5.15) (6.00) (4.48) (5.70) 
       
Engage 1.82*** 1.71*** 1.48*** 1.40*** 0.94* 0.55 
 (4.56) (5.95) (3.50) (3.83) (2.50) (0.87) 
       
P.Meet07 2.76* 2.01† 2.16 1.46 1.12 -0.28 
 (2.17) (1.90) (1.43) (1.28) (0.65) (0.17) 
       
Environment   0.59 0.53 0.73 0.75† 
   (1.03) (1.29) (1.32) (1.70) 
       
P.Meet07*Engage     2.31 3.80† 
     (1.62) (1.66) 
       
Ind.Meet  2.04  2.08  1.82 
  (1.52)  (1.57)  (1.34) 
       
Co.Meet  4.83***  4.79***  5.27*** 
  (3.61)  (3.48)  (3.73) 
       
Marginal effect       
Engage 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.16** 0.09 
PMeet07*Engage     0.39 0.61† 
       
Wald-Chi2       
Full Model 34.46*** 70.96*** 36.79*** 75.32*** 37.78*** 73.83*** 
All Engagement 20.81*** 35.38*** 12.24*** 14.64*** 18.26*** 17.56*** 
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.24 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with countering bribery criteria in 
2009. The independent variables are engagement from FTSE reinforced by the exclusion threat 
(Engage), the prior probability of complying with the new criteria (P.Meet07), meeting FTSE4Good 
environmental management requirements (Environment), and mean compliance rates in the industry 
and country. The absolute t-statistics are given underneath in parentheses. I also present Wald-Chi
2
 
estimates of the significance of a) the full model and b) the engagement variables plus any interaction 
term. All standard errors are robust and are clustered by country.  
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
I additionally find that the coefficient on the prior probability of meeting countering 
bribery criteria is positive and significant in the simplest models (Model 1: β=2.76, 
p<0.05, Model 2: β=2.01, p<0.10) but its significance declines when the FTSE 




estimate is partly determined by the firm meeting FTSE environmental requirements. 
The coefficient on compliance with environmental management standards is itself 
insignificant in all model specifications. These results are consistent with the view 
that introducing robust anti-bribery practices is a challenging task for the companies 
and meeting other FTSE requirements does not significantly impact company’s 
performance regarding bribery. Finally, the inclusion of industry and country 
controls does not substantially affect coefficients on the treatment and only country 
control is statistically significant.  
 
The interaction term causes the coefficient on the treatment variable and its 
significance to decline (Model 5: β=0.94, p<0.05, Model 6: β=0.55, p=insig). 
However, the joint effect of treatment and the interaction term is strongly significant 
(Model 5: Chi
2
=18.26, p<0.001, Model 6: Chi
2
=17.56, p<0.001). The net marginal 
effect of treatment, estimated using the mean value for the prior probability of 
compliance of 0.17, is slightly lower than the values estimated by Models 1 to 4 
without interaction effects but still substantial (Model 5: 0.16+(0.39*0.17)=0.23 and 
Model 6: 0.09+(0.61*0.17)=0.19). Further, when I control for industry and country, 
the coefficient on the interaction term becomes marginally significant (Model 6: 
β=3.80, p<0.10) and has a substantial marginal effect of 0.61, albeit also marginally 
significant. I therefore find a weak support for H1b, in that engagement may be more 
efficient for firms which were closer to complying anyway. A possible explanation 
for that could be that if a company chooses to establish a strong anti-bribery 
environment, possibly at the expense of a business lost to unethical competition, it 
would want to communicate its efforts to stakeholders to gain most benefits from the 
index membership and compliance, and would therefore respond particularly well to 
FTSE’s contact.  However, given that the result is weak these conclusions should be 
treated with caution. Most importantly, the results show that treatment has a 







4.4.2 Propensity Score Matching Tests of the Joint Engagement and Exclusion 
Effect 
 
Table 4.3 presents results of the analysis of the impact of treatment on compliance 
using propensity score matching. This approach explicitly aims at overcoming 
sample selection bias, in that the treatment and control groups may have different 
characteristics apart from treatment itself and may therefore not be comparable. 
According to this method, I first estimate the propensity to receive treatment as a 
function of compliance with another FTSE requirement related to environmental 
management and industry and country controls. I then contrast compliance in 2009 
using different matching techniques, i.e. nearest neighbour, three nearest neighbours, 
three nearest neighbours with propensity to treatment within plus or minus 0.001, all 
companies with propensity to treatment within plus or minus 0.001 and kernel 
matching procedure where the result for the control firms is averaged with the 
weights based on the propensity scores. I also re-estimate the statistical significance 
using bootstrapping techniques with 50 iterations and the results are consistent. Since 
matching approaches with stricter boundaries of the propensity score leave some 
treatment firms unmatched, I also report the sample sizes for each approach. This 
technique thus ensures that only those treated firms that I can construct the 
comparable counterfactual case for are analysed.  
 
The results demonstrate that, with the exception of the matching with the nearest 
neighbour, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is positive and 
significant providing support for H1a (Model 1: ATT=0.22, p=insig, Model 2: 
ATT=0.33, p<0.01, Model 3: ATT=0.42, p<0.01, Model 4: ATT=0.33, p<0.01, 
Model 5: ATT=0.32, p<0.001). When I compare the ATT with the marginal effects 
estimated from the regression analysis, I find that they are consistent, in that the 







Analysis of the Joint Engagement and Deletion Threat Effect Using Propensity Score Matching 
Matching ATT t-statistic Treatment Control 
 Treatment Control Diff.    
Unmatched 0.66 0.19 0.47 9.98***   
Model 1: Nearest (n1) 0.66 0.44 0.22 1.37 108 249 
Bootstrapped   0.22 1.27   
Model  2: Nearest (n3) 0.66 0.33 0.33 3.05** 108 249 
Bootstrapped   0.32 2.92**   
Model 3: Nearest (n3)  
Caliper (0.001) 0.67 0.25 0.42 3.10** 51 249 
Bootstrapped   0.42 2.99**   
Model 4: Radius, 
(0.001) 0.67 0.34 0.33 3.03** 51 249 
Bootstrapped   0.33 2.36*   
Model 5: Kernel 0.66 0.34 0.32 3.88*** 108 249 
Bootstrapped   0.33 3.28**   
       
Impact of Matching on Incentive Variables  
  Treated Control %Bias % Change t-statistic 
P.Ind08 Unmatched 0.61 0.26 152.7  13.11*** 
 Matched 0.55 0.47 34.1 77.6 1.75† 
Ownership Unmatched 0.22 0.37 -33.7  -2.89*** 
 Matched 0.18 0.27 -19.7 41.4 -1.08 
Governance Unmatched 0.52 0.53 -2.7  -0.23 
 Matched 0.42 0.39 10.5 -288.6 0.51 
Economy Unmatched 0.64 0.28 77.3  6.91*** 
 Matched 0.69 0.71 -4.7 94.0 -0.24 
This table presents the results of the test of the treatment using propensity score matching. I use 
nearest neighbour matching, radius matching and kernel matching methods to test whether the 
treatment has an effect on compliance with the FTSE4Good countering bribery criteria. ATT denotes 
average treatment effect on the treated group regarding the outcome (compliance). T-statistic is the 
result for the average treatment effect. Treatment presents the number of companies subject to 
engagement and threatened with exclusion. Control denotes the matched companies that were not 
engaged with and did not face the deletion threat. The second panel reports the distribution of the 
incentive variables before and after the matching process using radius matching. I report the means of 
treated and control sample unmatched and matched, the pre-matching and post-matching bias, the 
reduction in that bias achieved by matching and the t-test of difference in means before and after 
matching. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,*** p < .001 
 
 
Given that in the incentive-related hypotheses I predict that both compliance and the 
response to engagement may be conditioned by the expected index membership, 
ownership, institutional setting of the economy and internal governance system, I 
check distribution of these characteristics in the two groups. In Table 4.3 I report 
these variables for radius matching, however they are consistent for all matching 




matched firms. In the unreported analysis I re-estimate the propensity score including 
the incentive variables and repeat the matching process. This eliminates the 
differences in the incentives factors between the groups but the results remain 
consistent with the parsimonious approach. Finally, to shed some further light on the 
weak finding in the regression analysis regarding the coefficient on the interaction 
term between treatment and the prior probability of compliance, I perform propensity 
score matching separately for the firms with the prior probability of compliance 
above and below an average (i.e. 0.5). The results reveal that for the firms with the 
above average probability of compliance the difference in compliance rate is about 
50 percent compared to about 30 percent for the firms with the lower than the 
average probability of compliance. However, given that there are only 8 treated firms 
with the higher prior probability of compliance out of 110, on the whole I can 
conclude that the engagement did not only work well for ‘easier’ cases of firms with 
the higher prior likelihood of meeting the anti-bribery criteria. 
   
4.4.3 Tests of Incentives and Constraints 
 
In Tables 4.4 and 4.5 I introduce a set of incentives and/or constraints which may 
have an impact on company’s efforts to comply with FTSE4Good anti-bribery 
standards. In Table 4.4 I test the effect of a) expected index membership which 
reflects the net benefits from inclusion in the index, b) external governance by 
blockholders with equity closely held rather than used for trading, c) institutional 
environment and d) independent assessment of the internal governance. I first 
include each of the incentives separately in Models 1 to 10. For each of the 
incentives I also interact the main effect with the treatment variable to assess the 
impact of the incentives on the engagement efficiency. Finally, Models 9 and 10 
present all incentives together, with and without interaction terms.  
 
4.4.3.1 The Impact of Index Membership  
 
The results suggest that expected index membership is positively related to 




membership and engagement, the main effect is marginally significant (Model 2: 
β=1.36, p<0.10). In the latter case, however, the joint main and interaction effect of 
index membership is significant (Model 2: Chi
2
=6.24, p<0.05). Inclusion of the 
interaction term causes a decline in the statistical significance of the treatment 
variable (Model 2: β=0.82, p=insig) but the joint effect of all engagement-related 
variables remains significant (Model 2: Chi
2
=7.71, p<0.05). I interpret this result as 
indicating that, to the extent that the expected index membership estimate reflects the 
net benefits of inclusion in the index and associated potential costs of exclusion, both 
engagement and the threat of exclusion stimulate compliance and their influences are 
independent.  I therefore find support for H2a but not H2b.  
 
4.4.3.2 The Impact of Concentrated Ownership  
 
Here I find that closely held ownership negatively influences compliance (Model 3: 
β=-0.81, p<0.05, Model 4: β=-1.07, p<0.05) but does not moderate the effect of 
treatment as the interaction term is not significant (Model 4: β=0.62, p=insig). The 
joint effect of the main ownership variable and the interaction term is marginally 
significant (Model 4: Chi
2
=5.70, p<0.10) and in both models the main engagement 
coefficient is strongly positive and significant (Model 3: β=1.43, p<0.01, Model 4: 
β=1.29, p<0.01). When I examine blockholdings by corporations, institutions, 
families and the government separately, I find that concentrated corporate ownership 
is significantly negatively related to compliance as well as government ownership, 
albeit marginally so. Both family and institutional blockholdings have a tentative 
negative but insignificant association. I therefore find empirical support for H3a but 
not H3b. While presence of entrenched blockholders may hinder company’s 
motivation to comply with FTSE4Good anti-bribery requirements, a constructive 
dialogue between FTSE and a company management may still lead to improvements 









Tests of Incentives and Constraints 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9) (Model 10) 
           
Intercept -2.24*** -2.19*** -1.66*** -1.60*** -1.79*** -1.82*** -3.22*** -3.25*** -3.55*** -3.68*** 
 (4.45) (4.41) (5.43) (5.16) (4.36) (4.21) (6.05) (4.44) (5.80) (5.18) 
           
Engage 1.07** 0.82 1.43** 1.29*** 1.55*** 1.88*** 1.42*** 1.47* 1.12** 1.41† 
 (2.65) (1.43) (3.22) (3.37) (3.67) (3.46) (3.89) (2.19) (2.83) (1.85) 
           
P.Meet07 2.10 2.08 1.92 1.92 1.61 1.49 -1.95 -1.93 -2.35 -2.32 
 (1.22) (1.20) (1.46) (1.46) (1.10) (0.96) (1.19) (1.12) (1.24) (1.18) 
           
Environment 0.37 0.40 0.61 0.60 0.90 0.83 1.64*** 1.65*** 1.64** 1.63** 
 (0.65) (0.70) (1.22) (1.21) (1.55) (1.61) (3.40) (3.52) (2.81) (2.94) 
           
P.Ind07 1.55* 1.36†       1.34* 1.19 
 (2.54) (1.86)       (2.09) (1.19) 
           
P.Ind07 *  0.48        0.38 
Engage  (0.41)        (0.22) 
           
Ownership   -0.81* -1.07*     -0.01 -0.07 
   (2.31) (2.03)     (0.03) (0.18) 
           
Ownership *    0.62      0.17 
Engage    (0.82)      (0.25) 
           
Economy     -0.56† -0.32   -0.20 -0.05 
     (1.89) (0.65)   (0.41) (0.06) 
           




Economy *      -0.54    -0.38 
Engage      (0.82)    (0.37) 
           
Governance       2.75*** 2.79** 2.86*** 3.08** 
       (4.01) (2.81) (3.45) (2.87) 
           
Governance *        -0.09  -0.56 
Engage        (0.09)  (0.50) 
           
Wald-Chi
2
           
Full Model 37.36*** 50.34*** 41.67*** 46.80*** 46.28*** 62.98*** 57.75*** 57.59*** 54.47*** 1013.27*** 
All Engagement 7.02** 7.71* 10.34** 11.47** 13.44*** 20.21*** 15.12*** 14.62*** 8.01** 29.91*** 
All Incentives 6.46* 6.24* 5.32* 5.70† 3.56† 6.81* 16.08*** 21.10*** 38.62*** 99.69*** 
Observations 318 318 340 340 340 340 301 301 288 288 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with countering bribery criteria in 2009. The independent variables are engagement from FTSE 
(Engage), the prior probability of complying with the new criteria (P.Meet07), meeting environmental management criteria (Environment), the prior probability of 
being included in the FTSE4Good index (P.Ind07), the percentage of closely-held equity (Ownership), domicile in a CME (Economy) and the ASSET4 assessment of 
corporate governance (Governance). I also present Wald-Chi
2
 estimates of the significance of a) the full model, b) the engagement variables plus any interaction terms 
and c) all incentive variables plus any interaction terms. The absolute t-statistics are given underneath in parentheses. All standard errors are robust and are clustered 




4.4.3.3 The Impact of Institutional Context  
 
Model 5 suggests a negative relationship between being domiciled in a coordinated 
market economy and complying with FTSE4Good anti-bribery criteria but the 
coefficient is only marginally significant (Model 7: β=-0.56, p<0.10). When I test the 
effect of the economy on engagement, I find that the coefficient is insignificant but 
the two incentive variables are collectively significant (Model 6: Chi2=6.81, p<0.05). 
In an unreported analysis I follow Mackenzie et al. (2013) and include the ratio of 
market capitalisation to GDP (La Porta et al., 1997) and the anti-self-dealing index 
(Djankov et al., 2008) and find that both are positively related to compliance but the 
market capitalisation to GDP is insignificant. I then apply propensity score matching 
to clarify the relationship and find that for coordinated market economies treatment 
increased the probability of compliance from 0.32 to 0.62 and for liberal market 
economies from 0.38 to 0.73. Both differences are statistically significant supporting 
the tentative negative main effect of being domiciled in a CME revealed by the 
regression analysis. I therefore have some support for H4a. However, the results 
from both methods do not give evidence to accept H4b.  
 
4.4.3.4 The Impact of Corporate Governance  
 
The results suggest that governance is significantly positively associated with 
compliance when looking at the main effect only (Model 7: β=2.75, p<0.001, Model 
8: β=2.79, p<0.001) and together with the interaction term with treatment (Model 8: 
Chi
2
=21.10, p<0.001). I also find that good governance stimulates compliance 
independently from engagement as the engagement variable is positive and 
significant in both models (Model 7: β=1.42, p<0.001, Model 8: β=1.47, p<0.05) and 
the decline of statistical significance in Model 8 may be misleading as taken together 
the engagement variable and the interaction term are strongly significant (Model 8: 
Chi
2
=14.62, p<0.001). Interestingly, the interaction term, although insignificant, has 
a negative coefficient suggesting that well-governed firms do not require additional 
encouragement regarding anti-bribery measures. When I study the effect of the 




directors and the board size (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Judge 
et al., 2010), I find that CEO-Chairman separation and the proportion of non-
executive directors are both positively and significantly associated with compliance 
while the board size has a positive sign but is insignificant. Overall, the results 
support H5a but not H5b.  
 
4.4.3.5 The Impact of All Incentives  
 
In Models 9 and 10 I include all incentives together. The results for the main effects 
of expected index membership and internal governance remain consistent with 
individual estimations. Taken together, all engagement-related variables are jointly 
significant (Model 10: Chi
2
=8.01, p<0.01) and so are all incentive-related variables 
(Model 9: Chi
2
=38.62, p<0.001, Model 10: Chi
2
=99.69, p<0.001). The other 
constraint related to the presence of powerful undiversified blockholders appears to 
lose significance when other incentives are included (Model 9: β=-0.01, p=insig, 
Model 10: β=-0.07, p=insig). I therefore cannot make robust conclusions regarding 
this particular constraint. The coefficient of the economy variable also becomes 
insignificant (Model 9: β=-0.20, p=insig, Model 10: β=-0.05, p=insig). This could be 
driven by the strong correlation between economy and governance variables (Table 
4.1, =-0.58). Therefore any conclusions regarding the impact of the economy 
should be viewed with caution. Most importantly, the results demonstrate that both 
engagement from the index and membership in the index itself contribute to 
stimulating compliance with countering bribery standards. Further, higher internal 
governance assessment is associated with better compliance which is in line with the 
view that countering bribery standards could be regarded as one of the attributes of 
robust corporate governance (Ramdani & van Witteloostujn, 2012).  
 
4.4.4 Test of the Effect of Ethical Controversies 
 
Table 4.5 reports the results of the test where I include presence of an ethical 
controversy reported in the media. In Model 1 I include controversy along with the 




term between controversy and engagement in Model 2. I do the same in Models 3 
and 4 but also include the other incentive variables.  
 
The results suggest that being in the media spotlight because of an ethical 
controversy before or during the engagement process is significantly positively 
associated with compliance (Model 1: β=0.96, p<0.01).  When the interaction term is 
introduced, the significance of the main effect declines (Model 2: β=0.80, p<0.10) 
and the coefficient of the interaction term is also positive and marginally significant 
(Model 2: β=0.74, p<0.10).  These results give some support for H6a and weak 
support for H6b. Having an ethical controversy and the associated reputational 
concerns encourages compliance and stimulates the dialogue between management 
and FTSE.  
 
When the other incentives are included, the main effect remains positive and 
significant (Model 3: β=0.91, p<0.05) but the interaction term becomes insignificant 
(Model 4: β=0.47, p=insig). I therefore do not find reliable support for H5b. The 
results for the other incentive variables are consistent with the previous test of 
incentives, and in all model specifications engagement is positive and significant 
(Model 1: β=1.31, p<0.01, Model 2: β=1.30, p<0.01, Model 3: β=1.22, p<0.01, 
Model 4: β=1.13, p<0.05). Overall, the results suggest that reputational concerns and 







Test of the Effect of Ethical Controversies 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Intercept -4.24*** -1.84*** -3.34*** -3.29*** 
 (5.94) (6.28) (5.57) (5.30) 
     
Engage 1.31** 1.30** 1.22** 1.13* 
 (2.82) (2.89) (2.74) (2.49) 
     
P.Meet07 0.59 1.13 -2.04 -1.99 
 (0.44) (0.86) (1.18) (1.15) 
     
Environment 0.77* 0.75 1.66** 1.63** 
 (1.99) (1.56) (2.72) (2.70) 
     
Controversy 0.96** 0.80† 0.91* 0.77† 
 (2.79) (1.88) (2.23) (1.80) 
     
Controversy*Engage  0.74†  0.47 
  (1.70)  (1.05) 
     
P.Ind07   1.16* 1.15* 
   (2.09) (2.06) 
     
Ownership   0.01 0.00 
   (0.02) (0.01) 
     
Economy   -0.42 -0.39 
   (0.86) (0.80) 
     
Governance   2.20* 2.19* 
   (2.52) (2.50) 
     
Industry/Country Yes No No No 
     
Wald-Chi
2
     
Full Model 66.05*** 39.42*** 209.85*** 210.04*** 
All Engagement 7.98** 10.18** 7.53** 8.54* 
All Incentives 7.78** 5.77† 56.24*** 98.62*** 
Observations 276 276 263 263 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.26 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of meeting countering bribery criteria in 2009. 
The independent variables are engagement from FTSE (Engage), the prior probability of compliance 
(P.Meet07), meeting environmental management criteria (Environment), an ethical (Controversy), the 
prior probability of being included in the FTSE4Good index (P.Ind07), closely-held equity 
(Ownership), domicile in a CME (Economy) and corporate governance (Governance). I also present 
Wald-Chi
2
 estimates of the significance of a) the full model, b) the engagement variables plus any 
interaction terms and c) all incentive variables plus any interaction terms. The absolute t-statistics are 
given underneath in parentheses. All standard errors are robust and are clustered by country. † p < .10, 





4.4.5 Test of the Engagement Effect on Good and Best Practice in Controlling 
Bribery 
 
To test whether any FTSE engagement effect was substantial, I examine the impact 
of the treatment on the firm’s countering bribery score. I collect the data on the 
scores from FTSE4Good ESG ratings (FTSE, 2011). These ratings were introduced 
by FTSE in 2011 in addition to the FTSE4Good index itself to provide a more 
detailed assessment of companies’ risk and performance with regards to a range of 
environmental, social and governance issues. At the moment of ratings introduction 
(April 2011) only high risk companies were assessed for anti-bribery measures based 
on the FTSE4Good index criteria and a performance score of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 was 
awarded. Membership in the index corresponded to the score 3 or higher. Using the 
scores allows to test a) whether treatment effect was persistent for at least two years 
or if it was transitory to stimulate faster compliance and b) whether treatment 
encouraged minimum compliance with the criteria to gain membership in the index 
or whether the changes were more substantive. For example, to achieve the score of 
4 or 5 a company would not only have to make explicit commitment to prohibiting 
bribes and restricting facilitation payments but would also have to exhibit 
transparency of political donations and commitment at board level. In management 
systems best practice included a detailed sanctions procedure and the extent of 
reporting was also increased.  
 
Here again I rely on the index criteria to represent strong anti-bribery standards. 
However, having a written code of ethics is shown to be associated with significantly 
less tolerance for bribery (McKinney & Moore, 2008). Further, the index criteria 
systematise various provisions related to policy, management systems and reporting 
such as codes being signed by executives, internal monitoring and training and 
reference to punitive actions in case of non-compliance, which are found to 
constitute proactive management’s approach to combating bribery and corruption 
(Gordon & Miyake, 2001). The main reputational benefits however would come 
from the index membership so I expect compliance beyond that to be driven by the 





Tests of Engagement Effect on the FTSE4Good Countering Bribery Rating 
 (Column 1) (Column 2) (Column 3) (Column 4) 
 Good Practice Best Practice Good Practice Best Practice 
Intercept -7.57*** -9.15*** -4.23*** -5.71*** 
 (4.34) (5.01) (12.87) (11.27) 
     
Engage 1.63*** 0.32 1.83*** 0.01 
 (4.01) (1.11) (4.53) (0.03) 
     
Environment 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.72 0.72 
 (2.79) (2.79) (1.41) (1.41) 
     
Ind.Practice 1.60 1.60   
 (1.42) (1.42)   
     
Co.Practice 1.99*** 1.99***   
 (6.97) (6.97)   
     
P.Ind07   1.07* 1.07* 
   (2.28) (2.28) 
     
Ownership   -0.21 -0.21 
   (0.80) (0.80) 
     
Economy   0.63† 0.63† 
   (1.77) (1.77) 
     
Governance   3.67*** 3.67*** 
   (9.01) (9.01) 
     
Controversy   0.50* 0.50* 
   (2.09) (2.09) 
Wald-Chi
2
     
Full Model 437.86*** 437.86*** 303.27*** 303.27*** 
All Incentives   207.20*** 207.20*** 
Observations 234 234 234 234 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.25 
This table presents the results of a generalised ordered logit model of treatment effect on anti-bribery 
practice in 2011. The dependent variable is the countering bribery practice (weak, good or best). The 
independent variables are engagement from FTSE (Engage), meeting FTSE4Good environmental 
management criteria (Environment), mean anti-bribery practice in the industry (Ind.Practice) and 
country (Co.Practice), the prior probability of being included in the FTSE4Good index (P.Ind07), the 
percentage of closely-held equity (Ownership), domicile in a CME (Economy), corporate governance 
(Governance) and ethical controversy (Controversy). I also present Wald-Chi
2
 estimates of the 
significance of a) the full model and c) all incentive variables. The absolute t-statistics are given 
underneath in parentheses. All standard errors are robust and are clustered by country.  
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Due to a relatively small sample I aggregate the scores in three groups so the 




practices (scores 0 to 2), good practice (score 3) and best practice (score 4). I treat 
these three categories as ordinal, i.e. having an order (weak, good, best) with 
unknown distances between them (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011). I then apply generalised 
ordered logit model to test the impact of treatment on the firm’s countering bribery 
practice in 2011. This model follows the logic of the ordinal regression analysis but 
allows the coefficients on the explanatory variables to differ among comparisons of 
the categories (Long & Freese, 2006; Williams, 2010). Crucially, using this model it 
is possible to test whether FTSE engagement was equally efficient in encouraging 
companies to meet the minimum requirements necessary to be included in 
FTSE4Good or whether it additionally stimulated companies to adopt anti-bribery 
measures consistent with FTSE’s assessment of best practice in restricting bribery. 
 
Table 4.5 reports the results. In columns 1 and 2 I use the model specification from 
the main test of the treatment effect on compliance and include the treatment variable, 
complying with environmental management requirements and industry and country 
controls. In a similar test for environmental management criteria Mackenzie et al. 
(2013) include the components used to estimate the prior probability rather than the 
probability itself. Their rationale is that propensity to comply in 2002 would have 
less and less impact on compliance up to 2010. I follow this approach and do not 
include prior probability of meeting countering bribery criteria in the model. 
However, when I test the sensitivity of the findings to inclusion of this variable, the 
results remain qualitatively similar.  
 
The coefficient on the engagement variable is positive and significant when assessing 
meeting good practice (Column 1: β=1.63, p<0.001) but not when testing compliance 
with the best practice (Column 1: β=0.32, p=insig). This result is consistent with the 
view suggesting the importance for management of the reputational benefits from the 
index membership, either for personal reasons or to communicate their CSR 
activities to stakeholders. The strong influence of the country norm is in line with 
prior studies discussing the importance of the regulatory, cultural and institutional 





When I include other incentives, I find that engagement is still effective in 
encouraging good practice (Column 3: β=1.83, p<0.001) but again becomes 
insignificant when I assess meeting best practice requirements (Column 4: β=0.01, 
p=insig). Here I find that the peer pressure reflected in the probability of comparable 
companies to be in the index is significant and positive for both good and best 
practice (Columns 3&4: β=1.07, p<0.001), concentrated ownership suggests negative 
influence but is insignificant, good governance is strongly positively related to both 
good and best practice (Columns 3&4: β=3.67, p<0.001) and prior controversy is 
also positively associated with implementing stronger anti-bribery practices 
(Columns 3&4: β=0.50, p<0.05). The positive though only marginally significant 
coefficient for the economy variable is not consistent with the findings from the test 
of incentives and compliance. However, recalling the correlation between economy 
and governance variables, I test whether the coefficient is sensitive to the inclusion 
of the governance variable and find that it is, and without the governance variable 
included the coefficient on the economy becomes negative and insignificant. I 
therefore do not make any conclusions regarding the explicit impact of the economy 
type. Taken together, the results suggest that overall the index is effective in 
promoting stronger policies, management systems and reporting preventing bribery. 
While the dialogue is efficient in encouraging companies to adopt practices in line 
with good international anti-bribery standards, the index itself and the peer pressure 
to be included stimulates both good compliance and best practice. Finally, the results 
suggest that the engagement effect persisted for at least two years. 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Prior research has demonstrated that institutional investors do not yet have a strong 
beneficial impact on corporate social responsibility although the trend of social 
activism by these owners is increasing and there is evidence of individual successful 
efforts. Among various CSR initiatives, instigating strong commitment to combating 
bribery is a particular challenge given the risks of losing contracts to unethical 
competition and the ever-present justification of the illegal payments as ‘necessary’. 




diverse companies, this study examines the impact of engagement by a responsible 
investment index on the probability that a company will implement controlling 
bribery policies, management systems and reporting within the two-year period. 
Additionally, this chapter analyses the possible drivers of compliance and 
engagement related to the competitive environment, influential ownership, 
institutional context, internal governance and prior ethical controversies. Finally, I 
investigate whether the index was effective in prompting good practice of countering 
bribery among companies or also best practice. 
 
The results suggest that companies which received contact from the index and were 
in danger of public exclusion were considerably more likely to comply with the 
FTSE4Good countering bribery criteria. This is consistent with management on the 
whole supporting CSR investment due to potential personal or strategic benefits from 
both CSR enhancement itself and compliance with an international standard (Barnea 
& Rubin, 2010; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Slager et al., 2012; Young & Marais, 
2012).  
 
The results further demonstrate that the dialogue and the exclusion threat influenced 
compliance independently. Further, the findings suggest that entrenched owners 
negatively influence management decisions regarding restricting bribery. However, 
strategic ownership did not hinder the positive impact of the engagement. Companies 
were also more likely to comply if they came from liberal market economies and had 
stronger internal governance. This is consistent with anti-bribery provisions being 
associated with good overall governance, lower information asymmetry and better 
protection of property rights with higher exposure of illegal behaviour by the 
government officials. Finally, the results show that the positive effect of the index, 
whether the dialogue or the potential benefits of the index membership, lasted for at 
least two years and resulted in companies adopting a wider range of anti-bribery 
provisions than the minimum to keep index membership.  
 
It is not possible to postulate that the index activity would compel any company to 




in the right direction with regards to corporate management practices to combat 
bribery as it requires enhanced policies, management systems and reporting. Most 
importantly, the results demonstrate that for the institutional investor engagement 














I investigate whether through engagement and the reputational threat of exclusion a 
responsible investment index can motivate companies to adopt a set of practices 
aimed at reducing corporate impact on climate change. Prior evidence suggests that 
the index is able to encourage companies to advance their environmental 
management and that these improvements are persistent (Mackenzie et al., 2013). 
However, climate change arguably constitutes the largest market failure with 
consequences affecting the world at large yet urgency not fully recognised (Sullivan 
& Mackenzie, 2008; Rees & Rodionova, 2012). Socially responsible investors as 
well as large ‘universal owners’ do encourage companies to reduce emissions and 
adopt proactive climate change strategies (Kiernan, 2007; Dimson et al., 2012). 
These investors also lobby for more stringent and efficient legislation on corporate 
emissions (Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008). Yet evidence suggests that “the campaign 
to improve CSR via institutional investment has some way to go before it is effective” 
(Rees and Rodionova, 2012: 238). Meanwhile, undiversified owners such as families 
and corporations are likely to resist investments in climate change mitigating 
activities considering them predominantly a source of large costs with uncertain 
benefits and large scope for managerial discretion. 
 
Since the issue of climate change consequences is by no means fading away and is 
becoming more pressing (Bloomberg, 2013; PWC, 2013; Stern Report, 2006), this 
study explores the effect of a particular engagement approach by institutional 
investors via a responsible investment index. Such a strategy brings together 
collective expertise by investors, NGOs, academics and CSR experts and 
simultaneously challenges corporate reputation via company’s membership in the 
index. This study examines whether a) such engagement allied with exclusion threat 
is efficient in stimulating compliance with requested climate change criteria, b) 




external and internal governance systems affect compliance and management’s 
response to engagement.  
  
I address these questions using a unique dataset of recorded assessment of all 
companies from FTSE All-World Developed Index at the introduction of the new 
climate change criteria by FTSE and the subsequent evaluation of compliance in 
2010. This data offers a natural experiment where all companies with substantial 
climate footprint which were members of the FTSE4Good in 2008 and did not 
immediately meet the introduced climate change requirements received extensive 
engagement from FTSE. These companies therefore formed the treatment group. The 
engagement aimed to facilitate corporate development of the required strategies and 
challenged corporate reputation by the explicit notification of the potential exclusion 
from the index if a company fails to implement the necessary practices by 2010. 
Similarly, high impact firms from FTSE All-World Developed Index which were not 
members of the FTSE4Good in 2008 formed the control group. These companies did 
not face exclusion and did not receive engagement from FTSE. I contrast the 
response by treated and control firms to the criteria and further examine compliance 
in different governance contexts.  
 
I use a sample of 470 companies from 24 countries and find that the index 
engagement reinforced by the threat of expulsion has substantially increased the 
probability that a firm will develop the required climate change mitigating strategies 
within the two-year period 2008 to 2010. When I attempt to separate the engagement 
effect from the pressure to stay in the index assuming that companies which were 
expected to be members a) had relative benefits to do so and b) faced peer pressure 
to keep/gain their membership, I find that the latter did not independently stimulate 
compliance. This is consistent with the dialogue playing a role in promoting 
compliance while the reputation threat associated with exclusion and competitive 
pressure did not. However, engagement was more efficient for companies which did 
not themselves have the incentive to keep their membership. This indicates that to a 
certain extent engagement and the competition pressure can be viewed as substituting 




influence of strategic ownership on compliance, positive though weak impact of 
companies coming from coordinated market economies and strong negative 
influence of internal governance. While one cannot state that meeting FTSE4Good 
climate change criteria would necessarily result in significant emission reduction by 
the companies, I do find a tentative correlation between compliance and positive 
changes in corporate emission reduction efforts. 
 
These findings therefore contribute to the understanding as to how challenges in 
promoting ‘social’, or ‘external’, CSR in general and climate-related programmes in 
particular are embedded in the context reflected in agency theory. While the impact 
of the engagement combined with the reputational threat is consistent with 
institutional pressures influencing management decision making, agency theory helps 
explain how the owners are still viewing such CSR investments as a potential cost 
and how good governance does not reconcile ‘external’ CSR expenditures and 
shareholder interests. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that responsible investors 
may wish to consider advancing their engagement approach by using the index 
membership and the engagement by the index provider. 
 
5.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses 
 
5.2.1 Climate Change and Engagement 
 
Despite climate change regulation facing as many challenges as ever (FT, 2013), the 
importance of the issue is indisputable (Stern, 2006). In turn, academic research has 
developed an extensive discussion of the implications for business of 
mismanagement of climate change-related risks. These involve damage caused by 
severe weather events such as floods and hurricanes which imply both direct costs 
and increased insurance premium (Lash & Wellington, 2007; Sullivan and 
Mackenzie, 2008). Other firm risks result from the new legislation related to 
emission reduction, pressure from CSR-conscious consumers, investors and 
employees, competition from more environmentally advanced manufacturers and, on 




climate change effects (Lash & Wellington, 2007; Reinhardt 1999). Different studies 
focus on some or all of the above and offer evidence as to how to turn these risks into 
opportunities. These range from innovation and hence lower costs of inputs, 
processes and products, to enhanced corporate reputation among consumers, 
responsible investors and other stakeholders (Boyd, 1998; King & Lenox, 2002; 
Kolk & Pinkse, 2004). The overall emerging consensus is that corporations should 
include governance of climate change risks in their management strategy.  
 
However, given its long-term nature, imprecise estimates and risks being in the 
supply chain, climate change constitutes the largest market failure where the goals of 
corporations are not aligned with the interests of society at large (Stern, 2006; 
Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008). What is undeniable though is that adjusting the 
business to the low-carbon reality requires substantial costs in the short term while 
potential benefits from emission reduction are not always straightforward (Hart & 
Ahuja, 1996; Mackenzie & Ascui, 2009). As such, climate change is an ‘external’, or 
‘social’, CSR investment (Judge et al., 2010; Rees & Mackenzie, 2011; Rees & 
Rodionova, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, institutional investors increasingly want companies to address climate 
change-related risks and actively engage on this matter which is reflected, for 
example, in more and more institutions joining voluntary initiatives such as the 
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment or the Carbon Disclosure 
Project. Some institutions, such as CalPERS and other largest pension funds, do so in 
their position as ‘universal owners’ where their portfolio represents the global 
economy and excessive greenhouse gas emissions in one part of the world may have 
consequences in another (Gjessing & Syse, 2007). These investors perceive 
managing climate change risks to be in line with their fiduciary duty to provide long-
term returns. Other institutions may just take an ethical stand while others may hope 
to outperform (Barber, 2007; Dimson et al., 2012). In line with the discussions in 
management literature, most of the engagement is conducted based on the 
assumption that there is a ‘business case’ for companies with improved 




the superior financial performance by socially responsible investments remains 
mixed (Barnett & Salomon, 2006; Renneboog et al., 2008), engagement on 
environmental, social and governance issues is shown to bring about returns to 
investors (Dimson et al., 2012).  
 
From the shareholder perspective, requesting enhanced environmental performance 
is economically sound if it results in higher firm value or lower business risk 
(Reinhardt, 1999). Further, the choice of engagement strategy depends on the 
associated costs as indicated by some of the large US pension funds (Del Guercio & 
Hawkins, 1999). Among engagements on governance by Hermes UK Focus Fund, a 
UK activist hedge fund, a substantial proportion were confrontational and lasted over 
1,200 days (Becht et al., 2009) which implicitly suggests non-trivial costs. In 
addition, climate change is a complex issue and conducting meaningful engagement 
may be expensive and not feasible due to particular expertise required and an 
extensive number of companies in the portfolios of the institutional investors 
(Gifford, 2010). Cases of the largest institutions such as ABP and CalPERS present 
successful engagement stories, yet on the whole institutions are shown to have little 
influence over corporate social and environmental practices (Rees & Rodionova, 
2012) and it remains unclear to which extent they do monitor management (Starks, 
2009).  Meanwhile, undiversified influential investors such as families and 
corporations may effectively obstruct investment in ‘external’ CSR such as climate 
change practices.  
 
Evidence on successful engagement has mostly been related to corporate governance 
matters. Pension funds are shown to effect changes in anti-takeover and board 
matters via shareholder proposals (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999). Further, hedge 
funds are shown to influence various corporate governance aspects of the target firms 
through shareholder resolutions (Brav et al., 2008; Klein & Zur, 2009; Thomas & 
Cotter, 2007) or dialogue with management (Becht et al., 2009). Regarding corporate 
social responsibility, there is some evidence to suggest that institutional investors 
may successfully engage with companies on climate change issues, both via 




2012). In the latter case, the authors find that successful engagements on CSR issues 
generated cumulative abnormal returns of 4.4 percent and the positive market 
response was most pronounced for climate change and corporate governance topics. 
However, on average CSR-related proposals may still be struggling to gain support 
from other shareholders or to result in management action (Thomas & Cotter, 2007).  
 
Another way of engaging is via institutional mechanisms such as a responsible 
investment index. Emerging evidence suggests that management is increasingly 
taking into consideration CSR ratings in general (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). With 
regards to the environmental management, Mackenzie et al. (2013) show that 
engagement by a responsible investment index reinforced by the threat of public 
expulsion from the index has doubled the propensity to adopt more stringent 
environmental management provisions within the two-year period. Investor 
collaboration is generally being promoted, although many institutions choose not to 
coordinate their activist campaigns mostly because of the legal considerations 
(McCahery et al., 2009). In the institutional context where responsible investors may 
still be struggling to have their voices heard by other investors and management, the 
index engagement offers a mechanism of collaborative investor action on CSR 
matters.  
 
5.2.2 FTSE4Good Climate Change Criteria and the Engagement Process 
 
FTSE4Good Climate Change criteria were introduced in 2008 and aimed to lead 
companies towards reducing their climate change impact. As with the other criteria, 
these were formulated by an independent Policy Committee involving responsible 
investors, academics, CSR and industry experts, and reflected wider consultation 
with asset managers, institutional and private investors, NGOs, governmental bodies 
and business associations (FTSE, 2010). Such a process is consistent with the 
argument that investor-driven CSR indices reflect investors’ expectations and what 
they perceive to be important issues (Starks, 2009). The criteria addressed policy, 
management, disclosure and performance (FTSE, 2010). In recognition of the 




the criteria had to be realistic; however, by targeting all key aspects of management 
they were arguably still more demanding than low-cost actions requested by 
investors individually, and could help attract management’s attention to climate 
change risks (Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008). Overall, the requirements set up by 
FTSE are consistent with what prior research has found to be a proactive 
management approach to climate change (Lash & Wellington, 2007; Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998; Sundin et al., 2009). Additionally, prior studies observe the 
association between companies’ public disclosure of environmental information (Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Patten, 2002) and more specifically climate change disclosure 
(Dawkins & Fraas, 2011) and environmental performance.  
 
FTSE4Good climate change criteria targeted all companies from FTSE All-World 
Developed Index which were identified as having medium or high operational and/or 
product impact. The impact evaluation was performed based primarily on business 
subsector (FTSE, 2010). Underlying research of companies was carried out by an 
independent data provider, Ethical Investment Research Services (EIRIS) via an 
annual survey, an analysis of company websites and direct contact. This information 
was then used by the Policy Committee to assess every six months whether a 
company complied with the requirements. As a result of such reviews, FTSE 
announces those companies who become included in the index and those who are 
deleted from it. The latter may impact on a company’s reputation and cause adverse 
publicity (Collison et al., 2009). Given the reputational implications and 
consequently potential costs, FTSE allowed a grace period until 2010. This meant 
that a non-complying member of the index would receive engagement from the index 
and would be privately notified about the potential exclusion at the assessment in 
2010.  Engagement involved intensive communication with management through 
emails, letters, phone calls and in person meetings and involved, for example, 
consultation on emissions measurement, benchmarking and disclosure and reporting 
climate change strategies of highly diversified businesses. This is consistent with the 
engagement by activist hedge funds, asset managers and pension funds (Becht et al., 




sequence by the activist asset manager lasted on average 1.5 years (Dimson et al., 
2012).  
 
Given their extensive involvement in setting up the criteria and navigating the index 
approach to the engagement, such an activism strategy offers an instrument of 
collaborative investor action on CSR matters.  While the costs and benefits of CSR-
related activism for smaller investors may make it not economically justified or even 
feasible, forming coalitions or using collective action may make them more efficient 
as monitors (Poulsen et al., 2010). Consistent with this view, Renneboog and 
Szilagyi (2010) observe that formation of coalitions did indeed successfully 
discipline managers. This evidence is primarily concerned with using the voting 
power but can arguably be applied to private engagement as well. For example, 
Becht et al. (2009) note that in more than 80 percent of cases the Hermes UK Focus 
Fund contacted other institutional owners though it led to collective actions only in 
three instances. 
 
Apart from the dialogue itself, FTSE informed non-complying member firms about 
the potential deletion from the index if they do not adopt the requested practices by 
2010. This levied up the dialogue via normative power and urgency (Gifford, 2010). 
Similarly, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) argue that the threat of publicity may 
give activist pension funds leverage with targeted companies and may even trigger a 
response from companies not directly targeted by activists, i.e. generate a spill-over 
effect. In particular, they observe that the major activists such as CalPERS and 
CalSTRS use publicity as part of the engagement strategy. Further evidence by 
Dimson et al. (2012) shows that in 40 percent of cases the engagement by the activist 
asset manager was triggered by public news. The alignment of the index engagement 
strategy with the ones observed in the institutional activism studies is not surprising 








5.2.3 The Effect of Index and Engagement on Managing Climate Change Risk 
 
A low-carbon economy in some form or shape is inevitable. So the better and the 
earlier management responds by adjusting the business to emission constraints, the 
more likely the company can exploit potential competitive advantage (Lash & 
Wellington, 2007). Extant management literature equips managers with the 
knowledge as to how they could achieve this aim (Boyd, 1998; King & Lenox, 2002; 
Kolk & Pinkse, 2004). However, proactive climate change strategies would only 
present a competitive advantage if consumers and investors were aware of and 
rewarded such endeavours (Cox et al., 2004; Fisman et al., 2006; Kim & Lyon, 2007; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; O’Rourke, 2003; Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). A 
responsible investment index along with other ratings may help promote this 
awareness (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). Managers therefore could be inclined to 
respond to the engagement and adopt FTSE requirements to comply and remain or be 
included in the index to the extent that it would credibly recognise their efforts and 
promote their strategy among consumers, investors and other stakeholders. A 
positive market reaction of 10.6 percent to the engagement on climate change issues 
reported by Dimson et al. (2012) shows that this may be the case.  
 
Further, companies use CSR indices and ratings to alleviate potential conflicts with 
stakeholders, and strong CSR, particularly ‘social’, rather than ‘financial’, may help 
preserve shareholder value through corporate reputation among stakeholders 
(Godfrey et al., 2009; Young & Marais, 2012). In this case non-compliance with a 
CSR standard could augment risks associated with damaged corporate reputation and 
consequently potential costs. Consistent with this view, Deegan et al. (2000) find that 
in case of an environmental disaster companies operating in related industries 
increased the disclosure of their environmental performance in their annual reports. 
Similarly, Dimson et al. (2012) observe a positive and significant relationship 
between the number of climate change-related lawsuits and both the probability of 
being targeted by an activist investor and the probability of the company 
implementing the required changes. Alternatively, managers may also pursue 




responsible leader or follow their personal ethical values (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; 
Reinhardt, 1999). Considering either of these motivations or all of them taken 
together, I predict the following relationship:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms will be more likely to meet the FTSE4Good 
climate change criteria if they are subject to FTSE engagement and 
face FTSE4Good exclusion. 
 
5.2.4 The Effect of Incentives and Constraints on Compliance and Engagement 
 
Firm governance presents the setting which affects management’s strategies, the 
relative balance of potential costs and benefits and the ability to use corporate 
resources to implement particular management decisions. Hence I examine the 
impact of governance characteristics of the firm such as expected index membership, 
ownership, institutional context and overall internal governance. These may both 
impact on corporate adoption of advanced climate change practices and the response 
to external engagement. 
 
5.2.4.1 The Effect of Expected Index Membership  
 
Prior research has emphasized the importance of a company’s interactions with 
competitors and stakeholders (Reinhardt, 1999; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). 
Regarding the latter, management is especially keen on avoiding possible 
consequences of unexpected bad news (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011). Further, 
stakeholder’s response to corporate decisions is likely to be influenced  by the 
position of similar companies on this issue. Since membership in a responsible 
investment index provides a recognised benchmark of a good CSR practice, 
management’s decision towards membership may be affected by the extent to which 
similar companies tend to be in the index. Management could also be concerned with 
possible negative implications of exclusion from the index if comparable companies 
are in. Whether or not membership in an index equates to strong corporate social 




competitors in the index and the lack of the necessary disclosure or management’s 
commitment. In line with this view, Dimson et al. (2012) demonstrate that firms with 
stronger reputational concerns are more likely to implement CSR provisions 
requested through engagement. Similarly, firms tend to become targets of activism if 
they are more visible (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010). I therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Firms will be more likely to meet the FTSE4Good 
climate change criteria if the expectation of the firm being included 
in the index based on the membership of similar firms is higher. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. The impact of engagement and threatened exclusion 
on the probability that a firm will meet the FTSE4Good climate 
change criteria will be higher where the expectation of the firm 
being included in the index is higher. 
 
5.2.4.2 The Effect of Ownership  
 
From the owner’s perspective, climate change is an external issue where the benefits 
are long-term and fall on society at large while costs are borne by the shareholders of 
the company (Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008; Rees & Rodionova, 2012). The costs 
involved in rechanneling the business activity towards lower emissions are 
substantial (Mackenzie & Ascui, 2009) and the ability of a company to benefit 
directly from resulting changes beyond short-term ‘low-hanging fruit’ opportunities 
is uncertain (Hart & Ahuja, 1996). Strategic long-term owners with large 
shareholdings have both the incentive and the ability to closely monitor 
management’s investment decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986, 
1997).  Given their power to influence management according to their interests, they 
may effectively prevent external social activism initiatives (Judge et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Carleton et al. (1998) find that firms with higher insider ownership were 
less likely to reach an agreement with TIAA-CREF, an activist pension fund, before 




concerned with the adverse publicity resulting from the proxy initiative by an activist 
shareholder. Along similar lines, Brav et al. (2008) note that activist hedge funds 
tend to target companies with higher institutional ownership rather than companies 
with dominant undiversified equity holders. I can, therefore, predict the following 
relationships: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. Firms with high levels of strategic ownership are 
less likely to meet the FTSE4Good climate change criteria. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. High levels of strategic ownership will reduce the 
engagement effect. 
 
5.2.4.3 The Effect of Institutional Context  
 
According to the institutional theory, institutional forces coming from the 
government, non-governmental organisations, investors and other stakeholders 
influence company’s CSR responsiveness (Campbell, 2007). At the same time 
agency theory postulates that a country-wide governance system defines the extent to 
which the interests of different shareholders are protected, and thus moderates the 
spectrum of agency issues between managers and shareholders or majority and 
minority owners (La Porta et al., 2000). National governance system may therefore 
influence CSR proficiency and disclosure (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Kolk & Pinkse, 
2010). With regards to climate change, coordinated market economies (CME) are 
shown to have a generally more stakeholder-driven institutional environment than 
liberal market economies (LME) (Franks et al., 2006; Kang & Moon, 2012). 
Similarly, Young and Marais (2012) find that companies in CMEs report more on 
‘social’ CSR including environmental issues. While there are variations within 
CMEs themselves with regards to CSR incentives (Kang & Moon, 2012), on the 
whole, companies in CMEs have been shown to use CSR disclosure to communicate 
with stakeholders (Morsing & Schultz, 2006). Based on this evidence, I state the 





Hypothesis 4a. Companies from coordinated market economies are 
more likely to meet the FTSE4Good climate change criteria within 
the required time period. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. The engagement effect will be stronger if the 
company comes from a coordinated market economy rather than a 
liberal market economy. 
 
5.2.4.4 The Effect of Internal Governance  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as “ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 737). This definition implicitly assumes that in a well-
governed firm managers will consider economic benefits of any investment or 
strategic decisions they make. In this case spending resources on emission reduction 
and operations related to mitigation of the climate change may not seem appealing 
since it may be difficult to extract direct operational benefits in the short term (Hart 
& Ahuja, 1996). Similarly, Jo and Harjoto (2011) show that where management 
aspires to create value for shareholders via CSR enhancement, this is achieved 
through ‘financial’ CSR concerning employees or production rather than projects 
related to wider community or the environment. Conversely, Dimson et al. (2012) 
report the most positive market reaction to engagements on climate change and 
corporate governance which suggests that investors may be recognising the benefits 
or at least the necessity of proactive climate change practices though they do not see 
them as mainstream and thus reward outperforming companies. Given this evidence, 
I expect strong internal governance to have a negative effect on climate change 
compliance. However, I cannot predict precisely how internal governance will 






Hypothesis 5a. Firms with high governance ratings are less likely 
to implement FTSE4Good climate change requirements within the 
given time period. 
 
Hypothesis 5b. Firms with high governance ratings are influenced 
by engagement differently from firms with low governance ratings. 
 
5.3 Research Method 
 
5.3.1 Experimental Setting and Sample 
 
I test the hypotheses in the context of a natural experiment which resulted from the 
introduction by FTSE of the climate change criteria in 2008 and their implementation 
in 2010. The test sample consists of 470 companies from 24 countries and 8 
industries. These companies are members of FTSE All-World Developed Index 
which a) were assessed by FTSE both in 2008 and 2010
16
, b) had medium or high 
impact on climate change, c) were not in weaponry, tobacco or nuclear businesses 
(those were excluded from consideration for index membership according to the 
index rules), d) did not meet the FTSE4Good climate change criteria in 2008 and e) 
had complete data for the control variables. Of these, 160 companies were in the 
index in 2008 and form the treatment group. Engagement
17
 was conducted with all 
                                                 
16
 During this period 2008 to 2010 a number of firms dropped out of FTSE All-World Index. 
However, none of those had been assessed as high or medium climate change impact and therefore 
were not subject to climate change criteria and did not affect the sample. 
 
17
 It could be the case that companies were subject to simultaneous engagement regarding several 
FTSE4Good criteria or had previously been in engagement regarding a different FTSE4Good CSR 
theme. While this could provide a ‘synergy’ effect, different nature of the criteria and tight 
requirements in each theme meant that it would unlikely bias the results. Further, the analysis of semi-
annual Policy Committee documents revealed that there were cases of companies that had either in-
person meetings or teleconferences regarding the requirements to meet the criteria and had 
commissioned specialised teams to work on the requirements, yet the company would be deleted if it 
had not  demonstrated sufficient progress in meeting the requirements by the deadline. Further, 
conversations with FTSE representatives revealed that companies could be in regular contact with 
FTSE and could provide information internally but would not be willing to publicly disclose and 
clarify the emission trend data or would have the emissions data available but would not be ready to 
demonstrate senior level commitment and publish climate change policy. Finally, the strongest 
incentive to comply would be in situations where a company would have spent resources to improve 
their environmental performance. To the extent that a reputable independent data provider (ASSET4) 




companies in this group. The remaining 310 firms are non-member companies which 
did not receive engagement nor faced the potential exclusion, and these firms form 
the control group. The structure of the experimental setting and the time line are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. This empirical context allows us to contrast the response to 
the index by the two groups, one in treatment, i.e. engagement reinforced by the 






                                                                                                                                          
include a control variable representing ASSET4’s assessment (as a score) of company’s emission 









firms fail to meet 
the climate change 
criteria and form the 
treatment group. 
310 non-FTSE 
firms fail to meet 
the climate change 
criteria and form 
the control group. 
83 percent of treated 
& 22 percent of 
control firms meet 
the new criteria in 
2010. 
17 percent of treated 
& 78 percent of 
control firms fail to 
meet the new criteria 
in 2010. 
Sample are FTSE All-World Developed constituents, excluding prohibited 
firms (e.g. weaponry, tobacco), identified by FTSE as having medium or high 
climate change impact. These companies are independently assessed by EIRIS 
for policy, management, reporting and performance with requirements varying 
by climate change impact. Climate change criteria were established in 2008, 
with firms given until 2010 to comply. Engagement was conducted with 







Dependent Variable. The dependent variable (Meet10) is a dichotomous variable 
where one indicates compliance with the FTSE4Good climate change criteria 2010.  
 
Explanatory Variables. The main explanatory variable (Engage) represents the joint 
effect of engagement from FTSE and the threat of exclusion from the index. It is a 
dichotomous variable coded one for all non-complying eligible firms which were 
members of the index in 2008 and therefore received engagement and zero otherwise.  
 
Next, I measure the membership incentive (P.Ind08) as the predicted probability of 
the FTSE4Good index membership in 2008. Here I follow the rationale that if 
companies with certain characteristics tend to be in the index, there are net benefits 
in that, and the competition and reputation concerns would motivate managers to 
avoid exclusion or to become included in the index. This is consistent with the view 
that companies do feel the pressure from more environmentally advanced 
competitors (Lash & Wellington, 2007; Reinhardt 1999). To estimate P.Ind08, I use 
logit model on the full sample of 1,675 assessed FTSE All-World Developed 
companies not from weaponry, tobacco or nuclear businesses. The probability of a 
firm being in the index in 2008 is estimated using country (Country) and industry 
(Industry) dummies, climate change impact (High) as assessed by FTSE, size 
expressed as the log of market capitalisation (Size) and the concentrated ownership 
percentage collected from Datastream (Close): 
 
Ind08j = a0 + a1Sizej + a2Closej + … 
C1-21Countryj + I1-32Industryj + ej 
 
The country and industry dummies are collectively statistically significant 
(Chi2=270.05, p<0.001 and Chi2=131.69, p<0.001 respectively) as are the risk 
(Chi2=10.65, p<0.01), the size (Chi2=103.46, p<0.001) and the ownership 
(Chi2=11.98, p<0.001). The model has a pseudo-R2 of 0.23 and correctly classifies 






I collect the ownership data from Datastream and use the measure of concentrated 
shareholdings in 2010 defined as shares held for strategic rather than trading reasons 
and including shares held by family and employees, other corporations, governments, 
investment institutions and pension funds. I take the measure of the firm governance 
from ASSET4 and use their overall 0-100 governance score in 2010. ASSET4 
governance score is based on multiple criteria including, for example, various board 
characteristics and shareholder protection provisions. Taking the governance variable 
from a different source therefore avoids potential bias arising from taking both 
compliance and governance assessment from FTSE. The institutional environment 
(Economy) is included as a dichotomous variable distinguishing liberal market 




Control Variables. Given that companies assessed by FTSE as high risk in climate 
change had to meet the most stringent requirements, I include a control variable 
coded one if a company had a high impact on climate change according to FTSE 
assessment. Further, following prior research suggesting that the level of CSR 
disclosure varies in different industries and countries (Deegan et al., 2000; Young & 
Marais, 2012), I include industry and country controls defined as the average 
compliance rate in a given industry or country (Antonakis et al., 2010). Next, 
because prior evidence suggested that environmental performance may influence 
climate change disclosure (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011), I include in the models an 
ASSET4 indicator of emission reduction performance expressed as a 0 to 100 score. 
Again, collecting the environmental performance measure from a data source other  
than FTSE allows us to avoid potential bias in the assessment of the company’s prior 
environmental performance. I also interact the treatment variable with the emission 
                                                 
18
 The country classification is as follows (an asterix corresponds to those countries defined as CME): 
Australia 35, Austria* 1, Belgium* 6, Canada 14, Denmark* 4, Finland* 5, France* 15, Germany* 15, 
Greece* 4, Hong Kong 12,  Ireland 3, Italy* 4, Japan* 120, Netherlands* 5, New Zealand 1, Norway* 
4, Portugal* 2, Singapore 10, Spain* 7, Sweden* 6, Switzerland* 9, UK 68, USA 120. I followed 
prior evidence where available, otherwise I based the classification on stock market capitalisation to 
GDP (La Porta et al., 1997) and anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008). This effectively reflects 
common law versus code law systems.  
The industry distribution of the sample is as follows: Oil & Gas 34, Basic Materials 107, Industrials 




reduction score to test whether engagement was more successful with those 
companies which already had advanced climate change strategies in place and were 
therefore ‘easier’ cases for engagement. Finally, because prior literature documented 
the relationship between company size and environmental performance and 
disclosure (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Patten, 1992, 2002; 
Udayasankar, 2008), I control for size expressed as a natural logarithm of the market 
capitalisation (Thomas & Cotter, 2007).  
 
5.3.3 Model Specification 
 
In the main tests I use the following logit model to examine the effect of index 
engagement reinforced by the threat of public exclusion on the probability that a firm 
would comply with the climate change requirements by the given deadline.  
 
Meet10i  = 0 + 1Engagei + 2Emit.Redi + 3Engagei*Emit.Red i + … 
4Highi + 5Sizei + 6Ind.Meeti +7Co.Meeti + ei 
 
In the model i indexes firms, Meet10 denotes compliance with the FTSE4Good 
climate change criteria in 2010, Engage is the combined effect of index engagement 
and exclusion, Emit.Red is the ASSET4 emission reduction score, High determines 
companies with high climate change impact, Size is the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalisation and Ind.Meet and Co.Meet are mean compliance rates in a 
given industry or country.  
 
When I introduce the incentives/constraints variables along with their interaction 
terms with the engagement variable, the model becomes as follows: 
 
Meet10i  = 0 + 1Engagei + 2Incentivei + 3Engagei*Incentive i + … 





In this model Incentive comprises expected index membership (P.Ind08), strategic 
ownership (Ownership), firm’s internal governance (Governance) and institutional 
setting (Economy). 
 
5.3.4 Propensity Score Matching Approach 
 
Since the control variables in the regression approach could be associated with the 
treatment itself, I use propensity score matching as a robustness test (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) to control for the sample selection bias 
and the resulting heterogeneity between the contrasted treatment and control groups. 
According to this method, I first model the probability of a given firm to be included 
in the treatment group based on its climate change risk, size, emission reduction 
score and industry and country controls. As I predict that governance-related 
incentives and/or constraints affect compliance, I later test whether differences in 
those are eliminated after the matching procedure and find that they mostly are. 
Where not, I adjust the propensity score model to incorporate these additional factors 
and the results remain consistent. I also use propensity score matching as a 




Descriptive statistics are presented in Panel A of Table 5.1. Of the engaged 
companies, 83 percent complied with the climate change requirements in 2010 as 
opposed to only 22 percent of the control firms. Companies in the treatment group 
are also more likely to have medium impact on climate change, are almost twice as 
much more likely to be members of the index in 2008, are more likely to reside in 
coordinated market economies and have slightly lower governance scores. 
Conversely, ownership is about the same in the two groups. 
 
Panel B presents the correlation matrix for the dependent variable and explanatory 
and control variables. The engagement variable is strongly and positively correlated 




the hypotheses, there is a high (greater than 0.50) correlation between the 
engagement variable and the probability of index membership (0.55). There is also a 
high negative correlation between governance and being domiciled in a CME which 













Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Full Sample Meet10 Engage High Size Emit.Red P.Ind08 Ownership Governance Economy 
Mean 0.43 0.34 0.30 15.66 0.69 0.37 26.95 0.59 0.44 
Std. Dev 0.49 0.47 0.46 1.18 0.28 0.26 19.90 0.32 0.50 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.13 0.95 0.97 88.24 0.97 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.37 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 
N 470 470 470 470 470 441 425 461 470 
Engagement          
Mean 0.83 1.00 0.14 15.82 0.82 0.56 24.90 0.54 0.63 
Std. Dev 0.38 0.00 0.35 1.34 0.18 0.24 17.91 0.32 0.49 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.02 0.95 0.97 76.71 0.96 1.00 
Min 0.00 1.00 0.00 12.91 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 
N 160 160 160 160 160 155 152 156 160 
Control          
Mean 0.22 0.00 0.38 15.57 0.61 0.26 28.09 0.62 0.35 
Std. Dev 0.41 0.00 0.49 1.08 0.29 0.21 20.87 0.31 0.48 
Max 1.00 0.00 1.00 19.13 0.95 0.91 88.24 0.97 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.37 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 





Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 Meet10 Engage High Size Emit.Red P.Ind08 Ownership Governance Economy 
Meet10 1              
Engage 0.59*** 1             
High -0.37*** -0.26*** 1            
Size 0.07 0.10* -0.01 1           
Emit.Red  0.34*** 0.36*** 0.01 0.31*** 1          
P.Ind08   0.46*** 0.55*** -0.34*** 0.19*** 0.38*** 1         
Ownership  -0.09† -0.08 0.06 -0.11* -0.06 -0.22*** 1        
Governance  -0.17*** -0.11* 0.09† 0.26*** 0.14** -0.03 -0.33*** 1  
Economy  0.29*** 0.27*** -0.10* -0.06 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.23***  -0.71***  1 
Statistics and correlations are presented for the main test sample (470 observations) or where data on a specific variable is missing for the available sample. Meet10 
denotes meeting climate change requirements in 2010 (=1); Engage denotes subject to FTSE Engagement (=1); High is a zero-one variable which denotes high 
climate change risk as assessed by FTSE in 2008. Size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation. Emit.Red is the ASSET4 emission reduction score in 
2008 (zero to one). P.Ind08 is the estimate of the probability of being in the index in 2008, Ownership is the percentage of strategic equity as assessed by 
Datastream, Governance is the firm’s overall governance score as assessed by ASSET4 and calculated on a zero to one scale and Economy equals one for CME. 





5.4.1 Test of the Joint Engagement and Deletion Threat Effect 
 
Table 5.2 presents the results of the logistic regression model used to test H1 which 
predicted positive relationship between treatment (engagement reinforced by the 
threat of exclusion) and compliance with climate change requirements. In Model 1 I 
include the treatment variable along with the immediate controls for climate change 
risk and industry and country. In Model 2 I additionally control for size. I next 
incorporate the emission reduction performance first as the main effect only (Model 
3) and with the interaction term with treatment (Model 4).  
 
The estimated coefficient for the treatment variable is positive and significant in all 
model specifications which supports H1 (Model 1: β=2.92, p<0.001, Model 2: 
β=2.82, p<0.001, Model 3: β=2.39, p<0.001 and Model 4: β=4.47, p<0.001). The 
marginal effect estimated for these four models shows a significant impact of 
treatment (Model 1: 0.41, p<0.001, Model 2: 0.40, p<0.001, Model 3: 0.33, p<0.001 
and Model 4: 0.61, p<0.001), which corresponds to an increase in the probability of a 
firm complying after treatment of approximately 33 to 61 percent points.  
 
The coefficient on emission reduction score is positive and significant (Model 3: 
β=0.02, p<0.05, Model 4: β=0.03, p<0.05) suggesting that companies with a more 
proactive approach to climate change will tend to have a more systematic approach 
to climate change strategies and provide better disclosure of their programmes. This 
is consistent with the accommodative approach discussed in previous studies 
whereby managers want to communicate their environmental strategies to 
stakeholders (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Dawkins & Fraas, 
2011). However, while the inclusion of the interaction term almost doubles the 
coefficient on the main treatment effect, the negative coefficient on the interaction 
term (Model 4: β=-0.03, p<0.05) implies that proactive companies may not require 
additional incentive of engagement. The high risk variable is negative and significant 
(Model 1: β=-2.01, p<0.001, Model 2: β=-2.06, p<0.001, Model 3: β=-2.11, p<0.001 




assessed impact on climate change had to meet more stringent requirements making 
it more challenging for them to comply.  
 
TABLE 5.2 
Tests of the Joint Engagement and Deletion Threat Effect 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
     
Intercept -0.49 -3.38 -2.45 -2.92 
 (0.32) (0.95) (0.65) (0.75) 
     
Engage 2.92*** 2.82*** 2.39*** 4.47*** 
 (12.03) (9.96) (7.87) (4.07) 
     
Emit.Red   0.02* 0.03* 
   (2.56) (2.57) 
     
Engage*Emit.Red    -0.03* 
    (2.32) 
     
High -2.01*** -2.06*** -2.11*** -2.10*** 
 (5.60) (5.14) (6.64) (6.32) 
     
Size  0.16 -0.09 -0.07 
  (0.87) (0.48) (0.37) 
     
Ind.Meet -0.73† -0.78† -0.55 -0.56 
 (1.78) (1.93) (1.28) (1.32) 
     
Co.Meet 0.28 0.63 1.59 1.48 
 (0.28) (0.63) (1.62) (1.59) 
     
Marginal effect     
Engage 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.61*** 
Engage*Emit.Red    -0.003** 
Wald-Chi
2
       
Full Model 684.10*** 673.24*** 581.41*** 630.48*** 
All Engagement 144.75*** 99.14*** 61.93*** 54.52*** 
     
Observations 540 529 470 470 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with climate change criteria 
introduced in 2008 and implemented in 2010. The dependent variable is compliance in 2010. The 
independent variables are engagement from FTSE reinforced by the exclusion threat (Engage), 
ASSET4 emission reduction score taken at 2008, high climate change risk (High), size as the natural 
log of market capitalisation (Size), and industry and country mean compliance controls. The absolute 
t-statistics are given underneath in parentheses. I also present Wald-Chi
2
 estimates of the significance 
of a) the full model and b) the engagement variables plus any interaction term. All standard errors are 






5.4.2 Propensity Score Matching Tests of Engagement 
 
In Table 5.3 I used propensity score matching to test the effect of the FTSE 
engagement on compliance with climate change requirements. In this approach I 
contrast compliance of the firms which received treatment with control firms which 
were equally likely to be treated but did not receive treatment. I match treatment and 
control firms based on a propensity score which is a function of climate change risk, 
size, emission reduction score and industry and country controls. I report the results 
using a range of matching techniques including matching with the nearest neighbour, 
three nearest neighbours, three nearest neighbours within 0.001 propensity of 
treatment, all firms with the propensity of treatment within the 0.001 radius and 
kernel matching where the result for the treated firm is matched with the weighted 
average results for all control firms with weights determined by their propensity 
scores. I use bootstrapping with 50 iterations to validate the estimates.  
 
The results in Table 5.3 add further support to H1 as the difference in compliance 
between the two groups of companies is strongly significant (Model 1: ATT=0.37, 
p<0.001, Model 2: ATT=0.40, p<0.001, Model 3: ATT=0.44, p<0.001, Model 4: 
ATT=0.45, p<0.001, Model 5: ATT=0.37, p<0.001). Some of the approaches which 
impose stricter requirements for matched companies leave substantial number of 
companies out of comparison. In these cases the difference in the probability of 
compliance between treated and control firms reaches about 45 percent. However, as 
can be seen from the second panel of Table 5.3, when I compare the incentives 
indicators for the two groups, I find that treated firms are significantly more likely to 
be members of the index in 2008 and, while in the original dataset treated firms were 
almost twice as likely to come from coordinated market economies, after matching 
the sample is skewed in the opposite direction with substantially more control firms 
coming from CMEs. Given that I expect the impact of these characteristics on the 
company’s response to engagement, I refine the propensity score matching test by 
incorporating the expected index membership and the institutional setting variables 
in the model to obtain propensity scores. The model suggests that expected index 




the indicator of the type of the economy is insignificant. Overall, the resulting 
matching eliminates the difference in the incentives characteristics of the two groups 
but does not alter the main outcomes and further supports H1. 
 
TABLE 5.3 
Analysis of the Joint Engagement and Deletion Threat Effect Using Propensity Score 
Matching 
Matching ATT t-statistic Treatment Control 
 Treatment Control Diff.    
Unmatched 0.83 0.22 0.61 15.51***   
Model 1: Nearest (n1) 0.83 0.46 0.37 4.51*** 159 301 
Bootstrapped   0.37 3.88***   
Model  2: Nearest (n3) 0.83 0.43 0.40 5.92*** 159 301 
Bootstrapped   0.40 5.22***   
Model 3: Nearest (n3)  
Caliper (0.001) 0.76 0.32 0.44 4.37*** 50 301 
Bootstrapped   0.44 2.98**   
Model 4: Radius, (0.001) 0.76 0.31 0.45 4.37*** 50 301 
Bootstrapped   0.45 3.28**   
Model 5: Kernel 0.83 0.46 0.37 6.70*** 159 301 
Bootstrapped   0.37 6.75***   
       
Impact of Matching on Incentive Variables  
  Treated Control %Bias % Change t-statistic 
P.Ind08 Unmatched 0.56 0.26 134.1  13.68*** 
 Matched 0.53 0.41 52.9 60.5 2.54* 
Ownership Unmatched 0.69 0.84 -35.1  3.66*** 
 Matched 0.69 0.66 6.5 81.6 0.28 
Governance Unmatched 0.54 0.61 -20.9  2.11* 
 Matched 0.59 0.51 22.7 -8.9 1.05 
Economy Unmatched 0.62 0.35 55.7  5.72*** 
 Matched 0.52 0.73 -43.2 22.4 2.18* 
This table presents the results of the test of the treatment using propensity score matching. I use 
nearest neighbour matching, radius matching and kernel matching methods to test whether the 
treatment has an effect on compliance with the FTSE4Good climate change criteria. ATT denotes 
average treatment effect on the treated group regarding the outcome (compliance). T-statistic is the 
result for the average treatment effect. Treatment presents the number of companies subject to 
engagement and threatened with exclusion. Control denotes the matched companies that were not 
engaged with and did not face the deletion threat. The second panel reports the distribution of the 
incentive variables before and after the matching process using radius matching. I report the means 
of treated and control sample unmatched and matched, the pre-matching and post-matching bias, 
the reduction in that bias achieved by matching and the t-test of difference in means before and 
after matching. The results for the incentives variables remain consistent when I use the other 









5.4.3 Tests of Incentives and Constraints 
 
Table 5.4 reports the results of the logistic regression models used to test the impact 
of governance incentives on corporate adoption of the FTSE4Good climate change 
requirements. The incentives and/or constraints examined are the expected index 
membership, concentrated ownership, institutional context and firm internal 
governance. In Models 1 to 8 I introduce each incentive construct separately and 
together with the interaction term with engagement. Models 9 and 10 have all 
incentives together as main effects and with the interaction terms. Each model also 
includes climate change risk, size and emission reduction performance variables as 
well as industry and country controls.  
 
5.4.3.1 The Impact of Index Membership  
 
Models 1 and 2 reveal some but not strong positive relationship between expected 
index membership and compliance as the coefficient on the probability variable is 
insignificant when examined as the main effect only (Model 1: β=1.14, p=insig) and 
significant when the interaction term is also included (Model 2: β=1.66, p<0.01) . 
The interaction effect is negative and strongly significant (Model 2: β=-2.51, 
p<0.001) and the two incentives variables together are significant (Model 2: Chi
2
= 
16.40, p<0.001). The engagement coefficient is positive and significant as the main 
effect (Model 1: β=2.11, p<0.001, Model 2: β=3.10, p<0.001) and is significant 
when estimated jointly with the interaction term (Model 2: Chi
2
= 43.64, p<0.001). 
As a robustness check I conduct propensity score matching tests separately for 
companies with above average probability of being in the index in 2008 and those 
with lower probability. For the former I find that engagement increases the 
probability of compliance from 42 percent to 83 percent while for the latter from 41 
percent to 84 percent. Thus the results further suggest no significant impact of the 
expected index membership on compliance.  
 
The results therefore do not generally support H2a as competitive pressure implied 




of compliance with climate change requirements.  Meanwhile, strong significance of 
the engagement coefficient implies that, to the extent that these two variables 
introduced together separate the effect of FTSE engagement itself from the 
simultaneous threat of exclusion, FTSE dialogue does stimulate companies to adopt 
the required proactive climate strategies which is consistent with prior evidence 
regarding dialogue-driven investor engagement (Dimson et al., 2012). I also find the 
opposite result to H2b as it appears that engagement is less efficient if the company 
is more likely to be a member of the index. A possible explanation for this could be 
that competition forces motivate companies to comply while the FTSE 
communication process achieves more noticeable results in cases where the company 
is not a priori expected to be a member of the index. An alternative explanation could 
suggest that, if shareholder engagement signals manager’s inability to maintain 
strong social responsibility and/or reach an agreement with the shareholders (Chung 
& Talaulicar, 2010; David et al., 2007) managers may want to signal the opposite by 
taking the matters solely in their hands and avoiding external engagement. Finally, a 
third interpretation could be that, to the extent that companies regard membership in 
an index as a way to differentiate themselves from the competitors, companies which 
are not likely to be included may be more responsive to engagement which could 
lead them to become eligible for inclusion. 
 
5.4.3.2 The Impact of Concentrated Ownership  
 
H3a predicted that concentrated ownership would inhibit adopting climate change 
practices; consistent with this intuition, the coefficient on the strategic shareholdings 
is negative and significant (Model 3: β=-1.14, p<0.001 and Model 4: β=-1.13, 
p<0.001). When I decompose strategic ownership into categories of corporate 
shareholdings, institutional blockholdings, family holdings, government ownership 
and pension fund equity, I find that the negative impact comes from significant 
influence of families and, somewhat surprisingly, government and institutions while 
the potentially positive effect of pension funds is insignificant. Despite its overall 
negative impact on compliance, strategic shareholdings do not seem to significantly 




(Model 3: β=-0.04, p=insig) although the negative sign is consistent with prior 
evidence suggesting that concentrated owners may prevent external social activism 
(Judge et a., 2010). The positive impact of engagement on compliance holds despite 
the presence of strategic blockholders (Model 3: β=2.34, p<0.001 and Model 4: 
β=2.34, p<0.001). I therefore find support for H3a but not for H3b. Concentrated 
ownership itself tends to prevent proactive climate change policies however it does 
not inhibit external involvement with management on the issue.  
 
5.4.3.3 The Impact of Institutional Differences  
 
When I test the impact of the overall institutional environment, I find that companies 
which reside in coordinated market economies tend to comply with climate change 
provisions more readily than companies from liberal market economies (Model 5: 
β=0.72, p<0.01 and Model 6: β=0.87, p<0.01). However, engagement is efficient in 
both settings as the coefficient on the main engagement variable is positive and 
significant (Model 5: β=2.33, p<0.001 and Model 6: β=2.60, p<0.001) while the 
interaction term is insignificant (Model 6: β=-0.50, p=insig). The results are 
therefore consistent with H4a but not H4b. The findings suggest that, whilst 
companies in coordinated market economies may themselves have more incentives 
to enhance their climate change mitigating strategies, the positive influence of 
engagement from a responsible investment index can constitute an efficient 
mechanism of stirring companies towards higher climate change proactivity. I follow 
the same approach as in Mackenzie et al. (2013) and additionally incorporate the 
market capitalisation scaled by the GDP (La Porta et al., 1997) and the anti-self-
dealing index introduced by Djankov et al. (2008). The intuition is that the relative 
influence of the stock markets may put further pressure on management to 
outperform and may hinder investment in long-term projects with uncertain financial 
benefits such as climate change while anti-self-dealing index could indicate the 
potential discretion of management in pursuing their personal agenda. The results 
reveal insignificant impact of the market capitalisation scaled by the GDP although 
the sign is consistent with the prediction and with the findings by Mackenzie et al. 




with compliance with climate change criteria and the overall economy indicator 
remains positive and significant.  
 
5.4.3.4 The Impact of Corporate Governance  
 
H5a predicted that good governance would be negatively related to compliance and 
would affect the response to engagement. The results reveal that good governance is 
indeed negatively associated with compliance (Model 7: β=-1.47, p<0.001 and 
Model 8: β=-1.34, p<0.001) but does not alter the engagement impact (Model 7: β=-
0.45, p=insig).  When I test the impact of particular governance attributes such as 
CEO-chair duality, the number of non-executive directors and the size of the board 
(Judge et al., 2010), I find that CEO-Chairman separation and the board size are 
insignificant while higher proportion of non-executive directors is negatively 
associated with compliance. Taken together, the three governance characteristics are 
significant. Since such governance provisions are typically associated with strong 
shareholder-oriented governance system, this further supports the intuition that 











Tests of Incentives and Constraints 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9) (Model 10) 
           
Intercept -0.70 -1.62 -2.58 -2.58 -0.67 -0.71 -4.02 -4.18 0.99 0.01 
 (0.19) (0.46) (0.66) (0.66) (0.24) (0.25) (1.18) (1.23) (0.32) (0.00) 
           
Engage 2.11*** 3.10*** 2.34*** 2.34*** 2.33*** 2.60*** 2.27*** 2.55*** 2.06*** 4.24*** 
 (5.99) (6.20) (8.55) (8.55) (12.44) (7.61) (9.42) (7.44) (5.47) (3.64) 
           
High -1.90*** -1.95*** -2.07*** -2.07*** -2.15*** -2.15*** -1.99*** -1.98*** -1.82*** -1.75*** 
 (6.07) (6.08) (7.07) (7.02) (6.74) (6.69) (5.91) (6.03) (6.95) (7.04) 
           
Size -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.14 -0.11 
 (0.81) (0.65) (0.58) (0.57) (0.52) (0.49) (0.14) (0.12) (0.89) (0.70) 
           
Emit.Red 2.00** 1.93** 2.21** 2.22** 2.01** 1.98** 2.55*** 2.54** 2.08** 1.88** 
 (2.88) (2.82) (2.63) (2.68) (2.68) (2.75) (3.29) (3.22) (3.29) (3.07) 
           
Ind.Meet -0.38 -0.43 -0.44 -0.43 -0.53 -0.56 -0.35 -0.34 -0.24 -0.29 
 (0.78) (0.91) (1.04) (1.08) (1.29) (1.41) (0.86) (0.84) (0.55) (0.69) 
           
Co.Meet 0.98 1.18 2.45** 2.45**   2.28† 2.31†   
 (0.86) (0.98) (2.93) (2.90)   (1.87) (1.90)   
           
P.Ind08 1.14 1.66*       1.06 1.39 
 (1.64) (2.14)       (1.03) (1.19) 
           
Engage *  -2.51***        -1.24† 
P.Ind08  (3.38)        (1.67) 




Ownership   -1.14*** -1.13***     -0.70** -0.57** 
   (5.90) (4.19)     (3.16) (2.94) 
           
Engage *    -0.04      -0.16 
Ownership    (0.06)      (0.19) 
           
Economy     0.72* 0.87*   0.19 0.61 
     (2.12) (2.50)   (0.56) (1.27) 
           
Engage *      -0.50    -1.23 
Economy      (1.16)    (1.63) 
           
Governance       -1.47*** -1.34** -0.74† -0.20 
       (3.54) (2.59) (1.68) (0.38) 
           
Engage *        -0.45  -1.54 
Governance        (0.78)  (1.28) 
Wald-Chi2           
Full Model 584.23*** 1241.07*** 504.94*** 837.70*** 923.44*** 747.09*** 716.68*** 741.92*** 1133.55*** 1591.03*** 
All Engagement 35.88*** 43.64*** 73.12*** 74.15***  154.75*** 94.93*** 88.70*** 127.11*** 29.92*** 125.09*** 
All Incentives 2.68 16.40*** 34.77*** 34.40*** 4.50* 6.24* 12.55*** 18.32*** 180.44*** 342.51*** 
           
Observations 441 441 447 447 470 470 461 461 415 415 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with FTSE4Good climate change criteria in 2010. The independent variables are 
engagement from FTSE (Engage), high climate change risk (High), size as a natural logarithm of the market capitalisation (Size), ASSET4 emission reduction 
score at 2008, mean industry and country compliance (Ind.Meet and Co.Meet), the prior probability of being included in the FTSE4Good index (P.Ind08), 
strategic ownership with one indicating holdings of more than 10 percent (Ownership), domicile in a CME (Economy) and the ASSET4 assessment of 
corporate governance (Governance). The absolute t-statistics are given underneath in parentheses. I also present Wald-Chi
2
 estimates of the significance of a) 
the full model, b) the engagement variables plus any interaction terms and c) all incentive variables plus any interaction terms. All standard errors are robust 




5.4.3.5 The Impact of All Incentives  
 
In Model 9 I include expected index membership, concentrated ownership, 
institutional context and internal governance variables jointly and I further 
incorporate the respective interaction terms in Model 10. The coefficients for the 
main effects remain qualitatively consistent with the individual tests and all 
incentives are jointly strongly statistically significant as main effects (Model 9: 
Chi
2
= 180.44, p<0.001) and together with the interaction terms (Model 10: Chi
2
= 
29.92, p<0.001). When I include all interaction effects, the coefficient on the main 
engagement variable doubles and remains strongly significant (Model 10: β=4.24, 
p<0.001) and when I take all engagement-related variables together, they are 
collectively significant (Model 10: Chi
2
= 125.09, p<0.001). Engagement only 
appears to work less well for firms where there is already peer pressure to be a 
member.  
 
The decline in statistical significance of the economy and the internal governance 
indicators is driven by a strong correlation between them (Table 1, =-0.71) and 
when I introduce the interaction term between the two measures alongside all other 
incentives, I find that the negative impact of governance comes mainly from CMEs. 
The result for the economy variable is sensitive to the inclusion of the other 
incentives so I revisit the relationship using propensity score matching test and 
compare the probability of compliance as a result of engagement for companies in 
CMEs and LMEs separately. The results are inconclusive. Matching with the nearest 
neighbour or the three nearest neighbours suggest that the compliance outcome for 
CMEs and LMEs is almost indistinguishable with the increase in the probability of 
compliance from 48 percent to 85 percent for CMEs and from 44 percent to 77 
percent for LMEs. However, when I use tighter matching criteria, e.g. matching with 
a calliper, the results reveal some difference in compliance with companies in the 
CMEs displaying the increase in the probability of compliance from 39 percent to 74 
percent and LMEs – from 19 percent to 61 percent. However, this approach only 
leaves 23 treated CME firms and 13 treated LMEs firms for the analysis so the 




approach together with the declined significance of the main effect of the 
institutional setting variable in the regression model when the other incentives are 
included should be treated with caution. 
 
Since the result for the governance variable also seems to be sensitive to the 
inclusion of the other incentives, I apply propensity score matching test to contrast 
the compliance outcome for well governed firms as opposed to the ones with lower 
governance. The results support those of the regression analysis regardless of the 
matching procedure used. For example, for the nearest neighbour matching the 
probability of compliance for well-governed firms increases from 57 percent to 78 
percent while for the firms with less strong governance the increase is from 50 
percent to 89 percent. Thus, engagement has a significant positive impact on 
compliance but this influence is lower for firms with stronger internal governance 
system. 
 
5.4.4 Test of Compliance and Changes in Corporate Emissions 
 
I analyse the relation between the FTSE treatment and corporate emissions using 
ASSET4 data on total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emissions and direct CO2 emissions 
separately. To capture the intensity of emission reduction efforts, the variable of 
interest is measured as a percentage change in the absolute emissions between 2009 
and 2011, i.e. one year after the assessment of compliance. These years were selected 
as they gave the largest available sample. As a robustness test I also use alternative 
dates and the results remain qualitatively similar. Following prior research (Reid & 
Toffel, 2009), I log-transform the dependent variable. Following the general logic of 
the differences-in-differences approach, I assume that, if the firm characteristics are 
time-invariant, their impact on the outcome will be cancelled out. I therefore use the 
most parsimonious model where the difference in emissions is a function of 








The results suggest that meeting FTSE4Good climate change criteria is negatively 
related to the difference in emissions between 2009 and 2011 (Model 1: β=-008, 
p<0.05 and Model 2: β=-0.15, p<0.05). This is consistent with compliance being 
associated with reduction in emissions or at least increasing them to a lesser extent.  
 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Climate change is viewed as the result of massive market failure and, despite its 
urgency and wide implications, is regarded as a source of managerial discretion and 
agency problems (Sullivan & Mackenzie, 2008). Nevertheless investors are 
increasingly beginning to recognise material benefits of advanced climate change 
strategies and attempt to engage with companies to encourage them to enhance their 
climate change disclosure and adopt practices leading to emission reduction. 
Emerging evidence suggests that the market welcomes such endeavours (Dimson et 
al., 2012), yet institutional investors are facing constraints in their activism coming 
from both the complex nature of the climate change issues, internal constraints as 
monitors and the length and costs of engagement itself.  
 
This study therefore examines one way of institutional engagement where the 
dialogue itself is performed by a responsible index provider but is inspired and 
TABLE 5.5 
Test of Compliance and Changes in Emissions 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
 Change in Total Emissions Change in Direct Emissions 
Intercept 0.10** 0.10* 
 (3.39) (2.45) 
   
Meet10 -0.08* -0.15* 
 (1.99) (2.43) 
   
Observations 399 297 
R2 0.04 0.02 
This table presents the results of a regression analysis of changes in total and direct emissions 
in 2009-2011 measured as a log-transformed percentage change in total (Model 1) and direct 
(Model 2) emissions of CO2 and CO2 equivalents. The independent variable is compliance 





coordinated by the investment institutions and incorporates their expectations. The 
index engagement simultaneously applies reputational lever of potential public 
exclusion from the index. I assess whether such strategy is efficient in motivating 
companies to adopt a set of policies enhancing measurement and disclosure of 
emissions and strategies reducing greenhouse gas emissions. I also examine the way 
competition forces, ownership and external and internal governance systems impact 
on compliance and moderate the engagement efficiency. 
 
For a sample of 470 international firms with a high or medium climate footprint I 
find that the combined effect of the index engagement and threat of deletion has led 
to significantly higher probability that a firm will implement the required policies, 
governance systems and performance disclosure within the two-year period. I then 
separate the two elements by constructing a measure which is assumed to reflect the 
extent to which a given company may be expected to be a member of the index 
because similar firms are. I find that the peer pressure to be included does not alone 
drive compliance but that the dialogue process does. This could, of course, come 
from the misspecification of the proxy for the competitive pressure. However, the 
main outcome is that such engagement strategy by the index effectively stimulates 
compliance. The results additionally suggest that engagement is highly efficient in 
promoting compliance among companies which are not themselves expected to have 
CSR practices consistent with the index membership.  
 
I also find that internal and external contexts do indeed influence compliance. 
Strategic ownership hinders management’s actions to meet the criteria, which is 
consistent with large entrenched shareholders viewing climate change as an 
‘external’ issue and a direct cost. There is some evidence to suggest that coordinated 
market economies provide incentives to adopt the required proactive climate risk 
management while internal governance as yet does not reconcile investment in 
climate change-related projects with shareholder benefits. Most importantly, in all 





Although the FTSE4Good criteria mostly targeted measurement and disclosure of 
emissions and reporting on the strategies to mitigate company’s climate change 
impact, I do observe some tentative evidence of the criteria being associated with the 
actual emission reduction. Given the short span of time and the long-term nature of 
emission reduction programmes which often trigger structural changes in the entire 
industries (Mackenzie & Ascui, 2009), I do not expect to find strong results. The 
positive association between compliance with the FTSE4Good climate change 
criteria and the positive shifts in the actual emission reduction efforts implies that 
FTSE criteria and related engagement do contribute to shifting companies in the right 
direction towards lowering their climate impact.  
 
This study therefore sheds further light on the ways in which active ownership can be 
effective in promoting corporate social responsibility. In particular, we show how 
social CSR with a large societal impact can be advanced via an index and its 
engagement within the nexus of managers’ and owners’ motivations and constraints. 
The argument about competitive advantages offered by the proactive climate change 
strategies still does not present a compelling case for the shareholder value 
maximisation paradigm. However, the results demonstrate how responsible investors 
can have a credible chance of making their voices heard and effectively encourage 
better governance of climate change risks in different external and internal 
governance contexts. Finally, the findings may be of interest to the governments in 
order to better understand the extent to which corporations may be left to market 
forces to reduce their climate change impact and where the stringent government 







Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This thesis examines the effect of a responsible investment index and its engagement 
on the probability that a company will comply with a set of corporate social 
responsibility criteria within a specified period of time. I study the overall effect of 
this strategy, assess the contribution of the two elements – the dialogue and the 
exclusion threat – separately, and investigate the influence of ownership, institutional 
environment and internal governance. The findings also provide evidence as to 
whether the index stimulates persistent improvements. The analysis makes use of a 
quasi-experimental design provided by the introduction by FTSE of new or updated 
criteria necessary for inclusion in the FTSE4Good index and the subsequent 
implementation of these criteria. The setting provides me with a treatment group of 
companies in the index which did not meet the new or upgraded requirements and 
which received engagement from FTSE and were notified about potential public 
exclusion from the index, and a control group of companies which were not in the 
index but were also assessed for compliance and were not subject to engagement or 
exclusion threat. 
 
Following the argument of prior research suggesting that different CSR areas should 
be analysed separately (Barnett & Salomon, 2006; Johnson & Greening, 1999, 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), I conduct the analysis in three different CSR 
categories: environmental management (mixed ‘external’ and ‘instrumental’ CSR), 
countering bribery (‘contact’ CSR) and alleviating climate change (‘external’ CSR). 
As these three CSR areas present varied balance of costs and benefits for the owners, 
I expect governance mechanisms to affect compliance and the response to 
engagement differently.  
 
The results of the first study – concerning environmental management – suggest that 
the combined engagement and exclusion threat almost doubled the probability that a 
company would adopt the enhanced environmental management practices within the 
time period 2002 to 2005. The results also demonstrate that the effect persisted for at 
least five years and was positively related to low levels of closely-held ownership 





The findings of the second study – concerning countering bribery – suggest that 
engagement reinforced by the exclusion threat motivated companies to implement 
anti-bribery provisions within the time period 2007 to 2009, and that the effect 
persisted for at least two years. Further, the results show that the two arrangements 
promoting shareholder interests, liberal market economies and high levels of 
governance, are associated with higher compliance rates. Additionally, ethical 
controversies appear to encourage companies to comply and respond to the 
engagement. Finally, the two levers of the index engagement are shown to promote 
compliance independently. The dialogue is effective in encouraging good practice 
while the expected membership in the index and the resulting threat of costs from 
being excluded appears to prompt best practice in controlling bribery. 
  
Finally, the third study – concerning climate change – demonstrates that, while the 
index and the engagement are efficient in motivating companies to adopt a set of 
practices to reduce emissions, compliance is negatively associated with strong 
internal governance and concentrated shareholdings. There is also some evidence to 
suggest that compliance with the FTSE4Good climate change criteria is associated 
with consequent emission reduction.  
 
Taken together, the studies offer significant insights into the ways institutional 
investors can promote different aspects of corporate social responsibility. The 
theoretical framework that this thesis builds on suggests that both managers and the 
owners will consider costs and benefits, whether personal or strategic, when 
investing resources in CSR activities (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Benabou & Tirole, 
2010; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). Prior literature also argues that CSR is an 
amalgamation of different themes and can be classified as financial or ‘internal’, 
intermediate or ‘contact’, and social or ‘external’ (Godfrey et al., 2009; Judge et al., 
2010; Mackenzie & Rees, 2011). Financial CSR offers benefits that can be 
internalised by the firm and will therefore be favoured by both managers and 
shareholders. Contact CSR affects relations with the business environment such as 




overall governance. The costs fall on the firm while the benefits can be internalised 
to the extent that improved relations with the contacts lead to enhanced business 
opportunities. Finally, social CSR constitutes a market failure as the benefits from 
these activities affect society at large while the costs are borne by the owners. The 
investors therefore have little financial incentive to pursue such endeavours. 
Consequently, while activist investors increasingly engage on all of these issues, the 
efficiency of such engagement in promoting specific CSR areas is likely to vary and 
to be moderated differently by the governance context. 
 
Table 6.1 presents the main findings from the three studies: Panel A reports the 
influences on compliance and Panel B demonstrates the influences on engagement. 
As can be seen in Panel A, the combined effect of the index engagement and the 
exclusion threat is efficient in promoting compliance within a given time period in 
all three cases. The prior probability of compliance is introduced in two studies to 
control for sample selection bias and to assess whether the engagement effect is 
driven by the success with companies which were close to meeting the criteria 
anyway. In the case of climate change all affected companies had to meet the criteria 
so the prior probability could not be constructed. Taken together, the results suggest 
that the likelihood of having all necessary practices in place before the FTSE 
engagement did not determine whether a company would comply by the given time 
and did not substantially facilitate the dialogue.  
 
Next, I separate the effect of engagement from the exclusion threat by modelling the 
prior probability of being a member of the index, which aims to capture the peer 
pressure to be included and hence the potential concerns and costs of being excluded. 
The results show that for the environmental management and countering bribery 
criteria the expected index membership stimulates compliance independently of the 
engagement itself, although in the case of environmental management tentative 
evidence suggests that engagement works particularly well where the perceived costs 






TABLE 6.1. Drivers of Compliance and Engagement Across the CSR Themes 








    
Engagement Positive Positive Positive 
    
Prior Probability of 
Compliance Positive Insignificant N/A 
    
Expected Index 
Membership Positive Positive Insignificant 
    
Concentrated Ownership Negative Insignificant Negative 
    
Domicile in CME Positive Weakly negative Weakly positive 
    
Corporate Governance Weakly positive Positive Negative 
    





Bribery Climate Change 
    
Prior Probability of 
Compliance No influence Weakly positive N/A 
    
Expected Index 
Membership Weakly positive No influence Negative 
    
Concentrated Ownership Insignificant No influence No influence 
    
Domicile in CME No influence No influence No influence 
    
Corporate Governance Weakly positive No influence No influence 
    
    
This table presents the summary of the findings regarding the effect of a) FTSE 
engagement reinforced by the threat of exclusion from the index, b) the prior 
probability of compliance with the criteria and c) the incentives including the 
expected index membership, concentrated ownership, domicile in a coordinated 
market economy and internal governance. Some judgement had to be made the case 
of weak or inconclusive results based on the dominant evidence and that was based 
on the overall conclusion from the regression and propensity score matching 
approaches. 
 
In contrast, in the case of climate change companies expected to be in the index do 




may therefore be viewed as substitutes. Concentrated ownership is negatively related 
to both environment-related areas, which is in line with the view that the owners do 
not expect the benefits from such projects to outweigh the costs. However, the 
negative influence of the blockholders does not jeopardise the efficiency of the 
engagement. Further, the institutional context in all cases has some influence over a 
company’s pursuit of CSR activities. However, this influence is different with 
coordinated market economies which stimulate community-oriented CSR such as 
environment-related projects while liberal market economies promote more 
transparency and ethical practices. This evidence is consistent with prior research 
suggesting that coordinated market economies, on the one hand, are more 
stakeholder-oriented but, on the other hand, are more prone to hiding unethical 
behaviour. Conversely, liberal market economies are more narrowly shareholder-
focussed and expose corruption more efficiently (Chen et al., 2008; Treisman, 2000).  
 
Finally, internal governance is positively associated with having stronger anti-bribery 
measures in place, which is in line with the view that controlling bribery can be 
regarded as a proxy for governance (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2012). The findings 
are consistent with better governed firms guarding shareholder interests and ensuring 
higher transparency and hence lower risk. In contrast, the climate change study 
demonstrates a strong negative influence of governance on advancing these projects. 
This is consistent with climate change being not yet reconciled with the objective of 
shareholder value maximisation.  
 
These findings offer insights for both theory and practice. With regards to the theory, 
they suggest that managerial decisions regarding various CSR activities are 
influenced by the potential costs and benefits of this activity, the competitive 
environment, the institutional context and the internal governance system. Where the 
benefits are likely to be personal or strategic and concern stakeholders and the 
community, influential owners will tend to resist such investments; where the 
governance system is strong external CSR will be opposed. Where the benefits of an 
enhanced reputation among business contacts and reduced information asymmetry 




institutional arrangements will encourage these practices. In all settings, however, 
promoting CSR via active engagement is shown to be effective. With regards to the 
practice of responsible investment, the findings suggest that the combination of the 
dialogue and the pressure of potential exclusion from the index offers an effective 
strategy for engaging on different CSR matters, and the engagement appears to be 
equally efficient in different institutional and governance contexts. Each of the three 
studies offers some evidence that the FTSE effect was not transitory. Firstly, the 
results indicate that the differences in compliance between engaged and control firms 
persist for at least five years. Secondly, the two drivers of the activism – engagement 
and the exclusion threat – may work independently or interact, and may promote not 
only good practice in the particular CSR area but also best practice generally. Finally, 
the climate change study offers some evidence consistent with compliance being 
associated with subsequent emission reduction. Overall, the findings demonstrate 
how, given the costs involved in engagement, monitoring can be enhanced by taking 
into consideration the nature of the CSR in question and the other governance forces 
influencing compliance.  
 
Taken together, the three studies in this thesis contribute to the understanding of 
what drives corporate social responsibility in firms. Prior research has related 
environmental, social and ethical performance to institutional forces such as 
stakeholder monitoring, public regulation, institutionalised norms of corporate 
responsibility (Campbell, 2007) as well as investors’ motives and constraints 
regarding social investments (Cox et al., 2004). While the importance of a dialogue 
as a form of engagement between stakeholders and companies has been highlighted, 
most studies focus on shareholder proposals (Reid & Toffel, 2009; Sjöström, 2008) 
rather than the dialogue. Consequently, there is only scarce and mostly case-study 
based evidence of how investors can be directly involved in governance to promote 
CSR issues (Dimson et al., 2012, Gjessing & Syse, 2007). Further, the research on 
shareholder activism regarding CSR has predominantly focused on US and UK and 
has mostly used aggregated CSR metrics (Barnea & Rubin, 2010). Consequently, it 
remained unexplored whether engagement would be effective when applied to 




to different CSR issues. This thesis thus contributes to the literature by investigating 
a particular engagement mechanism whereby the dialogue is conducted by the 
responsible investment index and is reinforced by the threat of exclusion from the 
index. While such engagement has only been explored qualitatively as a process of 
developing an international CSR standard (Slager et al., 2012), this thesis offers 
empirical evidence of the effect of this engagement strategy in different governance 
contexts. 
 
It is certainly the case that the findings do not prove that engagement necessarily 
improves corporate social responsibility, only that the management has taken steps to 
introduce policy, management and reporting practices that meet FTSE4Good 
requirements. Compliance with the FTSE4Good criteria therefore acts as a proxy for 
the actual improvement. Further, given a relatively short time period of about two 
years in each natural experiment, meeting FTSE4Good CSR criteria would in some 
instances imply commitment to the underlying practices and enhanced public 
disclosure, rather than actual improvements of the environmental and ethical 
performance. However, FTSE criteria bring together views and strategic measures 
proposed by various stakeholders including responsible investors, industry experts, 
NGOs and academics
19
 and it is unlikely that those views would have no credibility. 
Further, prior evidence suggests that FTSE4Good compliance indicators correlate 
positively and significantly with metrics offered by other reputable CSR data 
providers such as ASSET4 and KLD (now MSCI) (Rees & Mackenzie, 2011; 
Semenova, 2010). This is consistent with several independent expert systems 
evaluating the same underlying environmental and social issues.  
 
Above all, this thesis demonstrates that a particular governance mechanism of 
engagement conducted by a responsible investment index on behalf of investors and 
reinforced by the reputational threat of public exclusion from the index is effective in 
eliciting management’s response to the CSR improvements, and this effect holds for 
companies from different countries and industries and different governance systems. 
                                                 
19
 In different years of FTSE4Good’s existence Policy Committee included representatives from 
institutional investors such as CCLA, Jupiter, Legal & General, SWIP and Mercer, NGOs such as 




Whether or not the three FTSE4Good themes examined in the thesis are sufficiently 
‘demanding’ would be an interesting venue for further research. However, the 
findings presented in this thesis strongly suggest that, rather than dismissing a CSR 
index such as FTSE4Good, investor community could be more actively involved in 
the criteria development process to further enhance corporate social responsibility in 
firms. The engagement conducted through the index is shown to successfully 
promote interests of responsible investors amidst the agency problems between the 
management and the owners. In so doing, such engagement links the monitoring 
concept suggested by the agency theory with institutional pressures of public 
embarrassment resulting from not complying with an international CSR standard.  
 
Future research could extend this analysis by examining the effect of specific types 
of blockholders which are argued to have varying motives for investment in different 
CSR activities. For example, preliminary findings suggest that, while corporations 
may resist stricter controls of bribery in the company, families tend to oppose 
external projects such as investments in climate change prevention. Another area for 
future research could concern particular attributes of corporate governance, such as 
board characteristics, particularly since activist investors tend to target the board for 
negotiations regarding improvements in CSR. How different governance devices 
mediate the engagement process and the outcome is therefore a fruitful theme for 
future research. Finally, investigating reputational measures such as ethical 
controversies could be of interest. Are companies which have been involved in a 
controversy reported by the media more likely to advance their CSR provisions and 
will these efforts be symbolic or substantive?  As the findings in the this 
demonstrated that the index could effectively instigate changes in different CSR 
areas by simultaneously providing guidance and challenging organisational frames 
with reputational concerns, the proposed questions for future research could provide 
further insights as to how such engagement could be enhanced and applied to  
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